Democracies have been in decline, and many scholars are now rightly asking how this process can be halted. Much of the research on democratic resilience—the ability of democracies to prevent or withstand regression—focuses on the systemic properties that make democracies resilient. What this work often overlooks is the perspective of actors: Who actually defends democracy and through which strategies? Even less attention has been paid to normative questions, such as the moral responsibilities of these actors, the obstacles they may face, and the values that inform their actions. When the focus shifts to actors and norms, democratic resilience can be understood more precisely as democratic self-defense.
Adopting an actor-centred perspective is important for two reasons. The first is pragmatic: Even though a lot of democratic resilience relies on rules, practices, and institutions, these must be supported, advocated, designed, and introduced by real people. Democratic resilience does not emerge automatically. Democracy does not have the agency to defend itself. Secondly, foregrounding actors is necessary in order to examine the moral responsibilities, value judgments, opportunities, and constraints that affect their choices, particularly those relating to democratic self-defence.
Theorists of democratic self-defence have primarily examined rights restrictions and party bans—the so-called paradigm of militant democracy—and have therefore focused almost exclusively on state actors, such as governments, parliaments, judges, public prosecutors, and constitutional courts. It is presumed that these actors can efficiently intervene and block autocratic movements before it is too late. One or two decades ago, when autocratic parties were still weak actors in the opposition, it was reasonable to place hope in such formal restrictive actions. However, this is no longer the case.
With such parties increasingly in power and high courts often compromised, interest has shifted towards modes of resistance outside the formal state in the wider public sphere. Indeed, civil society often serves as the primary—and sometimes the only—site of resistance in many countries today and may have the incentive to intervene where state actors lack it.
Civil society actors clearly differ from state actors in the resources and tools they can use to defend democracy. They cannot pass or enforce laws nor can they rely on other forms of state power. They are also often more vulnerable, since defending democracy may put their professional and personal livelihoods at risk. At the same time, they typically have weaker moral and institutional obligations to uphold democratic principles than public officials do.
Still, the resources they possess and the opportunities they have to act should not be underestimated. Their actions are usually less coercive and less restrictive of rights. For example, journalists and staff in public service media can engage in expressive forms of action, such as publicly commenting on or responding to controversial statements. Whether they remain silent about or actively condemn such statements can shape how the public perceives their role in either enabling or resisting democratic backsliding. Ordinary citizens can act by talking with friends, family members, or acquaintances who hold antidemocratic views and challenging them to reconsider. Some have argued that citizens may even have a moral duty to do so. But such a demand may be overly burdensome and unrealistic, given what it would require of ordinary people in their everyday lives.
One important actor that has been largely overlooked in debates about democratic self-defence is academia. This includes universities, academic societies, university leaders, and individual scholars. Academics occupy a distinctive position in democratic societies. On the one hand, they benefit from institutional autonomy and academic freedom. On the other, they possess epistemic authority and credibility that comes from a commitment to truth-seeking and scientific method. Together, these features place academics in a strong position to criticize governments and shape public debate.
At the same time, academics are constrained by a professional ethic of neutrality, which is widely seen as essential for inclusive education and unbiased research. As a result, they face conflicting expectations: They are called upon to engage in public debate as members of civil society while also preserving their credibility as non-partisan actors.
Academics can, of course, defend democracy in relatively uncontroversial ways by protecting their own academic freedom—the freedom to teach, research, and express opinions. These freedoms are increasingly targeted by authoritarian governments. Yet the role of scholars does not end there. Academics may be justified in fighting a broader battle for freedoms beyond teaching and research.
Scholactivism—the blend of scholarship and activism—can have enormous societal benefits, provided it does not harm its fundamental values. As critics have emphasized, it should by no means compromise core scholarly virtues such as humility and methodological rigor. But once this condition is fulfilled, scholasticism can have epistemic benefits: A commitment to real-world change can sharpen insight and enhance the relevance of scholarly work. Scholactivism does not require partisanship or direct political campaigning. Rather, it involves working for the benefit of society and defending democracy through epistemic action, by using scholarly knowledge to expose the unjust exercise of power.
There are many normative perspectives that can guide such action, but for the sake of brevity, let us focus on a few that resonate strongly with epistemic values academics hold dear. One possibility is to engage in open and direct dialogue with those in power, including authoritarian leaders. This view draws on a commitment to free expression—not only as a political right but as a tool for advancing truth and human progress. It echoes the fallibilism associated with John Stuart Mill. Even deeply mistaken or harmful ideas, Mill argued, ought to be expressed, because it is only by confronting them openly that their errors can be exposed. For this reason, scholars may have purely epistemic grounds for scrutinizing government practices and publicly denouncing those who undermine pluralism, freedom of expression, and the conditions necessary for an open society.
A second possibility is to reclaim the social narrative about democracy and higher education. Authoritarian populists often portray scholars as part of a self-serving elite that has betrayed the virtuous singular People in order to serve their own corrupt and vicious self-interests. At the same time, real social injustices may fuel the anger and resentment that make such narratives persuasive. By promoting social justice and social security, academics can challenge the claim that they cater only to elite interests. And by stepping up to defend democracy and expose demagoguery, they can assert their alignment with the broader public good.
Academics are key civil society actors. Defending academic freedom is not the only way they can resist autocratic pressures. They should take democratic self-defense seriously. This does not mean abandoning scholarly standards or political neutrality altogether. Rather, it means using their knowledge, authority, and public voice to expose injustices and denounce actions that harm the broader public good.
Democracies do not defend themselves automatically. They depend on people who are willing to act, often under conditions of uncertainty and risk. Understanding democratic self-defense therefore requires attention to the agency and responsibilities of those who step in to defend democracy, as well as to the norms that should guide their actions.
Anthoula Malkopoulou
Anthoula Malkopoulou is Associate Professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. She is the author of The History of Compulsory Voting in Europe (Routledge, 2015) and co-editor of Equality and Representation (Routledge, 2018) and :Militant Democracy and its Critics (Edinburgh University Press, 2019). Her forthcoming monograph, Theories of Democratic Self-Defence (Oxford University Press), won the York Political Theory Manuscript Award. She is currently co-editing the Oxford Handbook of Democratic Self-Defence.
