TeachingTwo Principles of Academic Ethics

Two Principles of Academic Ethics

Some time ago, while I was advising a doctoral student regarding her search for an academic position, she showed me her graduate school transcript. I noted that she had been awarded an A in every course but one; in that single instance, she had received a B. When I asked about that anomaly, she replied, “I knew what view the professor wanted me to defend in my paper. But I disagreed with his position and wouldn’t adopt it even though I realized that as a result he would lower my grade.”

Assuming this student’s account was accurate, and I have every reason to believe it was, the professor in question violated two fundamental principles of academic ethics. The first is that the aim of teaching is education, not indoctrination. For a teacher to defend personal beliefs is appropriate, but regarding any disputed issue, students should be provided with the strongest reasons behind opposing positions, then encouraged to develop their own views. Forcing anyone to accept the teacher’s opinion regarding a debatable matter is professorial malpractice.

For instance, the teacher may be a materialist but students should be made aware of the arguments for dualism; the teacher may be a liberal, but students should be made aware of the arguments for a conservative position; the teacher may support abortion rights, but students should be made aware of the arguments for a right to life. Teachers who don’t know how to explain the reasoning used by their opponents are not fully prepared to guide others. As John Stuart Mill wrote in On Liberty, “He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.”

The second fundamental principle of academic ethics violated by the professor is to award grades fairly. A grade represents an expert’s judgment of the quality of a student’s work in a specific course and is not supposed to be affected by considerations of gender, race, nationality, physical appearance, dress, personality, attitudes, innate capacities, or previous academic record. Nor is a grade supposed to reflect whether the student agrees with the professor on any controversial issue or even on the grade itself.   

If an A in political philosophy is awarded because the student tries hard, comes from an impoverished community, displays an ingratiating personality, passionately defends the professor’s opinions, or is proud of the work done, then the A is hopelessly ambiguous and serves no useful purpose. If, on the other hand, the grade suggests that the student has a firm grasp of a range of issues in political philosophy, then the meaning is clear.

These two principles were exemplified for me on an occasion when I taught a graduate seminar in philosophy of religion. The class included a gentleman from India who frequently contributed insights about Hinduism. I assumed he was a Hindu and welcomed his insightful comments regarding that religious tradition. When the course ended, he told me that he had greatly enjoyed the class. When I thanked him for enriching our discussion by providing the perspective of a Hindu, he disclosed that he was not a Hindu; rather, he was a Catholic priest from a Christian community in the south of India. He explained that he had not revealed his religious identity because he didn’t want to inhibit members of the class from expressing skepticism about Christianity.

I was surprised by this news, but he told me that while he knew that I was not a Christian, he believed I had done justice to those who were and had demonstrated that my assessment of anyone’s work did not depend on whatever religious beliefs the author might defend or oppose. I was gratified by this assurance.

In sum, professors in every course should present the material in a balanced way and not penalize any students because they do not share the teacher’s viewpoint. Admittedly, whether a presentation or practice is appropriate may be contested. Nevertheless, an instructor is well-advised to imagine that intellectual opponents are in the classroom. Would they recognize the instructor’s version of their position? Would they agree that at least some of their arguments had been adequately explained? Would they recognize that the evaluations of student work were justifiable? If not, the instructor should consider making greater effort to achieve fairness.

Steven M. Cahn

Steven M Cahn is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center. Among the recent books he has authored are Teaching Philosophy: A Guide (Routledge, 2018); Inside Academia: Professors, Politics, and Policies (Rutgers, 2019); Navigating Academic Life: How the System Works (Routledge, 2021); Professors as Teachers (Wipf and Stock, 2022), and, most recently, From Student to Scholar: A Candid Guide to Becoming a Professor, Second Edition (Wipf and Stock, 2024).     

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