On September 23, 2022 the APA hosted the first of three currently-planned panels on “The Status of ‘Women’ in the Committee on the Status of Women.” As many noted at this initial event, the discussion is long overdue. As I understand it, the motivation for the discussion is to ensure that inclusive, intersectional conceptions of gender justice are prioritized in the Committee’s work, and this necessarily involves working against a white, ableist, cisheteronormative, homogeneous conception of women. One issue discussed at the event is whether this work requires changing the Committee’s name. As noted by some panel participants and attendees, a name change alone will not be sufficient for addressing the structures of power that need to be addressed. In other words, a name change would be meaningless in the absence of a sustained, demonstrated commitment to combat transphobia, racism, and heteronormativity both within the Committee’s work and in the profession overall.
Simone de Beauvoir opens The Second Sex with a comment on the “irritating” nature of the question of “woman,” the question of who, if anyone, is a woman. I welcome the efforts of those on the CSW who have initiated reflection on a topic that is irritating to those of us who feel varying degrees of alienation and non-belonging in relation to the category woman, but who also face various forms of gender discrimination in the profession of philosophy. One thing that is certainly irritating—indeed, enraging—is the persistence of misogyny, sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and classism in the world and in the profession of philosophy. As Jennifer Saul argues, philosophers hold, even if unconsciously, the same biases about social groups that prevail in our society. This is, of course, not news to those of us who are targeted in various ways by those biased beliefs and behaviors in classrooms, in our departments, on the job market, at conferences, and at other sites where professional philosophy happens. An important role of the CSW and the other APA diversity committees has been to track and address these biases in the profession of philosophy.
In what follows, I offer a suggestion in solidarity with those who are thoughtfully engaged in conversations about whether the current name of the CSW best reflects the political work it needs to do to address multiple forms of gender discrimination. I offer this suggestion in the hopes that it will be useful for thinking about how the CSW can work in coalition with other diversity committees to address all forms of gender discrimination in philosophy.
I agree that a name change alone will not do the work that needs to be done. However, what stood out most to me during the initial panel discussion was what went unnamed—the structures of power that produce and enforce a white, ableist, cisheteropatriarchal, binary conception of gender and, consequently, the problem of gender discrimination the CSW aims to address: namely, sexism and misogyny as they are variously shaped by other structures of oppression. Perhaps the current name of the Committee tends to keep discussion focused on the status of women rather than structures of oppression. What if the name of the Committee identified the structures of power at the heart of gender discrimination? What if the CSW were renamed the APA Committee on the Status of Sexism and Misogyny in the Profession? I suggest that such a revision would emphasize the political priority of tracking and combatting the structures that normalize and rationalize all forms of gender discrimination in ways that could open the possibility of new avenues of coalition with other diversity committees. In what follows, I offer a brief sketch of my rationale.
1. Naming the problem. Feminist philosophers already know what the status of women is in the profession. Women are underrepresented, and feminist philosophy remains marginalized. In fact, it is this knowledge that motivated the formation of the CSW. Demonstrating that women continue to be underrepresented and marginalized in philosophy, while important, does not by itself indicate why. The status of women is an effect of the problem, but not its cause. The cause is sexism and misogyny in concert with other forms of oppression. I don’t think I’m saying anything that feminist philosophers don’t already know. But it is curious that the current name of the Committee is silent about the power structure it needs to combat.
Kate Manne defines sexism as the ideology that justifies patriarchal structures of power and misogyny as the system that enforces that ideology. A binary conception of gender is central to sexism and misogyny. One’s gender identity doesn’t determine whether one is a misogynist; one’s insistence on and enforcement of a white, ableist, cisheteropatriarchal gender binary does. Furthermore, as trans feminists and feminists of color have shown, misogyny and sexism are not monolithic. Tracking and working against all forms of sexism and misogyny in the profession—from microaggressions to intentional exclusions and violence—is, as I understand it, a political priority of the CSW, because it is those structures that maintain all forms of gender discrimination in philosophy. What if the name of the Committee directed attention to an underlying structure of power?
2. More than demographics. Centering “the status of women” can contribute to a prioritization of demographics that eclipses diverse manifestations and experiences of sexism and misogyny in the profession. While it is crucial to continue to collect data about the numbers of women in the profession, the underlying structures of power that are at the heart of gender discrimination won’t necessarily be resolved if one day the profession can boast of 50% women at all ranks and in leadership positions. We are, obviously, far from that goal, but that is not the point. As feminist philosophers know well, not all women are feminists. It matters which women are held up as evidence of greater inclusion of women in the profession.
As Sara Ahmed points out, institutions (like universities and professional societies) often focus on and wield demographic data to boast about their commitment to diversity, while simultaneously undermining the sort of inclusion and diversity work that transforms the institution itself. Feminist philosophers know very well that when a department hires a woman who is not a feminist philosopher to develop or teach a feminist philosophy course, demographics are being used in ways that further marginalize and exclude feminist philosophy and feminist philosophers. Focusing on demographics alone does not challenge the structures of power that define the norms of the institution (or discipline). There is a difference between including marginalized and multi-marginalized people in a profession that remains the same and understanding inclusion as transformative of the profession itself. Focusing on the status of misogyny and sexism in the profession, rather than the status of women, will help the committee address the multiple forms and complexities of gender discrimination that persist in the profession despite changing demographics.
3. Intersectionality and coalitional priorities. Sexism and misogyny, and their effects, cannot be adequately understood and addressed without attention to their mutually reinforcing entanglement with other structures of oppression. Transmisogyny and misogynoir, for example, are not different words for a shared experience of misogyny. The Committee cannot hope to understand and work against all forms of sexism and misogyny without an intersectional framework attentive to the difference that differences make. This is difficult and complex work, and it is best done in coalition with other diversity committees. Changing the name to emphasize its focus on sexism and misogyny in the profession might open more avenues for coalitional work on gender discrimination.
My thinking about the importance of identity and the pitfalls of a politics focused on policing the boundaries of social group membership is indebted to the work of feminists and queer theorists of color like María Lugones, the Combahee River Collective, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Cathy J. Cohen. As these theorists point out, additive approaches to understanding oppression are not intersectional. Working to combat all forms of sexism and misogyny in the profession requires an intersectional understanding of what gender oppression is and how it is variously experienced. An intersectional approach to sexism and misogyny in the profession aims at transformation not assimilation of more privileged members of a group into the status quo of the profession.
The names of committees reflect their priorities. Would a name like the APA Committee on the Status of Sexism and Misogyny signal renewed commitment to the necessarily intersectional, coalitional work of ending all forms of gender discrimination in the profession? I offer these reflections in the hopes that they will be useful for current discussions about the relationship between the CSW’s name and its political priorities. A name change alone won’t accomplish the work that needs to be done. But names do matter, and perhaps the Committee’s name should focus on the structure of power it seeks to track and combat. Some might worry that the name I’ve proposed might offend the sensibilities of people who believe that the forms of power named by the words sexism and misogyny have nothing to do with them or the profession. But perhaps we can remember that real change doesn’t tend to make those who have benefited from an oppressive status quo very comfortable.
The Women in Philosophy series publishes posts on women in the history of philosophy, posts on issues of concern to women in the field of philosophy, and posts that put philosophy to work to address issues of concern to women in the wider world. If you are interested in writing for the series, please contact the Series Editor Adriel M. Trott or the Associate Editor Alida Liberman.
Kim Q. Hall
Kim Q. Hall is Professor of Philosophy and a faculty affiliate of the Gender, Women’s, and Sexuality Studies and the Appalachian Studies programs at Appalachian State University. She is the author of Queering Philosophy (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), co-editor of The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy (2021), editor of Feminist Disability Studies (Indiana University Press, 2011), and author of articles and book chapters in feminist philosophy, queer theory, and the philosophy of disability.
