April is autism acceptance month. Truly accepting autism requires both understanding neurodiversity and unlearning neuronormativity. The discussion that follows aims to provide some steps toward this process of understanding and unlearning. For example, did you know that it is incorrect and potentially problematic to refer to individuals as neurodiverse? And were you aware that even the common and seemingly neutral language of ‘neurotypical’ or ‘neurodivergent’ in fact reflects neuronormative assumptions? To understand why, let’s unpack the notions of neurodiversity and neuronormativity, starting with some brief definitions, then expanding on each further.
Neuronormativity refers to the privileged, so-called neurotypical set of assumptions, norms, and practices that construes so-called neurotypicality as the sole acceptable or superior mode of cognition, and that stigmatizes attitudes, behaviors, or actions that reflect so-called neurodivergent modes of cognition as deviant or inferior. Neuronormative assumptions, norms, and practices uphold standards regarding, for example, what is neurotypically considered appropriate eye contact, facial expressions, prosody, conversational flow, processing, and responsiveness—all of which can be more difficult for so-called neurodivergent individuals to understand, sense, or apply due to naturally occurring variations in their neurocognitive profiles.
The term ‘neurodiversity’ was coined in 1998 by Australian sociologist Judy Singer in her MA thesis. Neurodiversity refers both to a natural fact and to a sociopolitical movement. As a natural fact, neurodiversity corresponds to the range of neurocognitive variation that is naturally present across the human population. For this reason, while collectives such as humanity can be neurodiverse, a single person cannot be neurodiverse. In other words, neurodiversity, much like biodiversity or racial diversity, is a property of groups and not of individuals. As a sociopolitical movement, the neurodiversity movement advocates for the equal recognition and inclusion of the various types of neurocognitive profiles that make up neurodiversity throughout humanity. In this sense, the neurodiversity movement fundamentally aims to resist and dismantle neuronormativity, or the socially constructed hierarchization among naturally occurring variations in neurocognitive profiles. Let’s unpack each of these points about neurodiversity and neuronormativity further.
As a natural fact, neurodiversity is a part of biodiversity. Neurodiversity is the set of neurocognitive profiles that correspond to naturally occurring neurocognitive variations among humans. From this natural variation, people in positions of epistemic authority (e.g., some doctors, scientists, or researchers) have over time come to create normative categories that divide neurodiversity into two main subsets: on the one hand, neurocognitive profiles categorized as normal or typical; on the other hand, neurocognitive profiles categorized as abnormal, atypical, or divergent. So-called neuroatypical or neurodivergent profiles include for example autism, so-called ADHD profiles, dys- profiles (dyslexia, dysorthography, dyscalculia, dyspraxia), and Tourette profiles. Through this neuronormative process of categorization as typical or as atypical, individuals who fall into the ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ category come to be viewed and treated as superior, whereas individuals who fall into the ‘atypical’ or ‘abnormal’ category come to be viewed and treated as inferior. The neuronormative process of categorizing various neurocognitive profiles thus simultaneously creates a hierarchy among them.
Now, it might seem like these categories of neurotypical/atypical simply track preexisting natural kinds, or that they merely capture the statistical prevalence of a certain type of neurocognitive profile over others—but that, either way, hierarchization is an unfortunate byproduct of the process of categorizing rather than an inherent feature of this categorization process. The categories of neurotypical/atypical, however, are a matter neither of natural kinds nor of statistics, and the hierarchization they imply is an inherent rather than an accidental feature. Indeed, if these categories merely tracked natural kinds, all they would do would be to apply descriptive labels to preexisting entities found in nature. Yet the only preexisting thing to be found in nature, in this case, is neurodiversity as a whole—that is, the range of neurocognitive variation that is naturally present across the human population. Any attempt to sort these various neurocognitive profiles into particular subsets, such as typical or atypical, is going to have to rely on some criterion according to which various neurocognitive profiles can be sorted into one or the other category. In this case, the seemingly innocuous language of ‘neurotypicality’ and ‘neurodivergence,’ which seems to track natural kinds, in fact reflects an implicit reliance on a neuronormative norm that privileges so-called neurotypical profiles and marginalizes so-called neurodivergent profiles. To grasp how the language of ‘neurotypical’ and ‘neurodivergent’ is fundamentally grounded in neuronormativity, consider what happens if we take neurodiversity rather than neuronormativity as the norm or point of reference. If neurodiversity as a whole is the norm, the grounds on which to make the distinction between typical and atypical or divergent neurocognitive profiles no longer hold: typical and atypical or divergent in relation to what, or to whom?
Of course, so-called neurotypical profiles seem to be more prevalent across humans and hence may constitute a statistical norm—a statistical norm that nonetheless often surreptitiously and unjustifiably turns into a social and moral norm. But this still does not warrant creating and using the categories and language of ‘typical’ and ‘atypical.’ To understand why, let’s take an example from biodiversity, namely the natural variation in eye color. Within the human species, blue eyes are much less prevalent than brown eyes. Yet we do not refer to blue-eyed people as being ‘chromoatypical’ or ‘chromodivergent.’ Indeed, since in this case biodiversity—rather than brown eyes—is the norm or point of reference, it does not make sense to select the particular natural variation of blue eyes as being different, atypical, or divergent. If biodiversity is the norm, blue eyes are as different from brown eyes as brown eyes are from blue eyes. To single out blue eyes as different would be to institute brown eyes—rather than biodiversity—as the norm. Similarly, if neurodiversity—rather than neuronormativity—is the norm or point of reference, then it does not make sense to speak of ‘neuroatypical’ or ‘neurodivergent’ people. If neurodiversity is the norm, various neurocognitive profiles are all equally different from each other. To single out some neurocognitive profiles (i.e., so-called neuroatypical or neurodivergent profiles) as different is to institute other neurocognitive profiles (i.e., so-called neurotypical profiles)—rather than neurodiversity—as the norm.
In other words, far from tracking preexisting natural kinds or statistical prevalence, the categories and language of ‘neurotypical’ and ‘neurodivergent’ betray a neuronormative point of reference. In order to emphasize that so-called neurotypical and so-called neurodivergent profiles correspond not to natural categories but rather to different social positions and statuses created by power relations (here, neuroableism and neuronormativity), it would therefore be more appropriate to speak of ‘neuronormalized’ profiles for so-called neurotypical profiles and of ‘neurominoritized’ profiles for so-called neuroatypical or neurodivergent profiles. Terms such as ‘neuronormalized’ and ‘neurominoritized’ have the advantage of signaling the power relations that produce these categories. By contrast, terms such as ‘neurotypical’ or ‘neuroatypical’ conceal these power relations and therefore suggest that these are natural categories that somehow preexist these power relations. Yet, as noted above, while neurocognitive variation within the human species is indeed natural, the status of ‘normal/typical’ or ‘abnormal/atypical’ that is attributed to these different natural variations is not natural but rather the product of power relations. By drawing attention to power relations, the terms ‘neuronormalized’ or ‘neurominoritized’ thus make it easier to grasp the dimensions of privilege and marginalization that are fundamentally at play here.
Indeed, foregrounding the oppressive power relations that produce dominant and non-dominant social groups is important not only in order to politicize and denaturalize systems of categories and hierarchies that might otherwise seem neutral or natural, but also, relatedly, in order to highlight what might be termed here neuronormalized (or so-called neurotypical) privilege. Indeed, any system of oppression, whether it be sexism, racism, or neuroableism, is built around power relations that systematically privilege one group that thereby becomes the dominant group (men, people racialized as white, neuronormalized or so-called neurotypical people), while systematically subordinating or marginalizing another group that thereby becomes the non-dominant group (women or other gender minorities, people racialized as non-white, neurominoritized or so-called neuroatypical or neurodivergent people). Just as sexism or racism are systems of oppression that are produced and maintained by patriarchy or white supremacy; i.e., sets of assumptions, norms, and practices that discriminate against women and other gender minorities or people racialized as ‘non-white’; neuroableism is a system of oppression that is produced and maintained by neuronormativity; i.e., the set of assumptions, norms, and practices that discriminate against neurominoritized people (neuronormatively known as neuroatypical or neurodivergent people).
Because our everyday environments are often designed, even unintentionally, by and for members of dominant groups, neuronormalized people are privileged in that their environment is most often aligned with their mode of neurocognitive functioning. That is, their social and physical environment is designed in a way that supports and enables them, rather than in a way that constrains and disables them. When you have the privilege of living, navigating, and interacting in an environment designed in a way that suits you, the fact that you encounter few or no obstacles in that environment tends to go unnoticed. For this reason, privilege is most often imperceptible, unconscious, and taken for granted. Members of dominant groups often do not realize that they occupy a privileged social position and therefore tend to lack critical reflection about the power relations that underlie this privileged position. This lack of awareness of neuronormalized privilege is manifested among other things in the fact that the word ‘autistic’ is much more well-known than the word ‘allistic’ (meaning non-autistic). This terminological asymmetry reflects the fact that the privileged position of non-autistic, neuronormalized people is so much taken for granted that the need to identify or name it does not even seem necessary. Yet failing to name privilege serves to conceal the power relations that keep one group in a dominant position and the other in a non-dominant position.
One way power relations maintain neurominoritized people in a non-dominant position is via often unreflective yet harmful language. For example, while important in the legal context, the term ‘accommodations’ betrays a view of neurominoritized people (and disabled people more broadly) as burdens needing to be ‘accommodated’—at least, as long as their needs are deemed ‘reasonable’ by the neuronormative powers that be who designed the social and physical environment in ways that completely ignore the needs and modes of functioning of neurominoritized people, thereby effectively forcing neurominoritized people to consistently ‘accommodate’ neuronormalized people’s needs and modes of functioning without much, if any, chance of reciprocity. This is why it is preferable to speak of ‘adaptive measures’ or ‘inclusive measures,’ to emphasize that it is the neuronormative environment that by default is neither adapted for, nor inclusive of, neurominoritized people. In this sense, the terms ‘adaptive measures’ or ‘inclusive measures’ have two advantages. First, they emphasize that the problem does not lie in the individual (who is supposedly problematic and therefore needs to be ‘accommodated’), but rather in the environment (that is problematic because it is ill-adapted and non-inclusive). Second, they emphasize that what is at stake is a matter of justice and a moral (and often legal) right, not a matter of charity or goodwill on the part of the relevant authorities.
Another way in which the unreflective yet harmful use of language maintains neurominoritized people in a non-dominant position is the overwhelming tendency to refer to neurominoritized profiles (e.g., autism, so-called ADHD profiles, dys- profiles, or Tourette profiles) as ‘syndromes’ or ‘disorders’ and to describe them in terms of ‘deficits’ or ‘deficiencies’—though note how the foregoing phrasing intentionally does not use this pathologizing and stigmatizing language. Indeed, this language is inaccurate as it continues to take neuronormativity instead of neurodiversity as the norm (much as if, in the context of computers, where PC computers are more common than Mac computers, we were to refer to Mac computers as displaying or ‘suffering from’ Windows deficits, which would make little sense). Instead, members of the Autistic community generally adopt identity-first language (e.g., ‘Autistic people’ or ‘Autistics’) and reject the person-first language (e.g., ‘person with autism’ or ‘person with ASD’) that is pervasive in the medical and social spheres and that betrays a negative view of autism as a burden or a problem. Additionally, one should not use the term ‘neurodiverse’ as a euphemism for ‘Autistic.’ Using ‘neurodiverse’ to refer to individuals is not only incorrect, as explained above, but as a euphemism it also betrays neuronormative discomfort with autism that only reinforces the stigma around—and indeed the fear of—autism.
Whether about autism or other neurominoritized profiles, demeaning and misleading language contributes both to the misrepresentation and misunderstanding of people who present these profiles as well as to their devaluation as reliable epistemic agents; i.e., as people who are able to produce, use, and share valuable knowledge, including knowledge about their own experience of themselves and of the world. In other words, using pathologizing and stigmatizing language contributes to the lack of credibility and intelligibility that neurominoritized people often face. Philosophers refer to these credibility and intelligibility deficits stemming from biases as testimonial and hermeneutical injustice respectively. Testimonial injustice occurs when a person is not adequately consulted or believed because she belongs to a non-dominant group. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person’s experience or situation is not adequately represented or understood because she belongs to a non-dominant group. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are both types of epistemic injustice; i.e., an injustice that someone suffers in their capacity as an epistemic agent. Indeed, if you are not adequately consulted, believed, represented, or understood, this will seriously undermine your ability to produce, use, or share knowledge—or what philosophers call epistemic agency. Here, neurominoritized people may face testimonial and hermeneutical injustice due to neuronormative biases. That is, neurominoritized people may not be adequately consulted, believed, represented, or understood because they may avoid eye contact or otherwise navigate conversations in a way that differs from neuronormative standards and expectations, or because they are portrayed as deficient or incompetent.
In response to the widespread misrepresentation and discreditation (i.e., epistemic injustice) that neurominoritized people face, the neurodiversity movement has adopted the slogan from the disability movement: ‘Nothing about Us without Us.’ In the context of the neurodiversity movement, the injunction to do or say ‘nothing about us without us’ emphasizes the necessity of including neurominoritized people in the production of public policies, social discourses, academic knowledge, and scientific research about neurominoritized people. As a sociopolitical movement, the neurodiversity movement thus aims to center the perspectives, experiences, needs, and interests of neurominoritized people as they themselves—rather than neuronormalized people—express or communicate them, whether or not this expression or communication takes a verbal or oral form. In this sense, the neurodiversity movement’s call for ‘Nothing about Us without Us’ is best construed as a call to reclaim epistemic authority and agency. This will require unlearning neuronormativity, or all the aforementioned standards and expectations that so deeply pervade our neuronormative worlds. Concretely, this requires:
- understanding what neurodiversity and neuronormativity are (see definitions above);
- understanding that neuroableism is a system of oppression;
- becoming aware of neuronormalized privilege;
- recognizing that you may know very little, if anything, about neurominoritized profiles and people, and that what you think you do know may be largely inaccurate;
- suspending judgment toward neurominoritized people;
- using non-stigmatizing language (see terms to avoid above);
- actively unlearning the reflexes (habits, judgments, behaviors, practices) that neuronormativity inculcates (e.g., expecting or relying on orality, phone calls, in-person meetings, quick responses, eye contact, physical touch, facial expressions);
- seeking out information on neurominoritized profiles provided by first-person accounts of neurominoritized people (e.g., autobiographies, websites, blogs, social media);
- privately and confidentially asking neurominoritized people with whom you interact what you can do to include them effectively (rather than purely symbolically) and adapting interactions, practices, or the environment to their needs or modes of functioning;
- understanding that when they request adaptive or inclusive measures, neurominoritized people are not being difficult or overly demanding, any more than someone who needs glasses or someone who must avoid peanuts.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to the students and colleagues with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss neurodiversity and neuronormativity. In particular, numerous stimulating conversations and exchanges with Mylène Legault, Pierre Poirier, and Luc Faucher have been tremendously helpful in articulating some of the points in this blog post.
Amandine Catala
Amandine Catala is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Université du Québec at Montréal (UQAM), where she holds the Canada Research Chair on Epistemic Injustice and Agency. She is an Autistic self-advocate and the co-founder of the Autistic Collective of UQAM, an initiative that aims to bring together and support Autistics who study, work, or teach at UQAM. Her research and teaching focus on feminist, social, and political philosophy and philosophy of disability, which also inform her service.
