Diversity and InclusivenessSkepticism's Cure for the Plague of Mind

Skepticism’s Cure for the Plague of Mind

This post is part two of a two-part series on skepticism and ethics in the Women in Philosophy series. The first part can be found here.

Less than a year since the world was first overwhelmed with Covid-19, we can see its social aftermath. Protests and revolts of those who want to protect the Enlightenment and democratic values obtained in the 19th century—human rights, workers’ rights, gender and racial equality—meet two different equally frustrating reactions: violence and ignorance. While uprisings on the streets are violently suffocated by the self-proclaimed guardians of  ‘morality’, public initiatives such as petitions and appeals are coldly ignored.

Generally, catastrophic situations that cause the disintegration of socio-economical structures and put every individual under a death threat spur two contradictory symptomatic patterns of human behavior. On the one hand, people excessively cling to the rules in a panicked effort to preserve decaying social structures. This pattern results in all forms of dogmas, moral restrictions and puritanism (which is, of course, just a step away from sexism, racism and fascism). On the other hand, the constant threat of death and the feeling that you are doomed anyway cause just the opposite reaction – violation of all rules, immoderate behavior, insatiable debauchery, excessive intoxication and delinquency of all kinds.

In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes the Plague of Athens that killed around 100.000 people including Pericles and resulted in one of the largest recorded losses of life in ancient Greece and a general breakdown of Athenian society. Thucydides, who had the disease himself, describes how the plague introduced into the city a great lawlessness. People “saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the case both of those who were prosperous and suddenly died, and of those who before had nothing but in a moment were in possession of the property of the others”. Not knowing when death will come for them, they “resolved to get out of life the pleasures, which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their bodies and their wealth alike as transitory.” They became indifferent to every rule of religion or law and the morals were turned upside down, for “no one was eager to practice self-denial in prospect of what was esteemed honour, because everyone thought that it was doubtful whether he would live to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be regarded as at once honourable and expedient”(II. lii. 4-liii. 4, 353 – 355).

Plague in an Ancient CityMichiel Sweerts, c. 1652–1654 Public Domain

When plagues attack society, everything is turned upside down. People’s lives, habits, and attitudes radically change; all commitments are broken. Echoing Thucydides’ analysis of plague,  Antoine Artaud in his The Theatre and its Double describes the social aftermath of a plague:

Once the plague is established in a city, normal social order collapses.  There is no more refuse collection, no more army, police or municipality. (-) The remaining survivors go berserk; the virtuous and obedient son kills his father, the continent sodomise their kin. The lewd become chaste. The miser chucks handfuls of his gold out of the windows, the Soldier Hero sets fire to the town he had formerly risked his life to save. Dandies deck themselves out and stroll among the charnell-houses. Neither the lack of sanctions nor the imminence of death are enough to explain such pointlessly absurd acts by people who did not believe death could end anything. And how are we to explain that upsurge of erotic fever among the recovered victims who, instead of escaping, stay behind seeking out and snatching sinful pleasure from the dying and even dead, half crushed under the pile of corpses where chance had lodged them (10-11).  

Consider a thought experiment. Let us imagine that the plague attacks the realm of knowledge. Let us transpose this situation of a total social decay in its hypothetical simplified form onto truths, laws of logic, and systems of knowledge. The realm of knowledge falls apart. Blurry spots spread in its generally accepted systems. Incomprehensible gaps emerge in the laws of logic. General truths become inconsistent and lose their validity. Our confused minds start to doubt their cognitive ability and react in panic. This panic follows two directions: either our minds try to hold the strings, pretending everything is in order, clinging to the truths and laws that still seem to work, repeating them headlong, or they finally resign themselves to their inability to ever grasp the object of their thoughts.

These two panicked reactions of the mind facing the plague of knowledge reflect the epistemological stances of dogmatism and skepticism. Dogmatism assumes that the truth is something that can be commonly known and recognized. It holds that knowledge about this truth is possible and should therefore be spread among the unenlightened. Skepticism, by contrast, asserts that truth cannot be known and recognized and thereafter gives up any claim of common knowledge. Such skepticism can be traced to ancient Greek Academic skepticism, which is itself dogmatic. The very idea that knowledge is not possible becomes a dogma – possibly even the most stubborn and dangerous one.

The thought experiment involving an attack by plague on the realm of knowledge suggests that our minds tend to respond either with bloated dogmatism, sticking to the rules and alledged truths no mather how absurd, unfair and undecent they may be, or with some sort of dogmatic skepticism abstaining from any kind of position or attitude. These two responses of our minds are echoed in behavioral patterns characteristic for a degrading society. It is precisely at this point that the epistemological question becomes an ethical one.

Alarmingly, both responses to catastrophe collapse moral responsibility. Dogmatics stiffly hold to the rules coming from ‘above’, obeying the purely phantasmatic instance of ‘the master’, but are absolutely unable to make their own considerations about ethical aspects of these rules. Dogmatic skeptics, on the other hand, abdicate from the start any moral responsibility for the messy world into which they are thrown. This kind of collapse of moral responsibility is the real plague of mind attacking our society. While the threat that a virus represents to humanity should of course not be underestimated, we should well be aware of the even more dangerous effects and consequences of this plague.

We should therefore ask ourselves what kind of epistemological and ethical posture is necessary for establishing more just and confident procedures of human society?  

In ancient Greece, Pyrrhonian skepticism refused to take the dogmatic position of Academic skepticism on any issue, including skepticism itself. Sextus Empiricus outlines Pyrrhonian skepticism as emphasizing the undecidability of equipollence (isostheneia). Equipollence is the experience of paralysis between two equally appealing but contradictory experiences. Out of this paralysis comes the suspension of judgement (epochē). If the dogmatic position that knowledge is not possible is suspended, this means that exactly in the suspension of this judgement, in the annulation of this statement, knowledge as such is possible: not in the form of a judgement, but in the form of skepsis as investigation. The paralysis is not a destructive, but a constitutive, moment of thought. It paralyzes the subject, but precisely in so doing, it pushes the subject forward.

Whereas dogmatic skepticism obstructs investigation and hinders action, Pyrrhonian skepticism stimulates action and encourages further exploration. Sextus Empiricus claims that Pyrrhonian skepticism cannot lead to ethics. We can nevertheless find an ethical value in this form of skepticism, as Rachel Aumiller does in her own contribution to this series. The ethical value of skepticism is the innovative stance of the forthcoming book A Touch of Doubt: On Haptic Scepticism (see my contribution to the book, “The (Un)Touchable Touch of Pyramus and Thisbe: Doubt and Desire”). We claim that skepticism as an ethical posture leans on a skeptical attitude, which is in opposition not only to dogmatism but even more directly to skepticism in its dogmatic form.

From an ethical perspective, skepticism can be regarded as an antidote for the plague of dogmatisms. Diotima of Mantineia, an ancient Greek philosopher, priestess and prophetess, Socrates’ alleged lover or at least his teacher of the “philosophy of love”, who plays an important role in Plato’s Symposium, is said to have successfully postponed the Plague of Athens for ten years. When opening his speech in the discussion about the nature of love, Socrates presents her to his interlocutors with the following words: “She was an expert on that subject and on many other subjects too. There was one occasion in particular, before the plague, when she procured for the Athenians, after they had performed sacrifices, a ten year postponement of that disease. She it was who taught me the whole subject of love” (201d). In this great Platonic text about love, each participant tries to prove that he is the expert of Eros. Diotima’s dialogue denies the possibility of such a mastery. The feminine interruption is symbolic of the skeptic interruption of both the dogmatist and skeptical dogmatist stance. In her dialogue with Socrates, Diotima assumes a skeptical position, stressing the importance of the state in-between and criticizing the dogmatic position, which always sees things in an exclusive opposition: “Do you really think that if something is not beautiful it has to be ugly? (…) And something that is not wise is ignorant, I suppose? Have you not noticed that there is something in between wisdom and ignorance?” (202a) Wise people don’t pursue wisdom, because they are already wise. Neither do ignorant people seek for it – but from another reason. The problem of ignorance is, says Diotima, that “someone who is neither fine and good nor wise is still quite satisfied with himself.” For “no one desires what he does not think he lacks.” (204a).

If you are not aware of your ignorance, you will not desire wisdom. Only the one who “knows that he knows nothing” will humbly follow its trait. Those who pursue wisdom are therefore neither wise nor ignorant but rather in between. Eros, Diotima claims, is one of them, for “wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Eros is love of the beautiful”. From this Diotima concludes that “Eros must be a philosopher”. A middle state between a wise individual and an ignorant one is therefore a philosopher, who endlessly pursues wisdom, skeptically investigates the world of certainties and tirelessly questions all the firm and steady truths (204b). While ‘the wise’ may assume the posture of a dogmatic, ‘the philosopher’ takes the stance of a skeptic who ‘knows that he knows nothing’ and therefore actively investigates the world.

The epistemological and ethical posture of the skeptic differs from the dogmatism of those who ‘know that they know’ and are stuck in immovable self-confidence. It equally differs from the dogmatic-skeptical views of those who, like the skeptic, ‘know that they know nothing’, but are frozen by their awareness of the limits of cognition. The crucial difference between the skeptic and the other two is that the skeptic implements investigation, thinking as praxis in an endless process, which includes tireless consideration of conflicting views and situations. The devotion to tireless investigation not only contributes to the free development of knowledge, but is also a bearer of a democratic discourse and a potential carrier of social changes.

What is the most threatening virus of interhuman relations (today and ever before) is perhaps not dogmatism as such, but precisely the attitude of skeptical dogmatism, a dogmatism disguised in a skeptical stance. The dispiriting attitude of skeptical dogmatism echoes in contemporary cynicism, which has expanded in the era of neoliberalism. As Sloterdjik frames this cynicism: “They know very well what they are doing, but still they are doing it.” The cynic’s stance can be compared to the stance of the dogmatic skeptic, who ‘knows that he knows nothing’, but still doesn’t do anything to improve his knowledge.

In order to establish a more just and confident procedures of human society, we must first and foremost deal with the fundamental discrepancy between what we think or what we know and how we act. Plato is regularly inviting interlocutors to join their knowledge of what is good to how they live. The key point here is that we should bring the very discrepancy between what we think or what we know and how we act to the level of equipollence. The paralysis, which follows, results in a radical skepsis, which calls not only for the investigation as a self-demanding praxis of theory, but also for social action as a self-demanding praxis of politics. In order to break with the prevalent ideology and categorically change our society we must overcome cynical reason with radical skeptical reason.

In Symposium, Diotima herself represents a radical skeptical position, which calls for an ethical responsibility of the insistence in the uncomfortable realm in-between, neglecting the comfort zone of a fixed place either of a dogmatic belief or of a skeptical-dogmatist ignorance. The first moral task of each individual is thinking, constantly re-questioning all the presumable truths and facts, searching for new solutions and apparitions of wisdom.

When Socrates introduces Diotima as one who fended off plague, he offers a metaphor of skepticism as a cure for the plague of mind and a medicine toward collapsing society.

The Women in Philosophy series publishes posts on women in the history of philosophy, posts on issues of concern to women in the field of philosophy, and posts that put philosophy to work to address issues of concern to women in the wider world. If you are interested in writing for the series, please contact the Series Editor Adriel M. Trott or Associate Editor Julinna Oxley.

Bara Kolenc

Bara Kolenc is a research fellow at the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, and a lecturer at the Academy for Theatre, Radio, Film and Television in Ljubljana. She is the author of Repetition and Enactment (DTP, Analecta, 2014; in Slovene, English translation forthcoming) and president of the International Hegelian Association Aufhebung. She is also an artist in the performing arts and recipient of the European theatre award Theatertreffen Commission of Work in 2016.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

WordPress Anti-Spam by WP-SpamShield

Topics

Advanced search

Posts You May Enjoy

Metaphysics, Colin C. Smith

The syllabus for Metaphysics is the result of my aim to put the “classical” subjects in contemporary metaphysics like personhood, mind, and the potentiality-actuality...