It is pertinent to examine the perspective of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and its implications to enhance the understanding of technological development. By using Vulnerability theory as propounded by Professor Martha Fineman, this post attempts to analyze STS and technological development as constructed phenomenon, which means that it is shaped by the social and institutional context in which it arises. It is within this context that technological development can be argued to be constructed, as this perspective recognizes the role of human agency in shaping technological advancements. Rather than treating technology as an autonomous force, this view highlights the impact of social, ideological, and institutional factors on technological development, recognizing that technology is shaped by the values, interests, and choices of the individuals and institutions involved in its creation and deployment. By understanding technology as a product of social and institutional processes, we can better appreciate its impact on society and work towards creating technology that serves the common good. Thus, viewing technology as constructed is crucial for informed decision-making and the responsible development of technology.
In the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), researchers use theories and methods from the social sciences to understand the work practices of engineers, scientists, and technicians. They examine these professionals as individuals in their work environment, analyzing their documents and behavior based on current theories of human behavior. Empirical research has played a significant role in STS, challenging the deterministic view of technology that was represented by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger. This view portrayed technology as developing autonomously, with society adapting over time. However, empirical research showed that technology is the inexorable culmination of people’s actions and choices, and its development is predicated on their behavior in specific situations. It is for this reason that technological development was perceived as socially constructed or simply “constructed.”
Against this backdrop, one question emerges: Is there any pronounced philosophical reflection regarding the foundations of STS? Despite its roots in philosophy, there is a noticeable lack of philosophical inquiry in STS literature. Steven Fuller is one exception, who contends that the field has lost touch with its philosophical roots, which may harm its future. This could be due to the interrelatedness of technology, science, and society, making it difficult for philosophy to provide a comprehensive reflection. Additionally, professional philosophers are often seen as hindering constructive work with their persistent questioning. Continental philosophers, who see STS as an extension of ideas from thinkers like Heidegger, are more welcomed than analytical philosophers, who are criticized for their condescending attitude towards STS researchers by continental philosophers who view STS researchers as “speculative sociologists” whose limited sense of context prevents them from reaching beyond their own “intertextuality.” The historical opposition to philosophy in STS can be traced back to the fact that its founders were mostly scientists who gravitated towards positivism, which is the source that STS and in particular sociology of knowledge sprung from.
STS constructivism, along with its techno-scientific orientation, means abandoning philosophy as a normative project. Philosophy thus goes from being the “legislator” to that which John Locke called the “under-laborer”—a term used to describe his own intellectual subordination to Isaac Newton. It is a sort of uncritical philosophizing which Kant regarded as dogmatic and which, for example, Leibniz represented. As a result, there is usually little space to pose philosophical questions about the foundations of techno-scientific research; instead, the STS researchers’ main task becomes to make observations and to describe them without epistemological bias. Consequently, STS takes its point of departure in various theories rather than in philosophy. In this context, “theory” refers to many possible frameworks that indicate how STS research should be conducted.
The dominant theory is Actor-Network Theory (ANT)—a theory, strongly associated with the philosopher Bruno Latour, engineer Michel Callon, and sociologist John Law, developed in France in the early 1980s in an attempt to understand big techno-scientific systems and their place in larger social contexts.
In this theory, the participants are not just human actors but also non-human actors such as laboratory animals and objects. The former is not prioritized above the latter. The network participants are referred to as “actants” which can be classified into both humans and non-humans. The act in the networks cannot be attributed to the human subject or the non-human object but is the result of heterogeneous relations between humans and non-humans.
Despite its insights, ANT has been met with objections from philosophers who argue that it undermines the normative project of philosophy. They argue that if technology is seen as having an agency of its own, then it is difficult to make normative claims about how it should be used. One key concept in STS is Actor-Network Theory. It seeks to understand the relationships between humans, non-human entities, and the wider social and material world. ANT argues that the objects of technological development are not simply passive tools, but rather they actively shape and influence the course of technological development.
There are several objections to the ANT. For example, it does not prescribe how one should act ethically, morally, and politically. The proponents of ANT would respond by stating that it is fully possible to have an ethical and political view but that one must first describe the network before asking questions concerning morality. The theory can also be criticized for assigning all actors within the network of equal importance. Furthermore, it disregards the existence of power structures when these authors describe how the structures emerge in a voluntary interaction between the actors in the network and through the ability of the acts to promote their interests. Lastly, it can be argued that the network of actors risks degenerating into endless chains of association and that we all eventually form one single extensive network.
It is in this context that a vulnerability approach can help to seek to understand the complex and multifaceted relationships between technology and society. It does not imply that technology is beyond human control or that philosophy should be abandoned as a normative project. Instead, it provides a nuanced view of technological development that underscores the significance of considering the social, material, ideological, and institutional dimensions of technology. This perspective is particularly important in light of the rapidly evolving technological landscape and the significant impact that technology has on our lives.
In conclusion, a vulnerability approach provides a valuable contribution as a framework for understanding STS, ANT, and technological development as constructed phenomenon. While some objections to ANT have been raised, it does not necessarily entail the abandonment of philosophy as a normative project. Rather, it highlights the importance of considering the complex and multifaceted relationships between technology, society, and institutions in our thinking about technological development.
Helena Moradi
Helena Moradi is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative at Emory University School of Law.
