One of the many takeaways from Donald Trump’s re-election is that America is, has been, and will remain deeply divided along political lines. And following the (in their eyes) deeply disturbing election results, many frustrated Americans are not looking for unity, but are instead focusing their ire on Trump supporters themselves.
For instance, just a few weeks ago, an employee of FEMA was fired after it was reported that she directed her employees to avoid helping at homes with Trump signs (though it is unclear whether this happened before or after the election). Many voters feel similarly. After the election, The New York Times interviewed frustrated democrats about their plans for the future. Ken Turco, a real estate photographer from Asheville, N.C. shared that he intended to stop helping with hurricane relief efforts in Republican-leaning counties near Asheville. Turco said, “I could care less what happens to them. They voted for it; they’re going to get it. They’re going to get everything they asked for.”
Clearly, the FEMA worker violated her professional obligations. She must be politically neutral, and FEMA was right to fire her. Moreover, there is an important difference between support that comes from government sources, and ordinary beneficence from individuals. Obviously, the former should not be allocated along political lines. (Indeed, Trump himself has shown a desire to do just this, for which his opponents have rightly criticized him.)
But what about those of us, like Mr. Turco, for whom political neutrality in our individual beneficence is not so obviously required? Is it morally wrong to forgo assisting Trump supporters? And if so, on what grounds?
Philosophers have written extensively on the idea of partiality—the idea that in addition to our general moral duties to everyone, we also have special permissions and obligations to others. Partiality is justified toward those with whom we stand in close relationships, like one’s children, one’s spouse, friends, community, and so on. Our duties to our nearest and dearest sometimes morally permit or require us to give them special treatment. If I can donate to one of two charities, but one of them will help someone I love, then surely I can prefer that charity over one that only helps a stranger. Of course, there are limits: I cannot give my loved ones unlimited preference. And I cannot seriously harm strangers so that my spouse gets what she wants.
More recently, some philosophers have discussed the inverse phenomenon of negative partiality—that is, showing dispreference for those with whom we stand in certain negative relationships. Just as positive partiality allows us to give positive treatment to those we stand in certain special positive relationships with, so does negative partiality allow us to give special negative treatment to those with whom we have negative relationships.
This may bring to mind the idea of revenge—harming some in retaliation for some wrong they have done to you. But negative partiality need not go that far. Just like positive partiality, negative partiality has limits. If someone stands in a negative relationship with you, you may be permitted to discount their interests somewhat. If you had a choice between donating to one of two charities, and one is for your enemy—someone who has consistently treated you badly, unjustly harmed or disrespected you, and so forth—and the other is for a stranger, you are clearly permitted to decline to support your enemy and give the aid to a stranger. And, plausibly, you may even decline to aid your enemy if their needs are somewhat greater than those of a stranger. In essence, you can treat them worse than strangers, in light of your negative history with them.
Is it morally justified for the ‘Anti-Trumpers’ to show negative partiality toward Pro-Trumpers?
First, is the relationship negative? Anti-Trumpers would claim that the Pro-Trumpers have shepherded in an administration that has promised mass deportations, anti-LGBTQ legislation, decimating the rights of women, the dismantling of regulations put in place to limit the effects of climate change, massive tax breaks for the wealthy that will further political inequality, and many other significantly damaging proposals—often with a deliberate cruelty at the center. In many cases, these proposals will harm Anti-Trumpers directly, or those they care about. In general, the fact that one champions harmful behavior at all renders negative partiality appropriate—even more so for those on whom the harms fall, directly or indirectly.
Notice, though, that negative partiality isn’t justified when these harms are justified: a malevolent actor does not secure reasons of negative partiality toward his victim on account of the fact that the victim fought back, harming the attacker. In other words, for negative partiality to be justified, it must be that the negative relationship is a product of injustice or wrongdoing on the part of the one to whom negative partiality would be shown.
Suppose, then, that this relationship is indeed negative, and thus some measure of negative partiality from Anti- to Pro-Trumpers would be (pro tanto) warranted. What does this mean for folks, like Mr. Turco, who act (or wish to act) on this negative partiality?
Three further questions arise. First, can one accurately determine, in practice, whether all of the people affected by acts of negative partiality are indeed those with whom one has a negative relationship? Second, and more generally, are Pro-Trumpers morally appropriate recipients of the Anti-Trumpers’ negative partiality? And, third: does the negative relationship in question justify this level of negative partiality—that is, declining to render significant aid?
First, we rarely know with enough certainty who one actually voted for. In some cases, supporters will make themselves known, particularly through their words and actions. But while a Trump sign in a yard is a good indicator that someone living there voted for him, it’s certainly not proof that everyone who lives there did so. (Indeed, many who support Trump nevertheless don’t vote for him. Perhaps their expressive support suffices to render the relationship negative, however. I will leave this question open.)
We could, of course, look at the county-level vote totals. This seems to be, in effect, what Mr. Turco did. But the fact that many in a given county supported Trump does not justify negative partiality toward everyone in that county. Indeed, the fact that the non-Trump supporters in a given county are outweighed might be evidence that they are in greater danger of the harmful effects of his agenda. While declining to aid this county would show negative partiality to the Pro-Trumpers among them, it would also harm the vulnerable. And perhaps there is a variant of Blackstone’s Ratio to apply here: better that a hundred Pro-Trumpers get aid (despite one’s being justified in not aiding them) than a single vulnerable non-Trump supporter fail to receive aid.
Thus, in practice it will be difficult to identify the Anti-Trumpers among the groups in which they are embedded, which poses a significant limit on an Anti-Trumper’s ability to accurately apply negative partiality to all and only those with whom they stand in the relevant negative relationship.
Furthermore, even if one could identify Pro-Trumpers—either in general or in a specific case—it is not clear that they would be appropriate subjects for negative partiality. Given the massive influence of propaganda and echo chambers to the political views of many Americans—perhaps particularly on the far right—we should ask whether all Pro-Trumpers are morally responsible for the harms they cause. As some have pointed out, Google searches for “How do I change my vote?”, “What is a tariff?”, and other related queries spiked after the election. This is not to say that Pro-Trumpers should be let off the hook entirely. But the negative relationship may not be, in a morally relevant sense, entirely their fault. And if there are relevant excusing conditions, such as having been manipulated, this weakens the justification for discounting their interests.
But suppose we know for certain, in a given instance, that this person is a Pro-Trumper who is not the victim of propaganda and possesses no other relevant excusing conditions. Does this mean declining to render significant aid is justified?
It is unclear whether the relationship in question is negative enough to justify significant discounting of their interests. After all, the relationship is (by hypothesis) rather indirect: the Pro-Trumper does not have a negative relationship with you per se—though perhaps there are exceptions (e.g. they openly endorse racist policies toward your racial group). Moreover, it is unclear whether negative partiality can justify allowing serious harms to befall others merely because of the negative relationship. In forced choice scenarios, where one can help one or another, it may be justified to prefer the neutral party over the enemy; but when it’s an enemy’s life at the cost of dirtying my sneakers, it’s clear that opting to let them die is unjustified.
But notice that Mr. Turco was not leaving people to die. He was simply declining to offer further assistance in their rebuilding efforts. In other words, he was declining to help them in ways that he was not in any sense obligated to do. His decision to stop helping is therefore quite different than if, say, he declined to help save those still in need of life-saving rescue.
Negative partiality is, of course, only one dimension of the question of whether it is morally appropriate to deny assistance to Pro-Trumpers. There is also the question of desert—namely, people getting what they deserve. One could argue that those who vote for policies that will harm them have lost standing to complain when the effects of those policies harm them. So, given the extent to which the Trump campaign (and previous Trump administration) showed open hostility toward measures aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change, it makes sense to think that those who support these policies are getting their comeuppance when they suffer the effects of climate disaster. Still, whether they deserve to bear these costs and whether we have an obligation to prevent their suffering are two different questions.
Of course, one could hold that, even if it is justified, acting on negative partiality is simply a bad political strategy, since it promises to drive the two sides even further apart, sowing discord and resentment throughout the country, likely causing even further harms in the future. It could be politically and socially effective to show, in words and actions, the values one endorses, even if the benefits accrue to those who have actively fought against your interests. There is much to be said for approaching even one’s enemies with love and compassion, if one can bring oneself to do so—even if ignoring their needs might be otherwise justified.
Jeremy Davis
Jeremy Davis is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Georgia, where he is also a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Artificial Intelligence. His research is in normative and applied ethics, with a special focus on issues relating to justified harms and special relationships.
