David Foster Wallace and the Challenge of Fatalism

Recently I had occasion to consult major reference works to compare their accounts of fatalism. What I found was disappointing.

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Simon Blackburn, contains the following entry for “fatalism”:

“The doctrine that what will be will be, or that human action has no influence on events. ‘Either a bullet has my number on it or it does not; if it does, then there is no point taking precautions for it will kill me anyhow; if it does not then there is no point taking precautions for it is not going to kill me; hence either way there is no point taking precautions.’ The dilemma ignores the highly likely possibility that whether the bullet has your number on it depends on whether you take precautions. Fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human action is ineffectual.”

The first definition offered is a tautology, “what will be will be”; if that thesis is fatalism, then the doctrine is true but uninteresting. The second definition, “human action has no influence on events,” is clearly false, because, for example, obtaining a divorce logically requires getting married. Examples like that of the bullet were known in antiquity as the “idle argument,” and the appropriate reply, given by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, is that taking precautions may save you, and, if so, then they were fated to do so. Hence such examples provide no refutation of fatalism. Furthermore, the difference between fatalism and determinism is not that fatalism claims human action is ineffectual but that fatalism makes no reference to causation. Moreover, some determinists affirm free will, but all fatalists deny it.

The entry for “fatalism” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, New Edition, edited by Ted Honderich, is no more helpful:

“The belief, not to be confused with causal determinism, that deliberation and action are pointless because the future will be the same no matter what we do. According to the famous ‘idle argument’ of antiquity, ‘If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, you will recover whether you call in a doctor or not; similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this illness, you will not recover whether you call in a doctor or not; and either your recovery or non-recovery is fated; therefore there is no point in calling in a doctor.’ Thus all actions and choices are ‘idle’ because they cannot affect the future. Determinists reject fatalism on the grounds that it may be determined that we can be cured only by calling the doctor.”

Here fatalism is identified with the “idle argument,” as though that piece of reasoning is itself the fatalistic position. In fact, the “idle argument” is a supposed refutation of fatalism, easily answered with the response of Chrysippus that, for example, whether your call a doctor is as fated as whether you recover.

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition, edited by Robert Audi, offers no entry on “fatalism” but refers readers to an article titled “free will problem.” There the term “fatalism” is not mentioned, but the detailed discussion of free will and determinism includes the following two sentences:  “Logical versions of determinism declare each future event to be determined by what is already true, specifically by the truth that it will occur then. Certain theological variants accept the predestination of all circumstances and events by a divine being who knows in advance that they will obtain.”

The term “logical determinism” suggests that fatalism is a form of determinism, which it is not. Furthermore, while divine foreknowledge can raise speculation about human freedom, fatalism does not rest on theism.

The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig, adds to the confusion. Its entry states:

“‘Fatalism’ is sometimes used to mean the acceptance of determinism, along with a readiness to accept the consequence that there is no such thing as human freedom. The word is also often used in connection with a theological question: whether God’s supposed foreknowledge means that the future is already fixed. But it is sometimes explained very differently, as the view that human choice and action have no influence on future events, which will be as they will be whatever we think or do. On the face of it this is barely coherent, and invites the assessment that fatalism is simply an expression of resigned acceptance.”

Here fatalism is first conflated with determinism, next misleadingly associated with a belief in God’s foreknowledge, then equated with the tautology that what will be will be, and finally supposedly refuted by the “idle argument.” The brief accompanying article begins by asserting that “Taken as meaning exactly what it says, the dictum that human choice and action have no influence on future events is absurd.” Here is an example of the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, arguing against a claim not in dispute.

Fortunately, the proper understanding of fatalism can be found in the Encyclopedia of Ethics, Second Edition, edited by Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker. There the extended entry “fate and fatalism” authored by John Martin Fischer begins:  “Fatalism can be understood as the doctrine that it is a logical or conceptual truth that agents are never free to do other than what they actually do.”

Note the following key points in Fischer’s definition. First, fatalism is not a form of determinism. Second, fatalism does not presume theism. Third, fatalism denies free will on the basis of conceptual considerations. Fourth, fatalism does not affirm or imply that human actions have no influence on future events.

The key question, of course, is whether fatalism, appropriately understood, can be supported by a philosophically sophisticated argument. The most celebrated contemporary attempt was authored in 1962 by Richard Taylor, whose accessible article “Fatalism” in The Philosophical Review generated heated discussion in a host of leading journals. More than two decades later, a detailed contribution to the controversy was offered in a senior thesis at Amherst College submitted by the soon-to-be-celebrated writer David Foster Wallace. It was reprinted along with highlights of the original philosophical debate in Fate, Time, and Language: An Essay on Free Will, published by Columbia University Press in 2011 and co-edited by Professor Maureen Eckert of the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth and myself.

In sum, fatalism is not a tautology, a theological tenet, or a preposterous claim about the ineffectiveness of human action. Rather it is a challenging thesis denying free will on the basis of conceptual considerations and requiring for its assessment a careful exploration of issues regarding time, logic, and freedom.

Steven M. Cahn

Steven M. Cahn is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. The most recent books he has authored are Religion Within Reason (Columbia University Press, 2017); Teaching Philosophy: A Guide (Routledge, 2018); Inside Academia: Professors, Politics, and Policies (Rutgers University Press, 2019); The Road Traveled and Other Essays (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2019); Philosophical Adventures (Broadview Press, 2019); A Philosopher’s Journey: Essays from Six Decades (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2020), and Navigating Academic Life (Routledge, 2021).