Kenneth Park was rescued from the counterculture of the 1960s by philosophy, especially by Sartre and Nietzsche. In high school, he was Advanced Placement, but with little direction other than non-conformity and decadence. Once he started reading philosophy, he realized that he had a responsibility to create himself and subsequently became a workaholic in the discipline. He still wonders, however, if he is decadent because he doesn’t devote himself to STEM. Is he still a metaphysician?
If you could have a one-hour conversation with any philosopher from any time, who would you pick, and what topic would you choose?
I would choose Nietzsche. The topic would be: which contemporary commentators would Nietzsche think was the most accurate in terms of his philosophy? In particular, would Nietzsche be in favor of compassion without solidarity (compassion at a distance) rather than Nietzsche being just totally opposed to compassion in any form? Kaufmann quotes Nietzsche as saying that he thinks sometimes the greatest joys are experienced by making other people happy (this is a paraphrase, not a direct quote). But, is Kaufmann interpreting Nietzsche in a way that Kaufmann wants Nietzsche to be, rather than how Nietzsche actually was? This holds over into contemporary commentary with Katsafanas being more like Kaufmann in the sense of thinking reasoning on drives is more important to Nietzsche than the drives themselves (or at least, equivalent, as Katsafanas writes about the evaluative aspects of drives). Gemes and Leiter seem to view Nietzsche as valuing drives more than reason, with the reason being one drive among many (with the reasoning drive being dominant in philosophers). But the question remains: can we change all people using reason, or are people determined by their drives? Nietzsche is right in criticizing the metaphysical forms of reason, but there are more concrete forms of reason which are not so disembodied.
Nietzsche is showing the psychological bounds of reason, to adapt Strawson’s analysis of Kant’s first critique.
A related concern is whether Nietzsche would value the French Nietzscheans (Bataille, Deleuze, Foucault, Irigaray, among others) over the Anglo Nietzscheans (Katsafanas, Gemes, Leiter, Reginster, among others).
What are you working on right now?
I’m working on a book, tentatively entitled Psychoepistemology and Subjective Determinism, with Bard College Professor and APA member Daniel Berthold. It deals with a critique of the neo-conservative project in the Middle East. In particular, it deals with what were the philosophically and psychologically deficient concepts that led the neo-conservative project to fail. The neo-conservatives had faith in the underlying ontology of human beings that was a form of “armchair morality,” to use Nietzsche’s phrase. This faith led the neo-conservatives to think that hard power was necessary to have Muslims liberated/liberate themselves. It was “armchair morality” because its premises were derived in a way that was alienated from the concrete psychological conditions of the Muslims on the ground. In particular, women and other parts of the Muslim world, at least in many ways, embraced the chains that oppressed them, rather than welcoming us as liberators.
I still view the neo-conservative project as being good in many ways; the plight of women, homosexuals, and religious dissidents in Iraq and Afghanistan are similar to, or even worse than, the conditions of African-Americans in the Antebellum South.
I do think, however, that we should use smart power, which is a combination of hard power and soft power, to change other cultures, not just hard power, which the neo-conservatives think is sufficient. Richard Rorty sinks into the opposite extreme, thinking that soft power alone is sufficient to create change. (But, like the liberals, I am more than willing to give peace a chance.)
What are you reading right now? Would you recommend it?
I have been reading all three of Katsafanas’ books. I love Katsafanas’ interpretation of Nietzsche and his work on how to be devout in ways that don’t necessarily lead to either violence or normative dissipation (lack of devotion). I do, however, wonder if Katsafanas (and Kaufmann) are engaged in a type of “philosophical hope” in deemphasizing Nietzsche’s classism and aristocracy.
Perhaps Beiner is more correct in Beiner’s interpretation of Nietzsche in his Dangerous Minds. Nonetheless, Katsafanas’ work is essential to all contemporary studies in philosophy and other disciplines. I think Katsafanas’ account could be strengthened by a discussion of and prescription of processes of dispute resolution (which I think we should be devout about and hold sacred, especially if it is done peacefully).
What excites you about philosophy?
Philosophy excites me because it provides a social space for serious thought independent of facts and statistics. I do value facts and statistics, but I don’t think that the thinker should be imprisoned by them. This means that, in some senses, I value a priori thinking without being totally determined by it. This is not just because of my limited understanding of Kant, but also because of the work of the Austrian School Libertarians, especially von Mises. (My Libertarianism, however, is not devout and not dialectically invulnerable in the definitions of the terms by Katsafanas.) In some ways, my goal is similar to some of the ideas of the positivists’ view of a unified science and the Frankfurt School (minus the Hegelian Marxism). I must emphasize that my work in these areas is not complete, it is still developing as I study more. As I am writing in my (hopeful) book, one of the deficiencies of the Bretton Woods system was its neglect of the issues of subject formation. Subject formation was left to the accidents of fate, rather than planned. As Nietzsche writes, genius must now become rationally cultivated and bred (creating society as a machine that produces Overmen, including rationality and tolerance, while giving predominance to proficiency over morality as many Nietzsche commentators argue, including Reginster). Genius and the psychology of overcoming will no longer be left to the accidents of fate.
Who is the most underrated philosopher?
I would say one candidate is Deirdre McCloskey. She tries to synthesize the Christian virtues with the Pagan virtues (especially in her The Bourgeois Virtues). I find her attractive because she proposes a form of Libertarianism that doesn’t discard compassion. I think the Democrats have a heart and no head; the Republicans have a head and no heart. I find the Libertarian alternative attractive.
Which books have changed your life? In what ways?
Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Words and Being and Nothingness. When I read them as a teenager, I realized that I had the responsibility to create myself and that I was entitled to nothing.
This section of the APA Blog is designed to get to know our fellow philosophers a little better. We’re including profiles of APA members that spotlight what captures their interest not only inside the office, but also outside of it. We’d love for you to be a part of it, so please contact us via the interview nomination form here to nominate yourself or a friend.
Alexis LaBar has a Master’s degree in Philosophy from West Chester University of Pennsylvania. Before attending West Chester, she graduated from Moravian University with a Bachelor’s in Philosophy, a minor in Global Religions, and an Ethics certificate. She is the recipient of the 2022 Claghorn Award in Philosophy, awarded by West Chester University, and the 2021 Douglas Anderson Prize in Philosophy, awarded by Moravian University. She is the Editor of the Teaching Beat and Work/Life Balance Beat.
