Warnings about crises and threats to democracy are more prominent than ever. “The world has never before seen as many countries autocratizing at the same time,” the latest V-Dem report states. To explain this trend, scholars point to right-wing populists who are assumed to undermine democracy because they thrive on polarizing rhetoric, construct existential threats to the nation and its people, delegitimize political opponents, and, ultimately, assault democratic institutions. The events of January 2021 in Washington, D.C., when supporters of Donald Trump attempted to overturn the election result and prevent its certification, seemed to confirm these worries. Similar scenes unfolded in Brazil in January 2023, when Bolsonaro supporters sought to prevent the transfer of power following the electoral defeat of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro.
Brazil is once again in the spotlight following Flávio Bolsonaro’s narrow defeat in the presidential runoff on October 25. Although the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro has failed to secure the presidency, his strong electoral performance underscores the enduring appeal of the political movement associated with his father. Flávio Bolsonaro’s refusal to recognize the election result has further increased concerns about the future of Brazilian democracy, which had already suffered significant damage under his father’s presidency. These concerns are not confined to Brazil. In other countries across the region—including Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru—right-wing populist candidates have recently made significant gains. So how threatened is democracy in Latin America?
On closer inspection, the picture is not quite so clear-cut.
To begin with, democracy is often conceptualized in very broad terms. For example, some conceptions of democracy treat the promotion of gender equality, climate protection, and constructive engagement in international organizations as essential democratic norms. Since right-wing actors often reject or challenge these objectives, they are considered undemocratic by definition. This, however, turns the question of right-wing populism’s impact on democracy into a tautology: “right-wing populist” and “anti-democratic” already overlap at the conceptual level.
To avoid this problem, we need a minimalist conception of democracy that focuses on its institutional and liberal core: elections, institutional checks and balances, and the protection of individual liberties against arbitrary state interference. If we adopt such a conception, as reflected in the Freedom House Index or V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index, we find that right-wing populist governments do not necessarily bring about a decline in democratic quality. In fact, the most severe democratic setbacks in Latin America have occurred in countries governed by left-wing populists, particularly Venezuela and Nicaragua, but also Bolivia under Evo Morales and Ecuador under Rafael Correa.
Another point to consider is that right-wing populism is a multidimensional concept. The term itself combines two components—“populist” and “right-wing”—that can vary independently of one another. Some right-wing actors are not populist, while some populist actors are not right-wing. If we assume that right-wing populism negatively affects democracy, we need to establish whether this relationship is attributable to the populist component, the right-wing component—or both. Additional factors, as well as possible interactions with contextual conditions, need to be accounted for, too.
The picture becomes even more complicated when we consider the wide range of ideological orientations within the right itself. These range from libertarianism and religious fundamentalism to classical conservatism, law-and-order politics, and culture-war radicalism. Right-wing ideology encompasses ethnic nationalism, which treats group identities as essential and immutable, as well as notions of a natural order grounded in religion or historical tradition. Some of these positions are presumably more compatible with democracy than others.
Right-wing actors in Latin America should not be lumped together either. The current governments in Ecuador and Bolivia are closer to the moderate than to the radical right and do not pursue disruptive agendas. In Argentina, Javier Milei emphasizes economic reform and frequently resorts to verbal excesses, yet without undermining the country’s democratic institutional order. In El Salvador, by contrast, Nayib Bukele prioritizes the fight against crime while disregarding the rule of law. According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, El Salvador has become an autocracy under his presidency.
How, then, should we understand the relationship between democracy and right-wing populism? Which of its various dimensions negatively affect democracy? In Brazil, for example, democratic quality declined significantly under Bolsonaro’s government (2019–2023), particularly regarding civil liberties and press freedom, as documented by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. But was this decline caused by Bolsonaro’s right-wing ideology, his populist and polarizing style, or his authoritarian outlook, shaped in part by his strong military background?
Multidimensional phenomena pose a major challenge for comparative politics. Imagine a group of people sharing a meal, after which some—but not all—fall ill. Since the meal consisted of a buffet, we do not know which dish was contaminated. How should we proceed? To identify the cause, we need to narrow down the possible explanations and isolate the suspected dish. Ideally, we would find two people with similar culinary preferences, only one of whom became ill. If we could reconstruct a difference in what they ate during the meal, we might be able to identify the source of the problem.
Qualitative comparative research follows a similar logic. We look for two cases that resemble each other in many relevant respects but differ in their outcomes. In the case of right-wing populism, we would look for two countries with powerful right-wing populist actors, only one of whom exhibits undemocratic behavior.
An approximation to such a comparison can be found in Jair Bolsonaro and Chile’s José Antonio Kast. The latter was elected president of Chile in November 2025 and, like Bolsonaro, is regarded as a representative of the radical right, a political current often considered particularly dangerous to democracy. Kast emphasizes religious principles and maintains close ties to religious fundamentalist organizations. He advocates a strict law-and-order agenda and seeks to curb immigration. His family was part of the inner circle around Augusto Pinochet, whose authoritarian regime Kast defended. He has also made disparaging remarks about the Mapuche, the Indigenous people of southern Chile. Given this profile, he has occasionally been described as Chile’s Bolsonaro.
There is, however, one crucial difference: so far, Kast has respected democratic rules and demonstrated respect for electoral outcomes. He first ran for president in 2021 but lost the runoff to left-wing candidate Gabriel Boric. Unlike Bolsonaro in 2022, Kast immediately accepted the result and congratulated the winner, stating: “I just spoke with @gabrielboric and congratulated him on his great victory. As of today, he is Chile’s president-elect and deserves all our respect and constructive cooperation. Chile always comes first.” Nor has there been any indication during his time in office so far that he intends to disregard democratic rules.
How can we explain this marked difference in behavior? One possibility is to point to differences in the broader context, but even in this respect, the two cases share important similarities. During the 2010s, both countries experienced high-profile corruption scandals, large-scale protest movements, and growing polarization. Anti-establishment sentiment was widespread. Both candidates also espoused radical positions, yet Kast made some efforts to moderate his stance during his second presidential campaign in 2025.
Moderation, by contrast, was entirely absent in Bolsonaro’s case. He never toned down his aggressive rhetoric or revised his polarizing positions, pointing to a crucial difference between the two countries: polarization in Brazil was far more intense and deeply rooted than in Chile. Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party (PT), in particular, became a political enemy to the right and the embodiment of the threat that Brazil might become “another Venezuela.”
This also gave corruption a different political significance in Brazil than in Chile. In Brazil, corruption was primarily associated with the PT and reinforced the perception that the country was under threat from left-wing populism. When details of a vast corruption network—the so-called Lava Jato scandal—began to emerge in 2014, coinciding with an economic slowdown, opposition to and protests against the PT government intensified dramatically.
Yet the scandal was merely the spark that ignited an already combustible situation. The PT had long been something of an outsider in Brazilian politics. Its radical, class-struggle-oriented roots aroused suspicion among the Brazilian establishment and conservative media. While Lula’s first presidency (2003-2007) was initially met with optimism, it soon gave way to skepticism and increasingly to outright hostility. Rather than gradually modernizing the country, critics argued, Lula’s moderate public persona was merely a means of paving the way for a radical agenda. Under the pretext of social justice, the PT was supposedly using state resources and social programs to secure the support of lower-income groups. It was suspected to build up a hegemonic position, akin to Chavismo in Venezuela, by infiltrating state institutions and filling the public administration with its own cadres.
This perception created a sense of existential threat to an already fragile project: modernizing Brazil and bringing it into the ranks of developed countries. In other words, the grand collective dream of a modern Brazil seemed fundamentally at risk. This perception was seemingly confirmed by the Lava Jato scandal and created the conditions of polarization on which Bolsonaro’s 2018 campaign could thrive. Only against this backdrop do Bolsonaro’s radicalism and his unexpected rise become understandable.
Therefore, the distinctive factor observable in Brazil (as opposed to Chile) was radicalization fueled by a deeply rooted sense of existential threat, which did not emerge from Bolsonaro’s radical discourse, but from preceding protests, corruption scandals, and long-term political trajectories. Such conditions were absent in Chile, which helps explain why Kast pursued a more moderate course, whereas centrifugal forces prevailed in Brazil, with unpredictable consequences for its further democratic development.
Admittedly, the comparison between Brazil and Chile has its limitations. Kast has only been in office since early 2026, which restricts the extent to which the two cases can be compared. Nor can all variables be assessed reliably, and the two countries’ underlying conditions are not identical. Nevertheless, evidence from Brazil and other countries in the region, including El Salvador, suggests, first, that a threat scenario is a crucial factor in turning right-wing populists into an acute danger to democracy. Second, such a threat scenario precedes the rise of radical populists. Although the perception of threat may be largely subjective, it cannot be discursively constructed ad hoc, as the Brazilian case suggests. Bolsonaro certainly exacerbated polarization, but its roots ran deeper—it developed over at least a decade. The threat scenario that facilitated his rise was historically conditioned rather than created by him. This, after all, may be good news, as it implies certain limitations to right-wing populists’ disruptive potential.
Editor’s note: This is an extra edition of the Perspectives on Democracy series for November 2026.

Thomas Kestler
Thomas Kestler is a political scientist at the University of Würzburg, Germany, specializing in comparative politics, democracy, populism, and political parties. His research focuses on Latin America, particularly the relationship between political ideas, institutions, and mobilization. He is also Latin America Regional Coordinator for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).






