Can there be morality without self? Do we need a sense of self for morality and ethics to work?
The question of selfhood or personhood — or of what it means to be an ‘individual self’ or a ‘person’– is central to understanding our actions and behaviors or how we ought to be behaving or acting. Hence, the concept of ‘self’ is linked to morality and it is also what constitutes our identity. The history of western philosophy, starting from the early Greek classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle to Enlightenment thinkers like Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Charles Taylor, has explored and engaged with issues of the self and the relation between selfhood and morality. ‘Self’ is the starting point of all rational and empiricist inquiry, and it would not be either untrue or presumptuous to say that western philosophy is essentially a philosophy of the ‘self’.
One of the most fundamental assumptions for ethics or morality to work is that there is an individual self or person who is rational and free. It is this assumption of a rational, free individual capable of making decisions and being responsible for them on which the entire domain of ethics and morality is based. There is a doer or an agent, and the action is performed by the agent. The agent and the action constitute the two objects of ethics. The rightness or wrongness of the action is dependent on the consequences of the action. Without an agent, there is no moral agency and with no moral agency, there is no moral responsibility associated with the action. Without the self, there can be no morality because the sense of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behavior and values come from a sense of self, i.e. central to morality is the possession of a moral self.
Non-western traditions, particularly Buddhism, offer an alternative view to the western self-centered conception of morality because of its unique perspective on the nature of the self. The Buddhists reject the dominant western metaphysical views on the nature of self — such as ‘the self being some kind of a unified whole persisting through time’ or the Kantian constructionist view of the self as ‘ the product of reason, a regulative principle because the self “regulates” experience by making unified experience possible’. The Buddhist view of the nature of self is the rejection of the unified essential self, called the doctrine of no-self (anatta). The doctrine argues that the “self is nothing more than a bundle of states and properties beneath which we tend to project a fiction of an enduring self”. This view finds resonance with many modern thinkers particularly Hume and post-modern thinkers who speak of a non-essential, transient self and call for the erasure of the category of self.
This then brings us back to the central metaphysical question of this article: can morality work without the concept of self? In the absence of a self “for any kind of self-orientation, nothing at all can be justified at least in the sort of ultimate sense” and therefore there is a tendency for contemporary thinkers to portray Buddhist ethics as a kind of moral-antirealism, where there is the rejection of ethics and morality. But Buddhism is, if not any other thing, first and foremost an ethical system.
The absence of self or a fixed underlying essential self has ethical implications. The ideal of a Bodhisattva (a person on the path to Buddhahood) in Mahāyāna Buddhism represents the Selfless ethics of Buddhism. A Bodhisattva embodies the highest ethical ideals, and there are many different interpretations of this ideal in Buddhists texts across traditions. A Bodhisattva is one who willingly continues to go through the cycle of birth and rebirth (Saṃsāra), even willing to undergo varied degrees of suffering for as long as it takes for others to reach enlightenment despite being far ahead in terms of spiritual development and fully capable of achieving full liberation on their own. They delay their liberation for the sake of the others while helping others also achieve the same. This is in contrast to an arhat, driven by self-interest whose motive is the attainment of one’s own liberation as opposed to others. At the heart of this bodhicitta (enlightened mind) is a type of compassion (Mahākaruṇā) grounded in the apprehension of emptiness. Bodhisattvas extend their compassion to all sentient beings. Emptiness (Śūnyatā) is the ultimate truth that is gained through perfected wisdom grounded in an impartial form of compassion or benevolence.
The underlying motivation for self-sacrifice and selflessness for the benefit of others is driven by the bodhicitta. The bodhicitta (translated as ‘desire for enlightenment or ‘awakening’) emphasizing the altruistic motive of a Bodhisattva (a spiritual aspirant of the Mahāyāna tradition) was introduced by Śāntideva, the 8th-century Mādhyamika philosopher. The bodhicitta is one who is aware and has realized both cognitively and conatively the no-self doctrine. Śāntideva in his Bodhicāryavatāra (Introduction to the Practices of Awakening) claims that “it is the nature of reality which is the premise for conclusions about how human beings should act”, so metaphysics logically entails ethics for Śāntideva, which is also the case with western philosophy.
Concerning the notion of free will or agency, just like the idea of a persistent ‘person’ or ‘self’ is an illusion for Śāntideva. Human beings are a part of a chain of cause and effect, the person is nothing more than a link in the chain of causes and effect, no action can be attributed to him. All of these actions and deeds are a result of several conditioning factors, everything is dependently originated (pratītyasamutpāda). Contemporary thinkers like Charles Goodman have interpreted the doctrine of no-self as representing a form of consequentialism, where there is a rejection of all composite entities including persons. Goodman says “since there are not ultimately any experiencers, it cannot matter who experiences particular burdens and benefits, so it is ok to ignore the distributive effects of our actions, and simply maximize the good”. Buddhist ethics argues that the internalization of a no-self will lead to the development of more compassion or karuṇā. While others like Mark Siderits have spoken about the uniqueness of Buddhist morality and argued that it is wrong to look at Buddhist Ethics either from a deontological or consequentialist perspective.
The Buddhist view is that moral behavior flows from mastering our own ego and desire and cultivating loving-kindness (metta) and compassion (karuṇā). Buddhism is also not about moral absolutism. It is as Karma Lekshe Tsomo, a Tibetan Buddhist and teacher says, “There are no moral absolutes in Buddhism, and it is recognized that ethical decision-making involves a complex nexus of causes and conditions. ‘Buddhism’ encompasses a wide spectrum of beliefs and practices, and the canonical scriptures leave room for a range of interpretations. All of these are grounded in a theory of intentionality, and individuals are encouraged to analyze issues carefully for themselves. … When making moral choices, individuals are advised to examine their motivation–whether aversion, attachment, ignorance, wisdom, or compassion–and to weigh the consequences of their actions in light of the Buddha’s teachings”.
In conclusion, I have argued that for the most part, the history of western philosophy has been about self, and the issues surrounding the self. The relation between selfhood and morality (good) is inextricably connected in western philosophical thought, but that is not the case with Buddhism. The selfless ethics of the bodhisattva, is rooted in the denial of selfhood (anatman) and all other concepts connected to the self. This denial comes from the realization of emptiness; however, this realization does not mean that it leaves behind morality. For the Buddhists, morality works at the level of conventional or everyday reality, but not at the level of ultimate reality where one is beyond morality. The Bodhisattva is the embodiment of the highest ethical ideals of altruism/ selflessness and works in the field of emptiness or no-self at the level of ultimate reality, but lives an ordinary life, undergoing pain and suffering at the level of conventional reality for the overall well-being of others and to guide them on the path of liberation. The bodhisattva way of life does provide a moral framework that justifies self-sacrifice or selflessness, however, there are obvious conceptual, ethical, and philosophical difficulties when we attempt to reconcile the doctrine of no-self with contemporary moral issues of agency, free will, and moral responsibility. Nevertheless, Buddhist Selfless morality provides an effective alternative to the dominant western self-centered morality and to understand/evaluate the ethical implications of Buddhists doctrines.
Narmada P
Narmada P holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Hyderabad, India. Her areas of research include Indian Intellectual History, Early Buddhist Ethics, Metaphysics, and Social and Political Philosophy.
Thanks for the lucid, illuminating piece. I think these distinctions are under appreciated and help reframe traditional ethical questions. For me, the most interesting Western philosophers draw on Eastern traditions – most notably/explicitly Schopenhauer.
Thank you for the positive comment! Yes, I believe it is important to re-engage with the fundamental distinctions to formulate traditional questions about ethics and morality. In the context of Western philosophers engagement with Buddhism, Schopenhauer’s contribution is quiet significant.
Great read Narmada! So I can think of a number of Western ethicists who would balk at the idea that their theories are “self-centred.” I am thinking of ethicists like Iris Murdoch, Sophie Grace Chappell, Emmannuel Levinas, and many western Christian ethicists. While they might assume the existence of the self, they argue that fundamental to our ethical orientation is “unselfing.” Their ethics is more “self-transcending” than “self-centred.” Do you think there are more points of connection between these western ethical theories and Buddhist ethics? Need their different metaphysical assumptions (about the self) make a difference to their selfless ethical prescriptions?
It can be argued that, Christian moral teaching for example, are not really about denying the self but about enlightened self interest. It’s not so much about being good as it is about being wise. The prescription of Jesus to “die and be reborn” seems to sum it up quite concisely. Yes, we are advised to “die” to our obsession with self by service to others, but the “reborn” part is there too. So long as we are alive we will be thinking, and so long as we are thinking the self will be present. But there are better and worse ways to be a self.
Thank you Mr. Yates for the comment. Yes the ultimate purpose of philosophy so also religion is moving beyond duality of ‘self’ and ‘other’, and to transcend the notion of the ‘self’. When i use the term ‘self-centered’ there is a possibility of it being misunderstood, what i meant is that in Western philosophical tradition there is an excessive engagement with the existence and theories around the self. Buddhism particularly in Mahayana Buddhism the underlying metaphysical assumption is the non-existence of the self, and their ethics follows from this assumption. It is not similar to positing a notion of ‘self’ and then ‘unselfing’ or transcending the ‘self’.
It’s perhaps helpful to reflect that the self is a story, a story made of thought. And so to understand the self we might examine what it’s made of, thought.
Thought operates by dividing a single unified reality in to conceptual parts. The self is one of these conceptual parts, a prominent one in the human experience. This conceptual division process which characterizes thought lies at the heart of much of the human experience.
This division process is what makes us brilliant as a species, because we are able to rearrange the conceptual parts in our minds to create new visions of how our environment could be, instead of just adapting to what already is as most animals do.
This inherently divisive nature of thought is also the source of what we call immoral behavior. Thought creates the self, which is experienced as being separate and alone, divided from the rest of reality. The self is seen to be very small, and the rest of reality very big, a perspective which gives rise to fear, which in turn gives rise to immoral behavior, and all the various forms of madness which so threaten the species.
I am not a scholar and so can’t relate any of the above to either Buddhism or Western philosophers. However, it can be argued that referencing these thinkers may be somewhat of a distraction from a real investigation as, reading this comment for example, or anyone’s writings, is a second hand experience of reality and the self.
I would imagine that some of the writers being referenced above might suggest that we set the 2nd hand experience of symbols aside in favor of a 1st hand experience of our own mind.
In doing so we might decide that the thoughts inside our own minds are also just symbols, also a second hand experience. If true, then the investigation might lead us in to pursuing observation for it’s own value, not as a means to some other end.
Such a state of observation for itself can empty the mind of content, leading to an experience of nothing, a mental experience which most closely aligns with the overwhelming vast majority of reality, space.
If we had to have a name for this experience it might be labeled “aphilosophy”, as in, not of philosophy.
Does the self exist or not? The question itself reveals the divisive nature of thought at work.
In the real world the self, like the rest of reality, is a holistic phenomena containing both the properties of existence and non-existence. For example, the overwhelming majority of all that we experience as a “thing” is actually no-thing, that is, space. Thus, in the single unified reality we inhabit the question of whether the self exists, yes or no, might be seen as nonsensical.
But as thought attempts to organize it’s conceptual database, it seeks to put the self in some category. In order to do that thought attempts to divide the property of existence from the property of non-existence. We are asked to choose, which is it, exists or not? And so centuries of “exist or not” debate unfolds and is never resolved, because the question itself is the problem.
The self, and the division we perceive everywhere we look, is not a property of reality, but rather a property of the medium through which we observe reality. The price tag for thought, for self, is to experience reality through a thought generated distorted lens.
Understanding this can have profound implications for our experience of philosophy, which is of course made entirely of the medium which is the source of the distortion. The harder we try to think our way out of the distortion, the more distortion we create.
Thank you for addressing the question of morality within a Buddhist no-self framework. Very perceptive how western thought remains self centric, with morality a function of individual choice, while Buddhist no-self practice tends to bring about ethical behavior even without that goal per se. I wonder if the practice of good intent and developing compassion as major tenants serves only to add ethical credibility for a western mind, as wouldn’t true no-self act without selfishness, ie. be completely ethical anyway? Or maybe not. I’ve struggled with the western scientific approach to no-self as explained on http://www.pathtonoself.com because there’s no mention of morality. Must no-self be within Buddhist practice to be ethical? Is there a danger exploring no-self without any tenant of compassion for other living things? The answer is probably in your excellent article but I’m not far enough along on the path to get it.