I am in the business of teaching philosophy and I have taught different kinds of students from many different backgrounds with different kinds of attitudes toward philosophy in my undergraduate classes. As a philosophy teacher, I am curious about philosophy pedagogy in general and have spoken to many in the business about philosophy teaching-related topics. Almost all of these encounters with other philosophy teachers highlight something similar to what I have also observed through my own teaching experience. Many introductory philosophy students often have the attitude that philosophy thought experiments are obviously stupid. This is a common observation among those who teach introductory philosophy courses. The issue is that often we introduce our students to philosophy thought experiments in hopes of facilitating robust in-class discussions; however, instead, we end up spending time and effort explaining to students why the particular thought experiment in question is not stupid, or we end up trying to convince our students that there is a utility and value to thought experiments in general. In any case, our teaching plan ends up working counter to the goal we hoped to achieve.
After reflecting on this pedagogical issue over the years, I have come to realize that the issue is something that we should expect if we are going to discuss philosophy thought experiments with our students. The situation is unfortunate, but it should not surprise us.
Intuitively, I think it is not something unique to our students in the introductory philosophy classes; most non-philosophy individuals respond in the same manner when they find out that philosophers are trying to find answers to complex and important questions by employing thought experiments that are often too far removed from the reality of their everyday life experiences in general. I remember feeling quizzical about philosophy thought experiments in my early years as a philosophy student as well, even though I was already very much interested in philosophy. From what I recall, it took me some time to develop the sort of philosophical maturity that is, perhaps, important to become appreciative of the utility and value of philosophy thought experiments. So, I think that trying to convince students to appreciate the utility and value of philosophy thought experiments in introductory philosophy classes is counterproductive and unhelpful as this approach often turns out to be.
We need to employ a pedagogical strategy that helps us facilitate robust philosophical discussions among the students in our introductory philosophy courses and, at the same time, would develop in them the sort of philosophical maturity to eventually become appreciative of the utility and value of philosophy thought experiments.
I have observed in my teaching that students do not respond the same way to all philosophy thought experiments. My observation is that the sorts of philosophy thought experiments that they can resonate with in some way work well and often help in facilitating a robust in-class discussion. For instance, Singer’s Drowning Child and Descartes’s Dreamwork work particularly well. Both of these thought experiments are of the sort that our introductory philosophy students can relate to. These are close to their general life experiences. They have experiences of having lucid dreams and they have seen people in need cross their path. So far, I have not encountered a case when a student commented that these thought experiments are obviously stupid. On the contrary, when I introduce them to thought experiments such as Nozick’s Experience Machine or Brain in the Vat, they seem to have the attitude that these thought experiments are a joke. These sorts of philosophical thought experiments seem to land differently. I have noticed that my students make the comment a lot more often that these thought experiments are obviously stupid.
My observation is that when students find a philosophy thought experiment that I am using to facilitate in-class discussion as obviously stupid, it breeds a certain vibe that makes it hard to facilitate a robust in-class discussion and curiosity among the students. When this happens, I end up spending time on things such as trying to convince students to be appreciative of the value and utility of philosophy thought experiments. I have come to realize that philosophy thought experiments that seem to be generally too far from the student’s general life experience are counterproductive to my pedagogical aims; however, not all thought experiments land the same. Thought experiments that generally seem to be close to the general life experience of my students, serve well. Observing this pattern in my teaching practice was helpful in achieving my pedagogical goal: facilitating a robust in-class discussion.
To other fellow philosophy teachers struggling with this kind of problem, I want to encourage them not to give up on employing philosophy thought experiments in their teaching; philosophy thought experiments, in general, are not the issue. It is the particular kinds of thought experiments, the ones that paint a picture too far removed from the general life experience of our students, that might be the issue. And, in a way, it is not an issue with those thought experiments either but an issue with our pedagogical strategy. We are expecting something from our introductory philosophy students that is hard to come by at that stage: appreciation for the value and utility of all kinds of philosophical thought experiments. This is something that we should not expect from them but should aim and hope to develop in them. We can achieve these goals through our careful selection of the kinds of philosophy thought experiments that we introduce them to in facilitating in-class learning and discussions. That is, we need to introduce our students in the introductory philosophy classes to thought experiments, but we need to introduce them to the right ones: the philosophy thought experiments that are not too far removed from their general life experiences.
Jabran Amanat-Lee
Jabran Amanat-Lee is a philosophy graduate student at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is interested in questions related to the nature and reliability of introspection.
