Political scholars and commentators often lament low turnout in elections. Declining participation in established and more recent democracies has long been treated as a warning sign. Normatively, citizens who do not participate politically cannot see themselves as co-authors of the laws they must obey. Empirically, representatives tend to be more responsive to voters than non-voters. Because those who abstain are often the young, the poor, and the less educated, the result is a vicious cycle: underrepresentation leads to policies that neglect these groups, which in turn deepens disengagement.
Supporters of compulsory voting argue that making participation mandatory can disrupt this cycle. They maintain that high turnout boosts the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, strengthens representatives’ accountability, and signals that every voice matters equally. For some, it should be considered a tutelary institution. They often cite Australia, where voting is compulsory and turnout exceeds 90 percent. There, voting is a civic duty comparable to jury service or paying taxes. One fascinating defense originates from the intuitive idea that broad participation embodies citizens’ collective and equal authorship of law.
Yet this line of reasoning encounters a fundamental challenge. While it is true that high turnout can symbolically represent inclusiveness and equality, it only does so under specific conditions which confer turnout its democratic value. When turnout is compelled, especially without corresponding efforts to ensure meaningful engagement, the appearance of democracy may be maintained while its substance is nonetheless eroded.
To see why, consider voting itself. Voting is a socially constructed practice: marking a paper or raising a hand counts as voting only because society recognizes these actions within a framework of rules. We can call these rules constitutive: they do not simply regulate but create the practice itself. Like money or sport, the practice exists only because certain rules define it. Just as simply handling a ball is not soccer, so placing a piece of paper in a box is voting only when it is understood as expressing a choice that will count toward a collective decision.
Three constitutive rules define proper voting. First, it must occur in the context of a collective decision with more than one genuine option. Second, it must express the voter’s choice. Third, that choice must contribute to determining the outcome. Unlike sortition, which is neutral by design, voting is meant to register the will of citizens and ensure collective outcomes reflect declared preferences.
This analysis is conceptual rather than normative or empirical. It does not explain why people vote or whether they should, and it accommodates motives such as anger, loyalty, or protest. But it also clarifies why invalid ballots or random gestures are not votes: they fail to express a choice that affects results. Casting a spoiled ballot may express discontent, but not a proper choice.
Voting, by itself, is not necessarily democratic. It is used in many contexts, including company boards and oligarchic assemblies, where democratic principles are absent. For voting to be democratic, institutional conditions like political equality and collective self-government must be respected. Weighed voting, for example, is often (not always) thought to undermine democracy by weighting some voices more than others. Yet institutional fairness is not sufficient. The way individuals engage also matters. A system may look democratic in design but fail in practice. If citizens are intimidated, or if too many treat elections as random exercises, the outcomes cannot be said to represent meaningful self-rule. Democratic value requires both levels to align: institutions must treat citizens equally, and citizens must act as free and reason-responsive agents.
The ultimate goal of democracy is that all citizens enjoy equal opportunities for political influence. In the context of voting, this is realized, I contend, when votes are free and reason responsive. Freedom means choices are made without coercion. Reason-responsiveness means votes are grounded in one’s own interests, values, or judgments rather than arbitrary selection or blind obedience. A coerced or thoughtless vote undermines both personal autonomy and democratic legitimacy.
Seen in this light, compulsory voting is problematic. While critics often object that it violates freedom by removing the choice to abstain, the deeper issue lies with reason-responsiveness. Compelling attendance without cultivating thoughtful engagement encourages blank, spoiled, or random ballots. Participation rises, but democratic agency does not. Imagine a society with near-universal turnout but only a minority casting valid, reason-responsive votes. The majority of ballots, being invalid or random, would not only signal a lack of capacity or willingness to choose but also distort equality by giving disproportionate influence to those who did vote meaningfully, just as in a low-turnout scenario.
Defenders respond that even if many compelled votes are meaningless, the total number of reason-responsive votes still rises. More turnout means more democratic voting overall. Yet this justification is flawed. First, compulsion falls unequally. Those with fewer resources or less education may be more likely to submit meaningless ballots, while the informed gain even more influence. A measure designed to equalize participation can end up reinforcing inequalities. Second, it treats citizens as mere instruments. What individuals are required to do—show up—is neither sufficient nor directly tied to the democratic goal of thoughtful voting. Compare it with taxation: paying taxes directly funds public goods. Attending the polls, by contrast, does not directly increase democratic legitimacy (citizens must vote in a free and reason-responsive way for that to happen). To compel attendance only for its aggregate effect is to use individuals as means, not agents.
High turnouts have democratic value only when they express free and reason-responsive participation. A crowded polling place is not in itself a democratic achievement. Numbers matter when they reflect genuine equality and collective control. This does not mean we should not care when turnout is low. Barriers such as restrictive registration, unequal polling access, poorly designed electoral laws, and gerrymandering make it harder for some groups to exercise their rights. In such contexts, formal equality of the right to vote is undermined by unequal opportunities to use it. But true democracy also requires equal opportunities to influence agendas, deliberate with others, and stand for office. Without these, even universal turnout lacks democratic value.
Compulsory voting does not solve these deeper structural problems, and by presenting itself as a quick solution, it risks obscuring how far real democracies fail to live up to their own ideals.
Chiara Destri
Chiara Destri is Assistant Professor (non-tenure track) at the University of Milan after having been a postdoc at Goethe University Frankfurt, Sciences Po Paris and the EUI. Her research focuses on democratic theory, particularly the ethics of voting, political representation, partisanship and political trust. She has published in international journals, such as Political Studies, Perspectives on Politics, Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy and Philosophy and Social Criticism.
