Do you think that you have a divine right to have children? Might you even have a duty to do so? Our new book, Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption, explains why you think you do. It is an illusion, but, especially if you are a philosopher, a deeply ingrained one.
The book combines historical, conceptual, and normative approaches to provide a balanced view of an emerging and frequently misunderstood philosophy and social movement.
Surface online sources have characterized antinatalism as “assigning a negative value to reproduction.” More precise definitions, however, continue to be debated. The word itself was not included in any established English lexicon until early 2024, when the Cambridge Dictionary defined it as “the belief that it is morally wrong to have children or that people should be encouraged not to have children.”
Numerous iterations of this idea, with varying names, have been around for centuries, and since the 1960s, academic formulations of the notion began to emerge in the works of Hermann Vetter, Julio Cabrera, Karim Akerma, and others. However, it was not until the publication of David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence in 2006 that the word “antinatalism” was coined and became popular. With this development, antinatalism as a contemporary academic philosophical position was officially born.
Nearly twenty years after the publication of Benatar’s seminal book, antinatalism is now a global phenomenon with international visibility in venues like The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast and The Cosmic AntiNatalist. It also features as the core tenet of several activist movements, including Antinatalist Advocacy, Stop Having Kids, and Childfree India. It was within this new environment that our inquiry into antinatalism’s past, present, and future began (see here, here, here, and here).
Most antinatalists believe that people should not have children. Many also believe that other sentient beings should not have offspring. And some think that machine sentience should not be developed. We have discussed these in our preparations for the book (here, here, and here). In the best possible world, the cycle of sentience, be that organic or otherwise, is broken and there is no more suffering.
Antinatalism is often met with disbelief. Many find the idea mistaken and unthinkable. Why suggest something like this when humankind has struggled for survival for so long? Why propose extinction when technology could eliminate suffering? And what could be wrong with passing on the gift of life? In our book, we answer these questions.
We begin our investigation by looking into the history of Western philosophy. The ancient Greeks, influenced by other cultures, realized that human life has no purpose. Why continue it, then? Plato responded by creating a belief-defying metaphysical system. An artisan god, a demiurge, created the world using imperfect materials. Human efforts were and still are needed to complete the work. This explanation was enough to satisfy most philosophical minds during the Greco-Roman centuries to come.
Early Christian Gnostic sects relaunched the antinatalist challenge. Believing in the second coming of Jesus and the sinfulness of the pleasures of the flesh, they renounced sex and childbearing. Augustine of Hippo, once a Gnostic Manichean himself, countered them by positing that our earthly life is followed by a purpose-giving afterlife if only we take our suffering in good stride. This is still the teaching of Christian churches today.
The challenges and responses have, however, continued to this day. We argue that Western philosophy can, in fact, be seen as an endless struggle against antinatalism. Every time life’s meaninglessness seriously enters intellectual conversation, philosophers come to rescue with new fairy tales. It is a bold claim, but we think it is worth considering.
Moving on to conceptual matters, we address the issue of extinction. If reproduction stops, species, including humans, will go extinct. If we aim to eliminate suffering, this is a good development. But, if we seek to perpetuate life, it is not so good.
Consistent antinatalism must come to terms with the fact that its consequence is the demise of species. At least for humans, this could be accomplished voluntarily. Some members of the antinatalist community have proposed that the idea of extinction should be abandoned altogether, and that working towards bioengineered bliss instead is the correct path forward. We argue that such plans lack any realism and that, whatever mental or moral reservations may be needed, extinction of some kind is a consequence of the methodical end of reproduction.
Opponents of antinatalism believe that reproduction itself gives meaning to our existence. Having children and raising them up to have more children gives purpose to human life. We respond that while this is true, it is also the foundation of the strongest argument against reproduction. It places parents in the horns of a procreative dilemma.
In the science-fiction short story The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas, Ursula K. Le Guin tells the tale of a utopian city in which one child must endure great suffering and misery for the happiness of all others. In Omelas and Omelas Take Two, we liken this patently appalling arrangement to perpetuated reproduction. If generations continue to follow one another, sooner or later, someone in any family line will have a truly miserable life. Parents raising their children to have more children will be, for their part, guilty of creating that misery.
They can avoid this by teaching their children not to have children of their own. But by doing so, they deny their offspring the purpose in life that they themselves achieved by reproducing. Either way, procreators are doomed to morally bankrupt and corrupt themselves.
We conclude the book by considering the future of antinatalism. Is there a way to realize its leading idea of a world without suffering? We explore this by listing and assessing thirteen solutions.
Matti Häyry and Amanda Sukenick, Antinatalism, Extinction and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. Open Access.
Matti Häyry
Matti Häyry is a Professor of Philosophy at the Aalto University School of Business. He has been involved in reproductive ethics and antinatalist philosophy since 1984. His 2004 A Rational Cure for Prereproductive Stress Syndrome is considered to be the first expression of the so-called risk argument against procreation. His more recent publications on the topic, in addition to the 2024 book presented here, include If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of Nonexistence, Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children, and Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher.
Amanda Sukenick
Amanda Sukenick has been producing antinatalist works in a wide variety of mediums since 2010. In her graduate thesis, a horror-comedy short film called The EFIList, she expressed in artistic form the main tenets of one of the main strands of contemporary antinatalism. Since 2020, she has been the host of The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast. Her recent publications, in addition to the 2024 book presented here, include, with Matti Häyry, Imposing a Lifestyle: A New Argument for Antinatalism.
(1) Re: “Consistent antinatalism must come to terms with the fact that its consequence is the demise of species. At least for humans, this could be accomplished voluntarily. Some members of the antinatalist community have proposed that the idea of extinction should be abandoned altogether, and that working towards bioengineered bliss instead is the correct path forward.”
In their book on pages 27 and 28 respectively, Matti and Amanda state: “Others who call themselves antinatalists, however, have mitigated the connection, to the point that they sometimes seem to be in denial about the fate of the species if reproduction should stop.”, and “many members of the antinatalist social media community (if the quarreling threads can be called that) seem to abhor the idea of human extinction, or being responsible for it, or being seen to be responsible for it”.
These 2 statements are presented without citation or any evidence. When I asked Matti to substantiate these claims he linked to a video posted on May 20 2024, 5 months after the book was released, and another quote from within the book that doesn’t prove the claims. In other words the authors are unable to substantiate their claims when asked (cf Section 9 https://stevegodfrey.substack.com/p/meh )
The claim presented in this piece is not the same as the claims presented in the book. M&A appear to be evolving the claims made in their book in an attempt to gaslight readers into believing the claim made here is the same.
I have two questions for the authors:
A: Are you intending the claim made in this piece to represent the claims you make on p27 and p28 of your book, or any other claims you made in your book?
B: Why haven’t you issued a retraction or provided evidence for the unsubstantiated claims on p27 and p28 of your book?
(2) Re: “If generations continue to follow one another, sooner or later, someone in any family line will have a truly miserable life. Parents raising their children to have more children will be, for their part, guilty of creating that misery.”
You appear to be presenting this as a line of thought you came up with. however, this has been a staple of online antinatalism discourse for at least a decade.
Will you acknowledge that neither of you originated this argument and that it is in fact an idea that’s been floating around online for ages?
(3) Re the book, I’ve asked the authors publicly and via email to address specific matters of misrepresentation and lifting of other people’s work without attribution.
Matti and Amanda, when will you respond to those inquiries?
(4) In Amanda’s profile, efilism is described as “one of the main strands of contemporary antinatalism”. Efilism is an extinctionist position mandating the annihilation of all sentience for the purpose of eliminating suffering, by any means necessary. BAMN means efilism permits for procreation. Accelerationism and the ecological niche replacement argument are old hat within efilist circles. Both expressly advocate in favor of procreation. This being the case efilism’s at odds with being against procreation. Being at odds with with being against procreation means being at odds with antinatalism.
Can Amanda clarify why she believes efilism, which permits for being in favor of procreation, is a strand of antinatalism, which is against procreation?