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Post-truth is a constant in the contemporary world, due to the relevance of socio-digital networks for obtaining information. An attempt to approach the problem is commonly made using the deficit model, which assumes that people ignore or do not understand the evidence against their beliefs, so the objective of it is to teach and communicate this evidence in the clearest way possible. However, it has been argued that this model is insufficient. This article will explore some of the reasons why this is.
What is post-truth?
The term post-truth usually refers to the circulation of false versions of facts that are presented as authentic. Although, in a more comprehensive way, it can be defined as circumstances in which objective facts have less influence on the formation of public opinions than appealing to emotions and personal beliefs. [i] Considering that, currently, much of the information we consume circulates in socio-digital networks (where it is more likely that false information travels through one channel and the information that could refute it travels through another) there are fewer possibilities to start dialogues and debates. It can be said that we encapsulate ourselves in microenvironments nourished by information and appreciations with which we agree, thus reproducing the preferences, prejudices, and points of view that reinforce the microenvironments in which we exist. [ii]
Because of that situation, it could be claimed (as some authors do) that post-truth is associated with a despise for reason, which can be linked to postmodernism which proposes the non-existence of absolute truths. In turn, it could be argued that reality is made up of hard facts, and that if the “objectivity” of reality was conditional to people’s perception, then its validity would be denied. [iii] However, it is worth questioning if it would be useful to maintain this position, because declaring that there is an objective reality to which we must adhere does not deny, or cause, that different perceptions of reality cease to exist. Furthermore, if we seek to combat post-truth, it is more useful to keep in mind that it is not only about “educating,” debating, or refuting the beliefs of others.
The deficit model
Hornsey & Fielding’s analysis of non-scientific attitudes criticizes the idea that it is easy to assume that the resistance to evidence is caused by ignorance or a lack of understanding, which is why it has been called the deficit model. It perceives public communication of science as a process of correcting society’s supposed ignorance, disinterest, or rejection of science and technology. [iv] The authors propose that if the deficit or explanation model is accepted to explain non-scientific attitudes, it is assumed that evidence, data, and arguments lead to scientific attitudes. However, the proposal of these authors goes in the opposite way, suggesting that people first develop certain mindsets and then search for biased and selective information to sustain those opinions. In this sense, the evidence is also evaluated selectively. [v]
Origins of attitudes
The mentioned authors seek to develop a science communication model that emphasizes the foundations of attitudes that make people want to reject the scientific consensus. They suggest that, to “convert” people who reject scientific evidence, it is necessary to identify the causes of those attitudes and then develop “adapted” communication strategies based on those underlying motivations.
Hornsey & Fielding’s scheme tells us the following. First, we must distinguish between superficial attitudes and the sources of those attitudes. What lies on the surface are concrete and specific attitudes: for example, creationism, climate skepticism, etc. What lies beneath is the basis of the attitude: like fears, ideologies, worldviews, vested interests, or identity needs that sustain the attitudes; also giving them coherence, stability, and permanence, even when they may be challenged through evidence. [vi] In addition to this proposal, another idea that seems essential (for me) to understand the insufficiency of the deficit model is what the author Luis Vega tags as second-order epistemic relativism.
Epistemic relativism
It is possible to continue the criticism of the view that there is an objective reality supported by hard facts by bringing into the discussion epistemic relativism, which aims to confront the absolutist visions that attempt to make a comparison between various ideas, cultures, or standards by appealing to universal notions of value, and from which the diversity of positions can be explained or evaluated. This opposition to absolutism supports a skeptical and a permissive relativist position, which can be summarized as follows: No point of view is privileged, no description is true, and no criterion of value is valid (skeptic). All points of view are equally privileged, all descriptions are true, and all criteria of value are equally valid (permissive). [vii]
Second-order relativism
Luis Vega suggests a second-order relativism in which we must proceed reflexively in the metacognitive field. According to this view, it is important to discuss notions such as truth, conceptualization schemes, criteria of rationality, and norms of justification. Instead of thinking that all ideas or knowledge are relative, we are invited to reflect about the criteria that allow us to justify these ideas or knowledge. [viii] It is possible to think, then, that (epistemically and discursively) people must interact not with truths and falsehoods, but instead with evidence and counter-evidence. He proposes that knowledge is not possible independent of the epistemic subjects. At this point, it can be sustained, following Vega, that things can occur independently of a particular subject or justification, but it is not possible to know that something is true or false outside of all justification. There is no epistemology without epistemic subjects, and those epistemic subjects are members of epistemic communities. [ix]
Subsequently, for Luis Vega, the rational justification of an alleged knowledge is (in principle) a justification that is not only relevant, but also generalizable according to an epistemic criterion; that is, a condition that marks certain differences between a belief or a system of beliefs, and a knowledge or body of knowledges. This means that there are epistemic standards that justify the idea that subjects’ beliefs are knowledge; so, although it is not denied that there is a reality that could be called “objective,” the important aspect is that, even if there is an epistemic criterion, it is not so simple that subjects assume scientific evidence simply by being exposed to it.
Conclusions
Both proposals, the one related to the origins of attitudes and the other of second-order relativism, allow us to see why the deficit model is insufficient to address post-truth, because it cannot be defeated simply by showing people evidence against their beliefs. Attitudes have a foundation that leads individuals to seek information that supports them. Also, beliefs are filtered through an epistemic criterion that determines them as knowledge for the members of an epistemic community. Understanding the origins of attitudes that people (who hold beliefs or knowledge distinct to what scientific evidence proves) hold allows us to refute the idea that post-truth is a matter of ignorance or lack of education; since there are compelling reasons that prevent people from accepting evidence contrary to their beliefs.
Notes
[i] Trejo, R. (2022). Posverdad, Populismo, Pandemia. Cal y Arena.
[ii] Trejo, R. (2022). Posverdad, Populismo, Pandemia. Cal y Arena.
[iii] Kakutani, M. (2018). The Death of truth: Notes on falsehood in the age of Trump. Tim Duggan Books.
[iv] Rodríguez, S. (2019). Conocimiento y poder en el Modelo de Déficit. Una aproximación epistemológica a la comunicación pública de la ciencia y la tecnología. Tecnología & Sociedad, 8, 31-57.
[v] Hornsey, M. & Fielding, K. (2017). Attitude Roots and Jiu Jitsu Persuasion: Understanding and Overcoming the Motivated Rejection of Science. American Psychologist, 72(5), 459-473. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040437
[vi] Hornsey, M. & Fielding, K. (2017). Attitude Roots and Jiu Jitsu Persuasion: Understanding and Overcoming the Motivated Rejection of Science. American Psychologist, 72(5), 459-473. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040437
[vii] Olivos, N. (2009). Dimensiones argumentativas del relativismo epistémico: Entre el programa y la duda escéptica. Andamios, 5(10). 197-226. http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-00632009000100009&lng=es&tlng=es
[viii] Olivos, N. (2009). Dimensiones argumentativas del relativismo epistémico: Entre el programa y la duda escéptica. Andamios, 5(10), 197-226. http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-00632009000100009&lng=es&tlng=es
[ix] Vega, L. (1995). Racionalidad y relativismo. In Olivé, L. (Ed.), Racionalidad epistémica. (203-222) Trotta.
Translated by Lina María Salazar
Alejandra Nava
Sociology student at National Autonomous University of Mexico. She is interested in STEM studies, and in sociology of science and religion.
