Is Racial Identity Ever Straightforward?

Introduction

One of the first times I was prompted to declare my racial identity was during a standardized test in second grade. I remember being confused by the options: White, African American, American Indian and Alaska Native, or Asian. I didn’t identify with any of those! I knew I was Puerto Rican and Salvadoran, but beyond that, I was unsure. When I expressed my confusion, my teacher asked, “What are you?” I told her I didn’t see what I was. She simply said, “Just put White,” and I did. This pivotal interaction sparked my awareness of racial identity and influenced how I’ve understood and navigated this aspect of my identity ever since.

Ethnically, I have roots in Puerto Rico and El Salvador, which aligns with the term Latinx—used to describe people from Latin America, in contrast to Hispanic, which refers to people from Spanish-speaking countries. Answering the question “What are you?” can be jarring and confusing, especially when you don’t neatly fit into any predefined categories and well, when you are eight. Navigating these assigned categories provides a rich ground for philosophy to offer tools for understanding and critiquing the frameworks that shape and organize our perception of race and racial identity.

Exploring the Philosophical Foundations of Racial Identity

Long before an eight-year-old me faced this dilemma, philosophers from Kant to Naomi Zack had already contributed to our understanding of these issues by debating the metaphysics of race. Is race a biological reality, a social construct, or something else? Such debates have laid the foundation for much of the confusion surrounding racial identity today, influencing both personal identities and systemic categorizations. Philosophers further clarify this by distinguishing between ‘race’ and ‘racial identity.’ While the consensus is that race is not biological but a construct with significant implications—often involving the classification of individuals based on attributes typically linked to physical characteristics like skin color, facial features, and hair type, usually associated with geographical regions and ancestry—there are still some who defend the biological aspect of race. ‘Racial identity,’ on the other hand, pertains to how individuals perceive themselves and are perceived by others, influenced by self-conception and shaped by personal experiences, cultural context, societal attitudes, and historical backgrounds.

Many discussions surrounding racial identity emphasize three key aspects: ascription (how society labels an individual), identification (how one self-identifies), and treatment (how one is treated by others). This general approach highlights the interplay between how individuals perceive themselves and how they are perceived and treated by others. It involves both first-person and third-person perspectives: on the one hand, individuals self-identify with their racial identity; on the other, society, institutions, or social groups categorize or perceive an individual’s racial identity.

Philosophically, the misclassification of racial categories carries significant ethical concerns, compelling individuals into predefined identities that may not truly represent their lived experiences. Not offering the proper racial categories to choose from or mislabeling someone as the wrong category carries significant repercussions from personal confusion to inappropriate distribution of federal funds.

The Philosophical Dilemma of Racial Identity

Two philosophical perspectives have motivated renewed debates about racial identification. Some argue for abolishing the concept of race due to its fraught historical origins, highlighting how it has been used to justify colonialism, slavery, and systematic discrimination. In contrast, others believe race, as a construct shaped by societal norms, warrants attention for its political and cultural relevance. Amidst varying opinions, there’s a growing push to replace ‘race’ with ‘racial identity.’ Advocates for this shift argue that it helps discredit the false biological basis of racial categories. Using ‘racial identity’ instead emphasizes the social aspects of race, acknowledging how these identities shape people’s lives and interactions in meaningful ways.

This shift is becoming increasingly relevant as more people assert their racial identity on their own terms. For instance, in March 2024—twenty-eight years after I faced confusion about my own racial identity—the U.S. Census updated its data collection method. It introduced a Middle Eastern category and merged race and ethnicity into a single question, allowing for multiple selections. Now, I can select “Hispanic or Latino” without misrepresenting myself or my self. However, there will still be confusion for some when identifying themselves in the options provided, not because they defy the definition of the categories, but because they simply are not represented.

The implications of these changes, however, extend beyond just adding new categories. In 2020, many Brazilians in the U.S. identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino, challenging established racial and ethnic categories. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not classify Brazilians as Hispanic or Latino, as this designation is intended for specific regions. When self-reported identities clash with these predefined categories, agencies like the Census Bureau may reclassify them, altering an individual’s racial identity to fit established norms. In this case, these individuals would be reclassified as “not Hispanic or Latino.” This practice highlights the tension between personal identity and societal classification systems, particularly when these identities do not align with official categories. Such discrepancies can lead to individuals being perceived and treated one way socially while official entities impose contrasting classifications, often ignoring the complicated realities of personal and cultural identity.  However, some argue that classification systems, despite their imperfections, are necessary for reasons such as policy-making, resource allocation, and demographic analysis. They contend that the benefits of maintaining such systems outweigh the costs, even if it means some personal identities are not perfectly captured.

Reflecting on the example of Brazilians in the U.S., we encounter a critical ethical question: How should we identify racially when there are no fitting options available? Addressing this question invites a deeper discussion about racial identity, opening the door to explore not only these discrepancies but also the various unconventional ways individuals assert their racial identities today.

Unconventional Racial Identities

Why else does the way we racially identify matter? Today, individuals are increasingly adopting racial identities that defy traditional categories. The widespread use of technology and social media, access to genealogy reports, and incidents of racial fraud have pushed unconventional racial self-identification into the public spotlight.

I define unconventional racial self-identification as an individual’s assertion of a racial identity that stands apart from conventional or historically defined racial groupings. People who may fall into this category are transracial adoptees, people who don’t know their racial identity, or find out their “true” racial identity later in life. Understanding and owning one’s racial status involves a conscious political awareness, deepening the concept of racial identity beyond mere internal self-conception. It is important that we pay attention to these experiences because we need language to make distinctions concerning these identities so that we can correctly assess the moral permissibility of said identities.

It is beyond the scope of this blog post to provide an instructive methodology for assessing the moral permissibility of various unconventional racial self-identifications. For example, if a person’s family unit is White but they later decide in early adulthood to transition into an Asian identity, is that morally permissible? My initial view is no, it is likely not morally permissible. That said, a thorough understanding of the narrative behind that decision and the choice to pursue it is necessary to make an informed judgment.

Philosophical efforts to unpack the issues I have presented here have led to conceptual conflation, sparking unwarranted social and political contention and diverting from what I believe to be the discipline’s objective and strength: to clarify conceptual frameworks. By proactively engaging with these shifts, philosophy can help us articulate and refine our understanding of what racial identity means and what it might become.

As we navigate these changes, it is crucial to philosophically grapple with and reflect on the moral questions surrounding how people do or should self-identify. We have the tools to understand and critique the frameworks that shape racial identities. By utilizing these tools, we can not only reflect on but also reshape how society categorizes and perceives race.

The Current Events in Public Philosophy series of the APA Blog aims to share philosophical insights about unfolding events and topics. If you would like to contribute to this series, email RichardBGibson@hotmail.com.

Asil M. Martinez

Asil is a fifth-year Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy and a certificate candidate in Africana Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. Asil’s research focuses on the philosophy of race and ethics, specifically exploring the complexities of racial identity, including non-traditional forms. Their dissertation aims to introduce a novel perspective on racial identity.

www.asilmmartinez.com