Moral Particularism
In metaethics, moral particularism is the view that moral reasoning is too context-sensitive to be guided by overarching principles. Traditional work in ethics searches for a set of principles to guide moral reasoning and action—e.g., utilitarianism or Kantian deontology. By contrast, moral particularism claims that these theories and principles are not applicable in practical situations, in part because of the wide variety of exceptions to any general moral principle that inevitably arises when confronting real-world moral questions. Most particularists concede that there may be a small set of applicable moral principles; however, they are not a substitute for rational moral thought and cannot be used on their own to make moral judgments. Particularist Jonathan Dancy states that “at best, [moral principles] are crutches that a morally sensitive person would not require, and indeed the use of such crutches might even lead us into moral error.”
Particularists and their opponents, moral generalists, both agree that a perfect moral agent reasons using facts relevant to the case at hand. They disagree about what it means to reason in a given context. Generalists claim that moral agents must reason using general principles applied consistently across a range of situations. Particularists emphasize the context-sensitivity of moral reasoning, claiming that moral agents must evaluate situational factors that have “variable relevance” across contexts. Accordingly, the same consideration can serve as a reason for some action in one context but fail to serve as a reason in an indefinite variety of other contexts.
I argue that from a feminist perspective, moral particularism risks failing to adequately address some of the most pressing moral issues facing contemporary society. My argument is feminist because I focus on gender justice as an example that exposes a weakness of moral particularism. Advocates for gender equality and other forms of justice often invoke general moral principles, such as “we should reject the gender binary.” The use of such general principles is central to advancing social justice and progressive feminist ideals. Adherence to moral particularism might hinder progress in the fight for gender equality by rejecting the existence of general principles concerning basic human rights and responsibilities. Further, moral particularism relies on the experienced moral judge to make ethical decisions on a case-by-case basis, which hinders the feminist goal of combatting oppression of all types. This is because, in a society that is subject to harmful prejudices, individuals cannot be trusted to make reliable or competent moral decisions. Rather, the appeal to general moral principles provides a clearer path to feminist goals.
Transphobia and the Trans Panic Defense
Transphobic hate crimes are on the rise, and many violent perpetrators have been acquitted through what legal scholars Wodda and Panfil call the trans panic defense. Defendants who are prosecuted for violence or lethal actions against a trans person use the defense as an attempt to justify their actions by claiming that they were “tricked” or deceived by a trans person in a romantic or sexual way, causing the defendant to react with physical aggression.
The trans panic defense is still legal in many states and continues to succeed in acquitting or lessening charges of violent offenses against trans people. In 2013, James Dixon beat Islan Nettles to death on the streets of Harlem after flirting with her earlier in the night, claiming that he was motivated to violence after being ridiculed by his friends who learned that Nettles was transgender. Dixon stated that he “just didn’t want to be fooled” in a recorded confession to the police. This claim of deception implies that Nettles somehow intended to “trick” Dixon with her gender identity. Dixon was initially charged with misdemeanor assault and released on a $2,000 bail. He was later sentenced to 12 years in prison for a guilty plea to manslaughter in 2016. Both the family of Nettles and the prosecution believed this sentence was far too lenient given the violent nature of the crime. This public display of leniency for graphic violence against a trans woman shows how deeply entrenched gender bias and transmisogyny are in our society.
The trans panic defense stems from gender-biased prejudice and ignorance. Dixon did not seem to be guided by any kind of moral principle; rather, he presumably acted from a place of prejudice and violence. Particularism robs us of a crucial tool for combatting such bias: generalizable moral principles.
Feminist Critiques of Moral Particularism
My feminist critique of moral particularism is two-fold. First, if applied uniformly to the treatment of all people, including trans people, general moral principles could properly guide uninformed agents to make morally sound choices that avert gender-based violence. These general moral principles could include the Rossian duty of non-maleficence, which states that we should “not injure others.” This duty states that we should prevent actions that directly harm others and avoid seeking pleasure that incidentally harms others. Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the central human capabilities, specifically the capacity for bodily integrity, involves “being able to move freely, to be secure against violence, and to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and reproductive choice.” The work of W.D. Ross and Nussbaum give us a framework of rights and responsibilities that can guide moral action. It’s plausible that in the absence of guiding moral principles to inform their actions, people can more easily justify brutal violence stemming from ignorance or bias.
My second critique is that the moral judge put forth by moral particularism can easily be swayed to make prejudiced decisions in a society that is subject to harmful biases. This means that moral judges might be less capable of making ethical decisions on a case-by-case basis given their own biases. The moral question at stake in cases like Nettles’s and other trans panic defense cases is whether it is morally permissible to physically harm another person if your sexual or romantic encounter with them does not meet initial assumptions of gender identity. The answer is obvious to anyone who accepts general moral principles about respect for gender identity and how we should treat one another regardless of gender identity. To those who are steeped in a transmisogynistic culture, however, the answers are not so obvious. The moral particularist unrealistically expects an indoctrinated public to make good moral decisions about trans people. Moral particularism leaves too much moral responsibility in the hands of a public that is indoctrinated against trans women and uninformed without the guidance of any coherent moral principles. The ability to properly judge moral nuance in a society prone to bias is compromised in contexts involving marginalized and oppressed populations that are often subject to said bias. Perhaps appealing to general principles of gender justice could help transphobic people shed their misconceptions and contribute towards minimizing the trans panic defense.
My second critique—addressing the capability of moral judges to make ethical decisions—is bolstered by the widespread legal acceptance of the trans panic defense, pointing to a potential pitfall for moral particularism. In a society that strongly indoctrinates heteronormative and transphobic ideals, “general moral knowledge” may not be sufficient to protect trans and gender-nonconforming persons from ignorance or hatred. Many experienced moral judges argue in favor of morally troubling acts as a result of their ignorance. The ability to determine relevant features of a moral situation and the importance of those features does not make a moral judge exempt from human ignorance and bias. While no ethical theory is perfect, moral particularism seems to largely fail by assuming too much accuracy and infallibility on the part of the “experienced moral judge.” Moral debate amongst the uninformed risks creating an echo chamber of misinformation and misguided moral judgments.
Addressing the Pitfalls of Generalism for the Feminist
A weakness of my argument is that people are frequently informed about transphobia and other forms of gender injustice. Yet many remain ignorant and even push back against efforts to spread knowledge and awareness. There are a variety of situations in which individuals protest, educate, converse, and illustrate the moral principles that should guide our actions in cases of gender-based discrimination or violence. One such example is Transgender Day of Visibility rallies that advocate for the protection of trans children and protest against anti-trans violence. The demands made by these rallies can be supported by principles like Nussbaum’s capacity for bodily integrity or Ross’ duty of non-maleficence, which can provide a framework of rights and responsibilities for combatting transphobia and anti-trans violence. However, these efforts show slow or little progress in swaying public opinion about gender theory. In some cases, there is even harder pushback against gender theory as a result of attempts to educate. Led by Governor Ron DeSantis, Florida has passed a bill that eliminates the mention of sexual orientation and gender identity in public schools. Other states have passed similar laws that remove the mention of LGBTQ+ people and issues from the curriculum.
Particularists are correct in arguing that generalism does not yield better moral results or less contentious moral discourse. However, while generalism in this sense is not practically or normatively more effective than particularism, it might offer more avenues to bolster future revisions of moral thought. For example, the application of the Rossian duty of non-maleficence to cases like Nettles’s would provide a clear ethical justification for curbing the use of the trans panic defense. The Nussbaumian capacity for bodily integrity would similarly prohibit transphobic violence. Generalism may also give comfort to oppressed people of all gender identities by proclaiming that general moral principles should protect them, rather than leaving the protection of rights to the whims of public judgment.
Even if not much attention is given to general moral principles, at least they are a part of the conversation. Having principles and ignoring or misinterpreting them is better than working with no principles at all. Working from general, unprincipled moral knowledge and relying on experienced moral judges is discomforting to those who do not benefit from the society that indoctrinates this “general moral knowledge.” A society deeply entrenched in prejudice does not provide an environment where a moral judge can operate without bias. Those who suffer from prejudice often rely on the ethical decision-making capabilities of a society that is biased against them. While advocacy for general moral principles may not yield better results, it can provide a concrete avenue for the oppressed to advocate for themselves.
The Women in Philosophy series publishes posts on those excluded in the history of philosophy on the basis of gender injustice, issues of gender injustice in the field of philosophy, and issues of gender injustice in the wider world that philosophy can be useful in addressing. If you are interested in writing for the series, please contact the Series Editor Alida Liberman or the Associate Editor Elisabeth Paquette.
Kimberly Beasley
Kimberly Beasley completed her undergraduate education at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Virginia, majoring in Philosophy and American Studies. She is currently completing her Master's in Philosophy at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, and will graduate in May of 2024. Her areas of interest include ethics, feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, bioethics, and care ethics.
You are overlooking the fact that there is a moral consideration at play in the panic defense. A transwoman is a man who tries very hard to be seen as a woman. A heterosexual man who flirts with a transwoman because he thinks he is flirting with a woman is being deceived. Deceiving people is wrong, especially if it leads up to sex, because sex based on deception is rape.
You can call this transphobic, and I would disagree. I could repeat your argument using an example of rape by deception and call you the biased one for using “transwomen are women” as a defense.
I guess that what I’m saying here is: this is not a good example, because the acceptance of this example as an instance of a lack of ‘general moral knowledge’ depends on one’s willingness to adopt an ideology that is unacceptable to most (for good reasons, which I will not get into here).
Dirk. I am not here to argue as a philosopher or anything, so let’s get that out of the way. But do you not think in the moments preceding an intimate encounter between say a heterosexual man and a pre-grs transgender woman that there would not be an opportunity for the heterosexual man to make a determination of the woman’s status as transgender? And even in such other cases, it falls apart with the task of trying to define womanhood. Reproductive capacity takes post-menopausal and infertile woman off the table. There are at least 6 common variations. Not to mention genotype does not always equate to phenotype. I also do not need to get into hormonal variations. Any attempt at a definition will inevitably leave out someone most people, likely including yourself, would designate as a “woman.” Your argument in general seems to lack a real-world application or at least be quite fringe as such violence on the part of the aggressor seems much more likely to take place before an encounter rather than during or after. Frankly, your counter-example seems quite weak.
On another note, wonderful essay Kim and I cannot wait to see where your career goes from here!