When we talk about art now, we seem to be talking about a bewildering array of different things. For children in schools, most art teaching still uses a familiar range of materials, techniques, and topics: drawing, painting, printmaking, mark-making, or basic color theory. But in galleries of contemporary art, art could be a warehouse-sized installation or a pile of blankets, a communal meal or many other banal or spectacular items. Maybe we still want to teach children some skills to support their creative making—drawing, for example. But might the emphasis on traditional skills be an obstacle to new thinking and connecting to the contemporary world?
Some contradictory ideas show up when we try to get an overview of all the things we call art today. That’s tough for young learners to get their heads around, especially for those with less cultural capital. We need some way to convey this confusing and fractured state of affairs. The alternative is that we end up teaching a random and parochial patch of the large, diverse territory that art covers, narrowing the horizon of possibility for students. My suggestion is that getting children to reason conceptually and historically is essential to teaching art because art’s identity has so significantly shifted and expanded. To learn art now is necessarily to position oneself within this wide and contentious field.
Reasoning and conceptual thinking are rarely seen as central to teaching art. A more common view is that what defines the arts, what makes them important, is their non-conceptual, sensory, affective, and material character. The arts, so the argument goes, provide a vital embodied, sensuous counterbalance to the dominant focus in schools, which is on a narrow, abstract conception of knowledge. Even the great art educator Elliot Eisner, who was sympathetic to the cognitive value of art, conceived of the arts as fundamentally rooted in perceptual experience. He argued that school education is impoverished because the richness of sensory and affective experience is not conveyed by privileged linguistic and quantitative forms of representation. On this way of thinking, it makes sense to teach art by providing learners with direct perceptual and material experiences, to facilitate situations in which learners can experiment and discover new and personal possibilities for expression and meaning-making.
A standard way of doing this in schools is a scheme of lessons called the formal elements project. This typically consists of a series of exercises to explore some or all of the following: line, tone, shape, color, pattern, and texture. Students might fill sheets of paper with varied lines and marks, using pencil, ink, or charcoal. Or they might create graded sequences of tones in different media or paint charts to compare primary, secondary, complementary colors, and so on. The idea of these exercises is that they provide a foundation for the whole field of art and design, an analysis of the raw matter of visual phenomena. There is an assumption of direct experiential learning at work, the idea that students are gaining unmediated knowledge by acquaintance with separate elements which can later be combined in complex products. But I don’t think these well-worn formalist exercises are up to the challenge of today’s artworld. They don’t make explicit the complexity and challenge of art.
Instead, I want to suggest an educational approach that is informed by Robert Brandom’s theory of inferentialism. This is a philosophical theory holding that the meaning of a word or sentence is determined by its role in reasoning, by what conclusions it allows you to draw, and what counts as a reason for saying it. The austerely linguistic, conceptual emphasis of inferentialism may seem unpromising territory for art education, but I claim that it has a lot to offer.
Adapting Brandom’s theory for art education proposes that art is discursive and rational, concept-using and reason-sensitive. It characterizes learning in art as developing students’ practical ability to use artistic concepts through performing expressive linguistic and material acts, navigating art as a space of reasons within which they take increasing levels of responsibility by integrating artistic ideas in practice and in theory. This couldn’t be accomplished through sensitive attunement to perceptual experience or engagement with lively matter. Learners just couldn’t acquire the know-how in handling the inferential articulations that give material performances artistic meaning through experience alone.
This inferentialist approach to art pedagogy blurs the boundary between students as speakers and students as makers, modellers, sketchers, painters, carvers, installers, or photographers. It emphasizes the practicality, normativity, and sociality of both art creation and art interpretation. Artistic statements can be verbal or practical, can be made, challenged, justified, qualified, or withdrawn. And they show up as statements against the context of prior expectations and conventions, that is, against the backdrop of art’s history.
To be art, even the most rudimentary handling of materials must be situated within the context of some specific historical artistic practice. Indeed, art itself, I would claim, is essentially historical: it has no essence other than what is offered by historical precedent variously reconstructed in the present. Adapting a Brandomian dictum, art does not have a nature, only an open set of interpretable histories. Art history, taken broadly, can be viewed as a normative space of reasons, structured by relations of permission, entailment, and contradiction, with earlier artworks seen as entitlement-conferring precedential authority to be critically challenged, subverted, or extended by emerging members of the disciplinary community, that is, by new students of art. How does this show up in practice?
In art historical terms, a cultural artifact, a genre, or a style of art should be seen less as a constellation of physical or visual features and more like a positioning performance within a system of reason relations governing what counts as appropriate artistic moves. For example, the Dadaist anti-art gesture of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain confounded the expectation that artists skilfully manufacture their work. And that anti-art gesture subsequently licensed many varieties of neo-avantgarde, conceptual, and installation art, for example, Adrian Piper’s street performances.
If all of this seems implausibly intellectual and demanding in relation to what usually passes as art education, I would point to the normativity, sociality, and rationality of even very early emergent artmaking. To imagine an example: if a young child, say a five-year-old, selects the color blue when making a painting, she already has a developing, although implicit, understanding of ‘blueness’ in the context of painting and of what she is committing herself to by her action. She understands that the brush mark’s blueness is compatible with its being either dry or dribbly, thick or thin, but not with its being simultaneously red or invisible. She may also have an emerging sense that it is appropriate to place the brush mark on a sheet of paper but not on the table, that marks placed on paper are given a special sort of joint attention by adults and are discussed and evaluated in certain ways. A child’s recognition of blue paint and her intentional markings in this painting context involve and require awareness of many conceptual connections and an emerging sense of appropriate norms. The child’s growing understanding of blue-in-painting is the development of ways of responding, judging, and acting, both practically and discursively, within a shared form of life.
As a school student, our imaginary youngster might extend her understanding of blue within the particular knowledge domain of art, with its specialized norms and terminology. She might learn that a commitment to painting monochromatically with blue rules out simultaneously exploring optical mixing with spots of complementary color. She might learn the decorum of some traditional painting techniques regarding style and genre or, perhaps as an older learner, she might engage with how Helen Frankenthaler’s proto-color-field technique of staining the canvas negated aspects of Pollock’s handling of the painted surface. In doing so, she would be taking up a commitment in a field of competing possibilities with increasing authorial self-consciousness.
We live in a time when several conflicting notions of art have currency. New conceptions have emerged over time to challenge the old, complicating though not erasing what has gone before. As a simplification, we could call them the traditional, the modern, and the contemporary. Each conception negates but also builds logically on its predecessor. Making such conceptions explicit for learners should encourage a critical, questioning attitude as they look at and practically draw upon a range of artworks and other cultural items, and as they reflect on the way that they are engaging with various practices. It should encourage learners to position themselves, drawing on their own emerging ideas, rationally synthesizing and integrating those intuitions, exploring and becoming responsive to the entailments and contradictions embedded within competing ideas of art. The contentious character of art today is a great opportunity to bring young learners into an exciting and living debate. We should be putting that right up front.

Neil Walton
Neil Walton is a lecturer in education at Goldsmiths, University of London. After training at the Royal Academy Schools, he received his MA in History of Art from Birkbeck. He taught art in London secondary schools and art history for various art school studio programmes. Current work includes developing a historicist pedagogy of art and design, integrating art history into the secondary curriculum, and examining how Robert Brandom's inferentialism can inform art education.






