A widely accepted principle of academic ethics is that candidates for appointments should not be asked questions that do not bear on performance as a faculty member. For example, no interviewer should inquire of a candidate, “How much do you weigh?” or “Do you think you are the right age to assume this position?” or “With whom are you living?”
A reason these questions are inappropriate is that while competence is a criterion for a faculty appointment, weight, age, and personal relationships are demonstrably not appropriate criteria. Thus they should never be mentioned.
Indeed, if a candidate raises such considerations, the discussion should not be allowed to continue along that path. Hence, for example, if applicants mention their sexual orientation, the response should be that the matter is not relevant to the appointment and will not be discussed further.
In addition, even if a candidate’s vita includes such information as date of birth or number of children, these facts should remain irrelevant. Such data should not be requested, and, if provided, should not be considered.
This much should be uncontroversial. Consider, however, a situation I faced some years ago, when one of our doctoral students asked my advice about whether to include on his vita the information that he had served as a columnist for National Review, a popular journal of conservative opinion.
Although I believe most professors would agree that a candidate’s politics should not be considered in making an appointment, I was uncertain whether in practice faculty were likely to act in accord with this principle. Of course, had the doctoral student worked for a popular journal of liberal opinion, he would not have been concerned about saying so. He anticipated, however, that most philosophers would be uncomfortable appointing someone with his political outlook.
At the time, my advice to the student was that the information didn’t belong on the vita. He omitted it and obtained a fine position. Perhaps the result would have been the same had he acted otherwise. I hope so, but I have my doubts.
Now for a few questions:
- Should activity that is more political than philosophical be noted on an application for a faculty position?
- Would indicating involvement in conservative politics endanger a candidate’s chances for appointment?
- Should an individual’s political beliefs be as irrelevant to the appointment process as matters of weight, age, and personal relationships?
- How would you have advised the student?
Steven M. Cahn
Steven M. Cahn is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. The most recent books he has authored are Religion Within Reason (Columbia University Press, 2017); Teaching Philosophy: A Guide (Routledge, 2018); Inside Academia: Professors, Politics, and Policies (Rutgers University Press, 2019); The Road Traveled and Other Essays (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2019); Philosophical Adventures (Broadview Press, 2019); A Philosopher’s Journey: Essays from Six Decades (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2020), and Navigating Academic Life (Routledge, 2021).
Although I am a Bernie Sanders style liberal….
If indicating involvement in conservative politics would endanger a candidate’s chances for appointment in a philosophy department, it might be time to start talking about closing down that department. The appropriate course of action would instead be to read the candidates political writing and see how well they make their case.
I would advise the student not to seek employment in any ivory tower but instead to use the opportunity of their youth to build their own business with their own customers. A life time of freedom awaits you if you have the courage to reach for it.
There are perfectly ethical political conservatives. Liberal ethics and politics deserve every bit of scrutiny that conservatives get.
Traditionally viewed, some philosophical positions are more conservative or liberal than other philosophical positions ie Marx (liberal) v. Smith Adam. A philosopher’s positional/political bias may also be deeply rooted in one’s views as well.
On the whole I think political views should not be considered for employment purposes. However, I think association with or participation in clearly immoral acts (or extremist views) such as torture, or advocating for racism should be disqualifying for professional philosophers.
I would’ve advised the student to not include the work for the National Review just to avoid any possible objection in the hiring process. I would also caution the student that if he has to compromise himself from the inception of his employment perhaps he is applying for a job at a place where he will not be a good “fit.”
Steven,
I’ll bite. In order:
No.
Yes.
Yes (may change)
Leave it off!
As a member of the tax paying public who is in some cases the source of funding for philosophy departments (that is, perhaps as your boss many times removed) I find it troubling that such questions even have to be raised.
In my perhaps entirely naive vision of philosophy faculty I imagine them to be above all else experts in the art of reason. Or at least that’s what I imagine they should be. What would be the rational argument for a department dominated by XYZ perspective hiring more staff of that same perspective? Wouldn’t that be a form of philosophical heresy?
The dominant form of social organization across the Internet is people of like mind coming together to reinforce each other’s views. That is, a mutual validation society, a phenomena both emotionally comforting and intellectually devastating.
Is the author trying to inform us that this anti-philosophy tsunami has flooded even the offices of our most highly trained philosophy experts?
I am the person Steve is speaking of. I was a graduate student at the CUNY Graduate Center for much of the 1990’s.
Unfortunately, the advice he gave me is even more important today, as the discipline has gotten far worse in terms of ideological rigidity and purity purges than it was back then. Witness the Tuvel affair or the ferocity with which people went after Kathleen Stock in response to her recent series of essays on gender identity and feminism.
Dear Prof. Cahn,
I’ll bite, too:
Yes, if the applicant views it as indicating either (1) an extension of their philosophical work, (2) their community involvement and the candidate views community involvement as part of the ethos of being a faculty member, or (3) something personally quite important to the candidate and the candidate thinks that it would be good to fill in who they are as a person.
In the case you mentioned, I think writing for a political review should be mentioned because it indicates (4) one’s mode of being a public intellectual. The tradition of the Enlightenment appears here.
It might, but that would only speak badly of the department in question and so it might be good for the applicant to do it as a way of flushing out a place that would be bad to work in anyway.
On the other side, it’s a good thing for an applicant to anticipate where people are — this is a feature of good teaching and of good argument in writing. I’d hope that a candidate with views that might elicit reactivity would anticipate the reactions and do some work to bring things back ahead of time to consideration. After all, folks whom I’ve met in academia who get reactive around conservative viewpoints are afraid that the viewpoint will undermine the space of consideration. And that is not an unreasonable fear given the way that some “conservative” attacks have been aiming for the throat of campuses, professors, and people who are already marginalized or dealing with oppression. I’d expect a good candidate to have some sense of all this and to show that they hold the space of consideration when it comes to disagreement.
Not always. It depends on how they see and use them. Someone who would identify their beliefs on their CV for some of the four reasons listed in response to (1) would hold their beliefs to be relevant to what they will do and how they will be on the job. However, how one takes them up should depend on the job description and not simply be relegated to the illicit reasoning that the person “will be a good colleague” (or won’t be). Collegiality should not count in a job unless it interferes with doing one’s job’s primary work.
A person whose beliefs included undermining the space of consideration should also have those beliefs evaluated as relevant.
As written here. And I’d ask the student not to do anything that would lead them to feel that they had to deceive in order to be hired. That erodes their character and is immoral.
Thank you for your interactive post.
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
The numbers dropped off of my reply:
“1.” before “Yes, if the applicant …”
“2.” before “It might, but that would only …”
“3.” before “Not always.”
“4.” before “As written here.”
The numbers correspond to the questions Prof. Cahn raised at the end of his post.
Nathan Oseroff:
Sorry, but I can’t agree with you on any of your main points. As for the “vast literature,” you simply presume that people aren’t familiar with it, rather than being familiar with it but having a different opinion of its quality than you. Just as you have a different view of the quality of the opposing arguments than some others do.
And no, I don’t think the treatment she received was deserved. Or that received by Rebecca Tuvel, for that matter.
As for your perception as to the direction in which the ideological rigidity points in our discipline — or the relative risks of someone with your opinion voicing their views and someone with Stock’s — I don’t find it credible, I’m afraid, in light of my experience now or that of over 25 years in this profession. If I had to hide in the 1990s for fear of my politics at the time hurting my career, someone in a similar position today has to do so tenfold.
So we’ll just have to disagree, profoundly, and see where things go. You’ll fight to push things in the direction you’d like to see our discipline take, and I’ll do the same.
Jeremy wrote:
As written here. And I’d ask the student not to do anything that would lead them to feel that they had to deceive in order to be hired. That erodes their character and is immoral.
= = =
If a writing gig at National Review had been on my resume, I very likely would not have gotten a job in this profession. Professor Cahn was absolutely right in advising me the way he did. And in my view, your perception of the direction in which the immorality points is backwards.
I liked Jeremy’s comment, where he said…
“It might, but that would only speak badly of the department in question and so it might be good for the applicant to do it as a way of flushing out a place that would be bad to work in anyway.”
This seems a good point. I’m not in a position to know what the reality of these concerns are, but…
If it were true that a philosophy department would discriminate against applicants based upon their political affiliations, why would one want to work in that department?? Why would one willingly and knowingly join such an organization?
If it were true that a philosophy department would discriminate against applicants based upon their political affiliations, why would one want to work in that department?? Why would one willingly and knowingly join such an organization?
= = =
Because I devoted an enormous amount of time and money and effort to obtaining a Ph.D. in philosophy and was 30 when I started my career. Not exactly the time or opportunity to start all over again.
The job market in philosophy is very, very competitive and was so even back then. One didn’t have the luxury of turning down job offers. You were lucky if you got one.
In real life, one often has to take jobs that one would rather not. At least with respect to this, I was able to work in the field that I was trained in and love. Many people do not even have that opportunity.
Daniel,
Now that you’re inside the department and have a closer view, is it your impression that job candidates are being evaluated politically? A question, not a point, as I have no idea myself.
Nathan wrote, “…I don’t believe we should treat trans people on par with how gay people were treated decades previously.”
I agree, but wonder whether making moral statements is really the best use of philosophers. A more appropriate focus for philosophers might be something like, “Why were gay people treated disrespectfully for centuries?”
The mistreatment arose from some collection of assumptions. If those assumptions are not uncovered and removed, then brute force blame and shame moralism will likely only temporarily suppress the oppression.
I’m not arguing that blame and shame moralism has no place, only that it would seem to be the job of philosophers to examine the phenomena on a deeper level.
Good morning!
Of course, there are conditions that nuance what is right to do. I don’t know the specifics of the case, but as a general rule, it’s not right or good to deceive.
A professional post isn’t an end all. There are many things to do in life and many ways to do philosophy. Philosophy erupted in the streets, along the porches, and in the mall. To my mind, the moral and ethical cost of hiding or deceiving is too high for a life. It seems more right to me to say “fuck off” to a situation that won’t respect you and to try something else — public high school teaching, the creation of community philosophy groups, or a better learning environment that doesn’t silence people. Of course, to be able to do this is a right, but in actuality it is a privilege that marginalized and oppressed peoples commonly do not enjoy. The exercise of judgment and conscience is thus called for and is highly specific to the case.
But all that said, please don’t take my comments personally, Prof. Kaufman. I was not speaking to your particular case. I don’t have the specific knowledge of context or the relationship. I was responding to Prof. Cahn’s questions which were hypothetical and general to an extent. I would agree that in some circumstances one has to omit information, but the cost is still real of doing that, a moral and ethical cost. You seem to be acknowledging this. Life is made of moral strains, and they can really wear on one.
I have my own experience of this. In graduate school and during professionalization, I felt that I was not allowed to display certain attitudes, beliefs, and ways of thinking that were perfectly reasonable and human. In fact, I was policed to not display them, threatened, and even characterized as “feminine” (in other words, misogyny was used to reinforce patriarchal roles). I was not supposed to show much emotion unless it was judgmental and contained anger, was not supposed to write creatively – despite a rich scholarly tradition behind doing so – and was not supposed to speak collaboratively in a way that turns a lecture Q & A into a shared experience that seeks the views of everyone in the room. Rather, we were supposed to sit silently as stupid people until we had something smart to say — which meant something inside a very narrowly defined academic game in which the point was to show one’s brilliance, not one’s searching or ignorance. Toady, intellectual snobs presided over this using hierarchical gestures, digs, and when needed institutional reminders. Over time, I felt that I had to suppress my own mind. It was total shit.
The case I’m mentioning is different, it seems, than your own. But I mention it only to attest to having some experience inside my comments about what is ethical and moral. The power was against me, but it was still immoral of me to have ended up silent. I don’t think I am a bad person for that. I think I was being pretty human. But I carried a moral strain and an ethical injury, partially self-inflicted.
With best wishes,
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
Jeremy wrote:
I would agree that in some circumstances one has to omit information, but the cost is still real of doing that, a moral and ethical cost. You seem to be acknowledging this. Life is made of moral strains, and they can really wear on one.
= =
No, I’m not really acknowledging this. In the grand scheme of things, its a pretty tiny moral and ethical cost. Indeed, I barely thought of it as one and still don’t. I can hardly call it a “strain” of any sort. I avoided certain topics in certain conversations with people who were not my intimates, but rather, professional acquaintances, and left a few things off of my resume. Indeed, I generally decline to evoke morality in such situations, given how ubiquitous they are in everybody’s lives. Not everything all the time can or should be engaged with via the moral framework. (I actually wrote something on this for the Electric Agora, not too long ago, entitled “Morality Everywhere.” (The APA Blog won’t let me post a link.)
You also have to understand that I was raised by Holocaust survivors and come from a family, most of which was exterminated during the Second World War. I was raised with an ethos of “if there isn’t war or famine, everything’s pretty damned good,” so I was hardly going to be wracked over the fact that I had to play along with things a little bit to accomplish my personal and professional goals in life. And the professional sphere is the least of it. Marriage, parenthood, social and civic life … all require a gazillion compromises just to navigate at all, let alone do so successfully.
No biggie, as far as I’m concerned. I only weighed into say that I thought Steve’s advice to me at the time was correct and that it would be even more correct today, given the current climate in the discipline, which is much more partisan and one-sided than it was back in the 1990’s.
Dear Professors Kaufman,
OK. I misunderstood tone and context — a typical internet thing. Thanks for setting how you felt straight.
To be clear on my end, I reserve the term “moral” for second-personal obligatory matters. I think of honesty as one of them. I reserve the term “ethical” for prudential matters. I think of self-care as one of them.
For the reasons I mentioned in my reply to Prof. Cahn, I think that there are moral and ethical reasons to disclose what one has done as a public intellectual when interviewing for an academic job, moral in that speaking on public intellectual matters is something for which an academic should be responsible as a member of the university and a department seeing how one might be part of the university has a right to know how one does that; ethical in that it is good to know how a department will support or not support one’s work as a public intellectual. I was not as explicit there as I am here about these views, thanks to this discussion.
Then, in my subsequent response, I added that there are moral and ethical reasons for trying to be open about what one believes and where one stands. Admittedly, these are of little consequence when the belief in question is a trivial one, but the moral side of openness is not parsed consequentially in my view, or not solely. Thus, I still have a problem with omissions that one could reasonably expect would be significant for another even if one things that they are trivial. It’s leaving out the relationship, and I think that we have a duty to keep our interpersonal relationships open. With deeply held beliefs central to one’s sense of self, on the other hand, the issue becomes ethically important as well.
If it is okay with you, I am going to leave this discussion at this point on my end. It’s heading into the minutiae, and the limits of online forums appear to me at that point. Thank you again for clarifying where you stand, and thank you for disagreement with my comments.
Sincerely,
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
1) Are candidates for jobs in philosophy departments being judged on their political affiliations? Can we get a yes or no to this?
2) If yes, do those hiring on this basis agree that they are using politics as a hiring criteria?
3) If yes, what are their arguments for why this is appropriate?
Or…
Do some feel candidates are being judged politically, while others deny that is happening? Is this a disputed “he said she said” situation? Do we have any hard evidence of any perspective, or is this all just a matter of opinion?
More broadly, it seems to me that there are inherent conflicts between 1) being a philosopher, and 2) being in the philosophy business, that should at least be examined.
As example, from the perspective of pure philosophy it seems departments should be staffed with a rich variety of perspectives to facilitate productive debates. But from the perspective of the philosophy business those doing the hiring have to answer to those above them (who may not be philosophers) and making political decisions may be the only way to keep the funding flowing, to stay in business.
Even if we were to resolve all hiring controversies, whoever is hired will still have to mostly color within the lines of the group consensus unless they are willing to put their relationship with their peers, and thus their career, in jeopardy. This isn’t really that appropriate a position for a philosopher to be in.