Think What Academia Does to People: Beauvoir contra Precarity

A current practice in academia is the use of casual or fixed term work. Non-tenure track teaching positions are one example. Research also takes the shape of fixed term projects, with academics expected to move across many postdoctoral positions before finding permanent employment. This practice is commonly justified through the flexibility it offers in organizing teaching or research as well as through funding structures and constraints. In what follows, I will investigate how the practice bears on the meaning of academic work through the lens of de Beauvoir’s ethics. Particularly, I will be looking into what the practice implies for how one relates to others within an academic context.

I stumbled across Simone de Beauvoir’s work while putting together a syllabus on existentialism. Though existentialism fell well outside my areas of research, I learned from my brief teaching experience back then that existentialism was better at instilling (self-)reflection in undergraduate students than analytic philosophy. Preparing the course took me through concepts such as transcendence, or significance, which brought to light another topic neglected by analytic philosophers until recently – meaning in life. Here I’d like to bring together reflections on Beauvoir’s work with my attempt at understanding present day academia.

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I. Beauvoir and meaningful work

Meaning in life is naturally a contested topic, but there are some broad ways in which we can think about it: as subjective, objective, or hybrid.

On views holding that meaning is subjective, what counts as meaningful for someone need not hold for others, coming down to one’s own views and thoughts. By contrast, objectivist accounts connect meaning to things deemed valuable through standards that do not vary from person to person. Hybrid views draw on both, holding that meaning in life comprises things that one finds subjectively valuable, but which connect to broader pursuits and practices valued by society at large. Susan Wolf’s characterization of hybrid views holds that “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.”

Existentialism is typically classified under subjectivist views, but, as I have argued, Beauvoir’s view could be a better fit for hybrid views. This is best illustrated by the discussion of ambiguity between self and other: one can choose what project to pursue, but the project does not exist in isolation – there are interactions with others’ projects to be considered, and also the prospect of the project being enriched and continued by others. For Beauvoir, meaning resides in how a project interacts with other projects, and in the extent to which it enhances the agency of others.

It should be stressed here that on Beauvoir’s view, meaning is inextricably linked to morality, and insofar as diminishing the agency of others is immoral, it also renders one’s own project meaningless. I interpret Beauvoir as holding that enhancing agency is necessary for a meaningful project. It is not sufficient because meaning also includes a subjective aspect. Someone pursuing a project that enhances the agency of others but does not engage one’s talents and interests can still view one’s work as meaningless. 

As I focus on meaningful work, there is a further case to be made in favor of hybrid views: work is hardly subjective, in the sense of mattering to the person doing it alone. Rather, it is done against a social background, involving interactions with other people, doing things that others also find valuable. The common perception of academic, particularly philosophical work, as solitary can be countered by pointing out that even when writing, a process often experienced as lonely and isolating, one engages with a strand of literature and writes for an audience.

Additionally, the myth of lonely philosophical work can easily lead to depriving people just starting out of much needed support. More broadly, judging the meaning of academic work through its relation to social concerns is consistent with work in the philosophy of science stressing the social character of knowledge.

Regarding academia, the question is under what conditions one can expect one’s projects to empower others, or to be continued by others.

Academic work can be seen as consisting of multiple projects pursued at different times, with possible overlaps. Among others, they could be research programs playing a defining role within one’s career or one’s commitments to particular teaching or mentoring practices. The “others” stands for people whose projects interact with one’s own project: some of these interactions may be minimal, while more significant ones may amount to mentoring, collaboration, or competition.

For instance, passing good practices onto students as a teacher counts as meaningful work. Note that the extent to which projects converge can differ: some students may be inspired to become good teachers themselves, others may apply the same practices in other areas. A project that diminishes agency is, by contrast, “absurd because it is immoral.” An example here would be a mentor who brings down mentees because they disagree with the mentor’s views. While at a first glance this may appear that dominating others is a way of having one’s academic contributions continued, this is done by impairing the agency of potential competitors, and, as such, it is (ethically) meaningless. 

Answering these concerns requires distinguishing between two possible claims, which due to space constraints I will investigate on their own, rather than as interpretations of Beauvoir’s views.

The first is a weaker claim, according to which a project is meaningless solely in cases where it decreases agency. On this interpretation, pursuing one’s project can be meaningful even in cases where others’ agency is not increased. This weakens the necessity claim above – enhancing agency is no longer a necessary condition for meaning, although abiding by ethical norms is still required. This is in line with ethical views that emphasize refraining from specific actions (i.e., those that decrease agency), while leaving open ways in which one may choose to increase agency.

The second stronger claim is that only agency-enhancing projects are meaningful. This is also the view I will support, as I take it to be more in the spirit of Beauvoir’s work.

According to Beauvoir, the ambiguity between self and other is central to the human condition. No project exists in a void, and even when seeking truth for its own sake, one starts from other people’s work, and would presumably expect one’s search to be continued by others, enabling them to be better researchers.

By stressing that any and all enterprises take place against a social background, and that we bring this background into view when we make choices, the view I favor avoids the excessive focus on particular actions or rules which is common to ethical perspectives such as utilitarianism. It might still be argued that enhancing the agency of others is too demanding, but this difficulty can be addressed by highlighting that one ought to act to increase others’ agency in some way, and choosing to pursue one project rather than another can affect the extent to which that happens. The implication is that projects with little connection to others’ agency are less meaningful than those that do enhance the agency of others. Nevertheless, our projects typically involve interactions with other projects, and as such they have the potential to be meaningful. Similarly, failing to increase agency is less meaningful than succeeding, but more meaningful than decreasing agency.

Regarding the particular example of academic mentoring, the advantage of this interpretation lies in its ability to highlight not only actions concerning one’s mentee, but also regarding the profession overall, including how it can be more open and accessible to others. This is in line with Beauvoir’s views, as shown by her claims on political action: “only equals (…) can hear or respond to my call” (3). In this setting, helping others act as equals would involve ending precarity.

II. Meaning and academic precarity

Academic work is tied to spending a significant amount of time on causal or limited term contracts, and/or working with people in this situation. Aspiring to become a researcher or to teach undergraduate students is tied to institutional structures separating insiders from outsiders, with increasing numbers of the latter.

Deciding to pursue projects in such conditions presents one with the serious possibility of being a perpetual outsider, as the example of the adjunct system illustrates. Even the prospect of becoming an insider raises two kinds of questions with regard to meaning.

First, does the intended work increase agency? Or does it also contribute to the perpetuation of the same two-tier system, keeping people with comparable talents deprived on resources and opportunities?

And secondly, would those who are insiders wish being part of an exploitative system upon anyone else?

If the answer to the former question leans heavily towards the maintenance of a system that impairs agency, and the answer to the latter question is negative, then, viewed through the lens of Beauvoir’s ethics, academic work becomes ethically meaningless.

That said, meaning may still be connected to the prospect of becoming an “insider.” One can help others’ projects through supportive interactions at academic events, joint work, and publications. It is important to stress here that meaningful work need not be confined to the institutional level and its official channels. It can also take place informally, through friendships and mentoring relations outside one’s institution.

While acknowledging what makes academic work meaningful under precarity, most projects owe their success to others remaining “outsiders,” doing tasks that are less valued, such as teaching or service work. This is captured by the framing of precarity as an atmosphere: most projects are in competition over funding, attention, prestige. While the agency of some is advanced, the agency of others gets curtailed. What is more, with precarity intensifying, few projects can be viewed as sustainable, as fewer and fewer people can reasonably expect to become “insiders.”

Moreover, the focus on those perceived as more likely to become “insiders” (or help one become an “insider”) spills over into informal academic work as well, something clearly captured in the difficulties faced by early career academics. Hierarchies of power and prestige influence who is counted as worthy of conversation. Thus, while one might find joy in doing academic work, one’s joy contends with a background where others’ agency is curtailed. Insofar as academic projects are bound up with injustices and the neglect of other academics’ interests, they fall short of being ethically meaningful.

Further questions emerge at this point. Given academic precarity, should talented students be advised to pursue a PhD? Helen de Cruz argues that advice on whether to pursue a PhD in philosophy should not deny the mentee’s agency. This is consistent with the points above, that projects of significance enhance agency, including mentoring students. One can hope that other people can pursue academic projects, and one can do the utmost to support them, but one mustn’t be blind to the cruelty of the system and the harm it can cause.

Take Cecilia Caballero’s discussion of how adjunct professors from underrepresented groups are put in a bind between the value of students viewing them as examples of upward mobility and the realities they actually face as precarious academics. Should aspiring PhD students be told about working conditions and pay for adjuncts? Again, would one wish precarity upon anyone else?

If academic work involves keeping other academics in positions with fewer resources, less security, and less recognition, then it decreases agency. Conversely, more stable working conditions can enable other people to continue one’s project, thus making it more meaningful. De Beauvoir’s analysis helps look beyond current structures and demands to how their practices affect agency. Her analysis shows where change could take place: in moving towards agency-enhancing practices.

One question arising here is how much the situation painted so far is characteristic of academia and how much it is present elsewhere. In many other areas, one’s enjoyment of job security may come at the cost of excluding others – for instance, migrant workers on exploitative contracts. The ubiquity of precarity shows this to be a problem beyond academia, and that highlights how broader changes are required for more meaningful work. Meaningful activities in this context can be twofold: in individual support of the empowerment of others as well as in pushing for structural change to undo precarity.

You might advocate for more job security, providing contingent workers with permanent contracts or promotions as well as making visible the amount of precarious work within the current system. More systemic change could involve shaping (academic) work around supporting others as opposed to always competing with them or gatekeeping.

What is particular about academia is that these relations are structured around knowledge. Unlike a limited pool of resources, knowledge has the potential to increase if more people are able to access it. Enabling other people to access intellectual goods and engage in related pursuits is central to academic work.

If my argument in this piece is right, then the implications are bleak for present day academia. Of course, one could also reject the argument, perhaps holding that being good at intellectual puzzles and getting paid for their solutions is sufficiently meaningful. Still, even assuming that the conclusion that academic work is currently ethically meaningless may be too strong, one must consider that de Beauvoir is onto something. When thinking of the meaning of academic work, one should (also) think of what academia does to people, and not only of grant money, publications, metrics, or prestige.

Can my essay’s negative conclusions lead to anything other than despair? But meaninglessness needn’t result in passivity. The threat of meaninglessness can also be a reason for action. To enhance meaning, one must fight precarity.

Significantly, the effort for which I advocate should have global scope. The concept of precarity was built around the loss of job security and assurances in Europe, but these were enabled by maintaining precarity elsewhere. Thus, building towards meaningful work also requires significantly broadening our perspectives on global systems of precarity and how they impact agency.

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This is an installment of Into Philosophy.