Matthew Owen teaches philosophy at Yakima Valley College in Washington State. He talked with Heidi Schmidt about his new book Measuring the Immeasurable Mind: Where Contemporary Neuroscience Meets the Aristotelian Tradition (flier here) which is now out with Lexington Books (Rowman & Littlefield).
What is your book about?
Ultimately, my book is about whether we can empirically detect and measure consciousness in completely unresponsive patients who are potentially covertly conscious. More precisely, it is about whether this is metaphysically possible even if physicalism is false and a version of substance dualism is true. I argue that this is possible given a metaphysical framework informed by Aristotelian causation and a view of human ontology I call neo-Thomistic hylomorphism.
The book ultimately offers a philosophical foundation for the scientific study of consciousness that’s an alternative to physicalism, which I apply to a practical problem in neurology. En route, I also address common objections to dualism, such as the idea that a nonphysical mind could not cause physical effects.
Why did you feel the need to write this book?
If consciousness is reducible to physical states in the brain, or if it supervenes on its neurobiological substrate, we could (theoretically) measure consciousness by measuring the neural activity consciousness is identical to or supervenes on. In other words, if physicalism is true, measuring consciousness is metaphysically possible. And if such a possibility could become a practical actuality at the bedside of unresponsive patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), we could more accurately diagnose these patients, caught somewhere along a spectrum between conscious active life and death (see third question). So, given physicalism and the practical payoff in neurology, it makes sense to do research focused on finding a way to empirically detect and measure consciousness. And this objective is foundational to the scientific study of consciousness, which set its roots and began to blossom within a materialist milieu at the end of the previous century.
However, materialism/physicalism’s adequacy to account for consciousness is being seriously questioned and it can no longer be taken for granted (see Koons & Bealer 2010; Göcke 2012; Koch 2012, p. 152; Koch 2020, p. 519). Meanwhile, dualism is being dusted off and re-considered. Before the cracks in the current ideological foundation of the neurobiology of consciousness spread too far, it would be wise for those of us interested in consciousness science to consider what other philosophical frameworks yield the metaphysical possibility of empirically detecting and quantifying consciousness.
In Measuring the Immeasurable Mind, I argue that the Mind-Body Powers model of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) provides a metaphysical framework for the possibility of empirically detecting and measuring consciousness. What is particularly interesting about this model is that it’s informed by a substance dualist human ontology inspired by Aquinas as well as an Aristotelian metaphysics of causation. An implication is that there’s metaphysical warrant for doing research focused on empirically discerning and quantifying consciousness not only from a physicalist vantage point but also a dualist, and even a substance dualist, vantage point. So physicalists and dualists can co-labor on a research objective at the heart of the science of consciousness with implications in clinical neurology related to diagnosing disorders of consciousness.
What are the implications for diagnosing disorders of consciousness?
As is generally the case with medical patients, a proper diagnosis of a patient with a disorder of consciousness (DOC) has important implications for their recovery prospects and treatment plans. Because the diagnosis of a patient tells you what their condition is, which can entail what their prognosis is and what the most effective means of treatment are. And related to the treatment of patients, there are often ethical issues concerning continuing or discontinuing care. Furthermore, there are issues related to quality of life for DOC patients when being cared for. For example, if a patient is unconscious and therefore not feeling any pain, then pain medication is not necessarily needed. Whereas if a patient is minimally conscious but behaviorally unresponsive, they might need pain medication but be unable to communicate it through speech or actions.
While accurately diagnosing DOC patients can be vital to making decisions about their treatment, which can have ethical as well as quality of life implications, diagnosing particular disorders of consciousness can be quite difficult. A well-known DOC is coma, a pathological state in which a patient is unconscious and there’s a continuous absence of eye-opening, and behaviors are limited to reflexive movements (Schnakers et al. 2013, p. 118). A second relevant DOC is popularly known as the vegetative state (VS), but it’s more accurately called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS). Because these patients open their eyes spontaneously or in response to stimulation and yet their behaviors are only reflexive and unrelated to their environment (Schnakers et al. 2013, p. 118). A third DOC, the minimally conscious state (abbreviated MCS), is often distinguished by the presence of inconsistent but clearly recognizable behavioral signs of consciousness (Schnakers et al. 2013, p. 119). However, it is possible for DOC patients to be covertly conscious even though they show no behavioral signs of consciousness. This makes it difficult to accurately diagnose such patients as minimally conscious given current clinical diagnostic resources.
A study conducted by Caroline Schnakers and her colleagues is sobering. They found that 41% of 44 patients in their study who were diagnosed as VS/UWS patients were actually MCS (Schnakers et al. 2009). More recently, a study led by Jiahui Pan implemented a novel machine learning algorithm in the assessment of DOC patients (Pan et al. 2020). In a scientific commentary on the study, Adrian Owen points out that 40% of the patients in the study clinically diagnosed as VS/UWS patients were able to follow commands well enough to be reclassified as aware (A.M. Owen 2020, p. 1052). Reports regularly suggest that roughly 30-40% of patients diagnosed as VS/UWS are actually conscious, and thus inaccurate diagnoses are far more common than we can be comfortable with (Giacino et al. 2014, p. 103; cf. Massimini & Tononi 2018, p. 33).
There are various reasons why it can be difficult to accurately diagnose DOC patients, which I discuss in Chapter 8 of Measuring the Immeasurable Mind. But what would significantly help clinicians overcome current diagnostic limitations is a way to empirically detect and measure consciousness at the bedside of unresponsive patients. In other words, we need accessible neuroimaging technology that can allow us to discern whether or not a patients is conscious and to what degree simply by recording neural activity, so patients are not required to give any response for clinicians to recognize the presence of consciousness. Yet, as Olivia Gosseries, Haibo Di, Steven Laureys, and Mélanie Boly point out in their research article ‘Measuring consciousness in severely damaged brains,’ successfully diagnosing disorders of consciousness using neuroimaging inherently depends on how consciousness relates to the brain. This is where the Mind-Body Powers model of NCC becomes critically relevant. What it says about how the mind relates to the brain entails that it would be metaphysically possible to detect consciousness by recording neural activity even though consciousness is not reducible to the neural activity nor supervenes on it. It gives a clear metaphysical explanation as to why this would be possible.
How does the book fit in with your larger research project?
As a doctoral researcher in the Philosophy Department at the University of Birmingham UK, I began researching hylomorphism and applying it to neural correlates of consciousness and mental causation. After finishing my PhD, I did a two-year research fellowship under the supervision of Dr. Christof Koch, who co-instigated the contemporary search for NCC with Francis Crick at the end the previous century (for a seminal article, see Crick & Koch 1990). As the Elizabeth R. Koch Research Fellow for Tiny Blue Dot Consciousness Studies, I was part of an interdisciplinary research team funded by the Tiny Blue Dot Foundation. The Tiny Blue Dot research team has multiple groups with different specializations based at institutions around the United States and abroad, from the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle to UCLA, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Massachusetts General Hospital, the Medical University of South Carolina, and the University of Milan in Italy.
The Tiny Blue Dot’s aim is to develop a practical system for identifying and measuring consciousness in unresponsive patients and other candidates for consciousness. The primary objective of my research as the Elizabeth R. Koch TBD Research Fellow was to address the question of whether it is metaphysical possible to empirically detect and quantify consciousness even if it is irreducible and nonphysical. Measuring the Immeasurable Mind is the main output of this research. Yet, I also considered metaphysical issues related to mental causation and the integrated information theory of consciousness (see Owen 2019; Owen 2020) as well as the sufficiency of neural mechanisms for consciousness (see Owen & Guta 2019).
I currently teach healthcare ethics at Yakima Valley College and my research related to unresponsive patients has significantly enhanced my teaching. I have also recently become an affiliate member of the Biosignal Interaction and Personhood Technology Lab led by Dr. Stefanie Blain-Moraes at McGill University. My research with the BIAPT Lab will extend my work on consciousness to cerebral organoids.
What writing and professional advice do you have for other young philosophers?
These are difficult times to be a young philosopher trying to establish an academic career. There are unique challenges that early career professors and researchers face, especially during a pandemic (as I write these words from my home office it is hard to concentrate as my one-and-a-half-year-old daughter is crying, loudly). While there are many things on our to-do lists, I think it is wise to prioritize habits that are conducive to our physical and mental health, which will help us achieve long-term success.
Some habits that I have found helpful are doing aerobic exercise four or five times during the work week. I enjoy running or stationary rowing, and since I have a young child and another on the way, I often run with my daughter in the stroller or stationary row while she is playing beside me with her toys. I also take weekends completely off, and here in Washington I have the opportunity to do an outdoor activity like skiing or hiking with my family on Saturdays or Sunday afternoons after church in the morning. This time refreshes me and recharges my motivation for putting in the rigorous work required for research. I am thankful to learn from the example of my mentor Christof Koch who has regularly met with me for breakfast at a bakery following his morning row on Lake Washington. During the pandemic we have met over the phone and while he has not been able to row as often, he has been trail running regularly. If someone who is the Chief Scientist at a large research institute like the Allen Institute for Brain Science finds it valuable to make space for exercise, I guess it is worthwhile for me to try to do the same. Granted, it’s not always possible. Yet when I do exercise and spend downtime in nature, there are cognitive benefits relevant to my academic work (see Mandolesi et al. 2018; Hunter et al. 2019).
Specifically with regards to writing, I think my best advice is to develop reasonable habits of regularly chipping away at writing projects, a little each day. I have found this works best with trying to juggle the multiple responsibilities we early career academics have. Lastly, regarding professional advice, it is helpful if you can find out where your philosophical passions intersect with other fields and practical needs. This broadens your professional opportunities. For me, my passion for philosophy of mind intersects with the science of consciousness where there are practical bioethical and neuroethical issues. Doing research at the crossroads of philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and bioethics is also one way to remind colleagues from other disciplines of the value of philosophy, and hopefully it helps remind society as a whole. The more folks appreciate philosophy, the more opportunities there will be for all philosophers, which will have a positive impact on each philosopher’s career.
Matthew Owen
Matthew Owen (PhD, University of Birmingham) is a faculty member in the philosophy department at Yakima Valley College in Washington State. He is also an affiliate faculty member at the Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan. Matthew’s latest book is Measuring the Immeasurable Mind: Where Contemporary Neuroscience Meets the Aristotelian Tradition.
