Loneliness is gaining increasing attention both as a subject of scientific investigation and as a social problem. In part, this is motivated by an increasing body of empirical literature suggesting that loneliness has harmful effects on health and well-being. In turn, this has prompted calls for interventions to reduce loneliness. Yet, from a philosophical perspective, one may ask whether loneliness is always harmful and in need of addressing. In this vein, there have been worries about approaching loneliness as a matter of individual responsibility toward one’s well-being, the commodification of therapeutic interventions, or medicalization. How can such pitfalls be avoided while still acknowledging that loneliness can be harmful in some cases and interventions for preventing or ameliorating it could be beneficial? In what follows, I will suggest that philosophy can help answer this question by clarifying the different meanings of loneliness and assessing their appropriateness in specific contexts.
Briefly put, claims about the health effects of loneliness as well as framing the experience of loneliness as a necessary part of human existence work with different notions of loneliness. This entails that empirical research, policy proposals, or calls to action should be clearer about the concept of loneliness employed. This is important also because the insufficient clarity in this respect together with the absence of deeper theorizing about the nature of loneliness poses problems for assessing the effectiveness of interventions to reduce loneliness. Furthermore, an account of which concepts are appropriate for specific contexts is needed, which requires bringing together philosophical and empirical input.
While loneliness has not been the focus of analytic philosophy, there has been a recent surge of interest in the topic, perhaps due to the scientific attention, or, more likely, in connection to the COVID-19 pandemic. Psychological approaches typically distinguish loneliness as perceived lack of social interaction from objective social isolation. However, philosophical analysis shows that there are further aspects to take into account. Recent work on loneliness and its connection to health highlights three ways of defining loneliness:
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Objectivism – loneliness is defined in connection to the absence of a particular intentional object, for instance, specific social interactions or social goods.
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Subjectivism – loneliness is defined as a mood, which affects how one perceives and relates to one’s social environment.
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Relational views – loneliness is defined through the interplay between the objective lack of particular social goods and self-narratives about being disconnected from one’s social environment.
This classification can help disentangle different concerns about loneliness and the appropriateness of specific approaches and interventions. For instance, psychotherapeutic interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, which place the problem within the individual work with a subjective notion of loneliness, as a mood that affects social cognition. The psychological description of loneliness associated with a ‘readiness to fend-off blows’, which leads to negative interpretations of social interactions and subsequent deterioration of relationships fits this pattern. The same holds for therapeutic interventions on social cognition, which work at the individual level and seek to change the defensiveness which leads to more loneliness.
When is such a subjectivist concept of loneliness appropriate? As discussed more broadly in the philosophy of science, the concepts we use influence the kinds of interventions that follow, in other words, they are value-promoting. Answering this question partly draws on empirical work, namely the finding that the most serious health effects are associated with chronic loneliness, thus when it has become a mood. Thus, this framing can be useful to reduce the health effects on individuals whose loneliness has become chronic. At the same time, it should be noted that this concept can also promote an excessively medicalized and individual approach, thus in other cases, such as preventing loneliness or for individuals dealing with temporary loneliness, such as when moving to a different country or ending a relationship, different concepts may work better.
Objectivist notions of loneliness help emphasize the kinds of social goods lonely individuals need, thus helping approach loneliness in a broader setting, albeit still with an individual focus. Further philosophical work, particularly phenomenological approaches, can help point out what kinds of goods lonely individuals are lacking or what kinds of interactions they feel excluded from and perceive as available to others. This concept is particularly useful for employing qualitative methods to study loneliness, particularly singling out the kinds of things lonely individuals are missing. Another important use can be to resist commodification. For instance, while social media or chatbots may promise social connection, if it is deeper interactions that one lacks, being aware of this can prompt one to look for the desired social goods elsewhere. Similarly, one can resist unhelpful advice about cutting off ‘toxic people’ and acknowledge that meaningful relationships often involve disagreements. A more structural use for this notion would be in conjunction with political analysis, particularly a critique of particular desires shaped, for instance, by widespread sexist norms. One example here is work on the loneliness experienced by incels.
Relational notions of loneliness hold the most promise of integrating more structural approaches. Particularly, reframing and shifting self-narratives to challenge social roles that maintain patterns of loneliness. As elderly individuals are particularly likely to experience loneliness, in addition to addressing medical issues stemming from loneliness becoming chronic, one may consider changing the (self-)narratives about old age and oppressive standards about productivity. Similarly, women who do not (fully) comply with the demands of patriarchal societies tend to report feeling lonely, particularly in less gender-equal societies. Again, one way of changing this is challenging the narratives around traditional gender roles. These notions also stress the connection to one’s environment, which can then be analyzed from the perspective of what social goods and interactions it affords. This is illustrated, for instance, by work on loneliness and environments and could be used in policy to move away from individual-focused interventions.
To sum up, I have suggested clarity about the concepts of loneliness at use and an assessment of the appropriateness of specific concepts for particular contexts. Yet, as with any pluralistic outlook a remaining question concerns the divergences between these approaches. Wouldn’t conflicts stand in the way of a coherent picture as sketched above? Indeed, this issue appears particularly pressing when formulating claims about loneliness causing various health outcomes. In reply, I first acknowledge that pluralism opens up a puzzle about whether to integrate different concepts and connected approaches or to work with multiple, potentially conflicting notions. Still, using this puzzle as a starting point is a better position than assuming loneliness to be one thing and missing approaches or interventions connected to other notions. Secondly, given the current state of research integration may be a serious possibility. For instance, relational and intentional (i.e., objectivist) notions of loneliness have been brought together in philosophical discussions. Loneliness as mood can also be thought of as emerging when one is systematically deprived of particular social goods. These philosophical insights can serve as hypotheses for further empirical investigations on different dimensions and experiences of loneliness.
Elena Popa
Elena Popa is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. She works on causality and causal reasoning and values in science, with special emphasis on cultural and social issues in medicine, particularly psychiatry and public health. Her work has been published in journals such asSynthese, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science: Part C, and Topoi. This post draws on her research in the project ‘Values, Trust and Decision Making in Public Health’ co-funded by the European Commission and the Polish National Science Centre.
