If you find this tweet to be as pointed as I do, Effective Altruism may be for you.
Effective Altruism is a social movement whose goal it is to encourage individuals to channel their personal wealth into highly effective charities. According to Effective Altruists, organizations such as UNICEF, OXFAM, and the Against Malaria Foundation are able to translate our charitable giving in the most effective way: by providing much-needed goods and services, such as access to food and clean water or medical care, to those suffering from severe poverty.
A number of philosophers have made headlines for their commitment to the task of Effective Altruism. Peter Singer, author of the seminal 1972 paper “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” claims to have given away at least 10% of his income over the last 40 years. Likewise, Oxford Philosopher Toby Ord has made the news with the same commitment, which he has honored the last 11 years running. Another Oxford Philosopher, William MacAskill, joined Ord to establish the Centre for Effective Altruism and to found an organization called Giving What We Can, which encourages others to make the 10% pledge.
In 2016, the movement widened within philosophical circles when Philosophers Against Malaria encouraged 26 philosophy departments to go head-to-head in friendly competition to see who could raise the most funds. In all, a total of $57,796 was donated to the Against Malaria Foundation, which is rated as a highly effective charity by GiveWell (the premier Effective Altruist organization, which incidentally was founded by two hedge-fund managers).
But Effective Altruism is not without its critics. Knowing philosophers, this will not come as a great surprise. Still, you might still wonder: “Effective Altruism has such a laudable goal. What moral monster could possibly oppose it?”
To be fair, it is not the goal of Effective Altruism that is troublesome, but rather the movement’s methods.
In recent years, several authors have repurposed the traditional concerns against Utilitarianism to use against Effective Altruism. John Gray, in his 2015 book review of Peter Singer’s The Most Good You Can Do, notes that Singer is a self-proclaimed Utilitarian. In an echo of Bernard Williams’ original criticism, Gray writes: “Whether or not they find fulfillment in the way they live, effective altruists are bound to view their lives not as ends in themselves but as means to the greatest good…If people prefer to give priority to the needs of their own children over the needs of others living in poverty, or the well-being of a loved one with Alzheimer’s over that of a dog or chimpanzee, they are not backsliding from an ideal of universal benevolence; they are honoring the ethical understandings that shape their lives.”
Likewise, Amia Srinivasan, in her (2015) book review of William MacAskill’s Doing Good Better, reiterates Bernard Williams’ concern about alienating people from their own integrity: “What is required [of Effective Altruism] is impersonal, ruthless decision-making, heart firmly reined in by the head. This is not our everyday sense of the ethical life; such notions as responsibility, kindness, dignity and moral sensitivity will have to be radically reimagined if they are to survive the scrutiny of the universal gaze.”
In “Philosophical Critiques of Effective Altruism,” Jeff McMahan rejects Gray and Srinivasan’s portrayal of Effective Altruism as reliant on Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is not a necessary feature of Effective Altruism, he argues, writing:
“It is therefore insufficient to refute the claims of effective altruism to simply haul out [Bernard] Williams’s much debated objections to utilitarianism. To justify their disdain, critics must demonstrate that the positive arguments presented by Singer, Unger, and others, which are independent of any theoretical comments, are mistaken.”
This leads to us to a rather interesting question in its own right. Is Effective Altruism inherently utilitarian?
Either it is—in which case critics have much ground to criticize—or it is not—in which case a utilitarian critique of Effective Altruism will be insufficient and, perhaps, in bad faith.
By “inherently” I mean that it is necessary: That without the tenets of Utilitarianism, Effective Altruism would not exist.
So, what are the tenets of Utilitarianism? They are Consequentialism, Hedonism, and Impartiality. By the Utilitarian framework, an act is morally good if and only if it produces the highest level of pleasure (or the least amount of suffering) for the greatest number of people.
To determine if Effective Altruism is inherently Utilitarian, let us begin by considering McMahan’s own definition of Effective Altruism:
“The primary goal of most of those who identify themselves as effective altruists is the prevention or alleviation of suffering and premature death resulting from poverty and disease in the areas of the world in which these problems are worst, or affect the greatest number of people.”
What could it mean for prevention to be the most “effective”? Evidently, it means to impartially distribute our wealth through the channels that will either assist the greatest number of people, or those suffering the worst fates.
In practice, Effective Altruists are looking for the ways they can get the most bang from their buck—to stretch the dollars they donate to do the most good. And how can we calculate to whom we can provide the most good? By carefully assessing empirical evidence, which can assist us in impartially determining who (within our global community) has the greatest need.
MacAskill (2018) writes that the core commitments of Effective Altruism are Maximizing the Good, Science-Alignment, Welfarism (where goodness is improvement the welfare of individuals), and Impartiality. As such, Effective Altruism specifies a commitment to using science as a tool to determine the most effective charities, which we can then use to impartially direct wealth such that increases human welfare.
Impartiality requires that we value each person’s welfare equally. The motivation behind this commitment is that it encourages us to concern ourselves with the suffering that is outside of our own personal purview. For instance, it is a fact that western money can “do more” abroad, where the dollar translates into a greater amount of goods and services. Effective Altruists argue that we have an equal moral responsibility to assist those abroad as we do to those near to us, even if they are strangers.
Clearly, Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism have much in common. So, why think (as McMahan and MacAskill have argued) that the Effective Altruism is not inherently reliant on Utilitarianism?
MacAskill writes:
“It is true that effective altruism has some similarities with utilitarianism: it is about maximizing the good, and it is primarily focused on improving well-being, with many members of the community making significant personal sacrifices (such as donating 50% of their income) in order to do more good. Unlike utilitarianism, effective altruism does not claim that one must always sacrifice one’s own interests if one can benefit others to a greater extent. Indeed…effective altruism makes no claims about what obligations of benevolence one has. Nor does effective altruism claim that all ways of helping others are morally permissible as long as they help others the most; indeed, there is a strong community norm against promoting or engaging in activities that cause harm”
Let us assume that Effective Altruism does, indeed, have hard limits on what methods they are willing to take to produce the good. For instance, it wouldn’t authorize murdering one healthy person to distribute organs to five people whose lives would be saved by this action. Nor would it require that I always sacrifice my own interests for the good of others. (Well, that’s a relief!)
The question becomes: Is placing a threshold on what we’re willing to do in order to maximize human welfare for the greatest number of people enough to show that Effective Altruism is not inherently Utilitarian?
Certainly, these claims do draw a line between Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism (in the sense that the views are not concentric circles); however, simply because the views are not exactly one in the same does not undermine their obvious shared philosophical commitments.
Rather clearly, Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism share the core philosophical commitments to Consequentialism, Impartiality, and Hedonism (repackaged by Effective Altruists into Welfarism).
But both McMahan and MacAskill argue that there is no specifically Utilitarian moral obligation built into the core commitments of Effective Altruism. This is a slightly different argument than the initial one, which claims that Utilitarianism is not necessary to Effective Altruism at all. Rather, this argument suggests that what might be problematic about Utilitarianism is that it determines what is moral based on this calculus. McMahan and MacAskill say that our general moral intuitions are enough to motivate Effective Altruism. We do not need the calculus to spit out a decree about what move is right and what move is wrong.
Still, could a general appeal to “do good” convince people to donate as much as 50% of their income to highly effective organizations? I doubt it. When it comes down to it, I take it that members of the Effective Altruism community do feel themselves morally obligated to do good in a particular manner—marked by maximizing the welfare of others in the most effective ways. Indeed, Effective Altruists do refer to their calculus to determine which ways they ought to act. Ultimately, Effective Altruism is movement about wealth and how we should channel it to attain certain ends.
For instance, MacAskill notes that studies have revealed that certain charities are 100x more effective than others. As such, there is a strong normative suggestion that we should donate to that charity as opposed to another one, which is only 1/100th as effective.
Both McMahan and MacAskill’s attempts to outsource Effective Altruism’s moral obligation to some general sentiment about our moral intuitions fails to explain why Effective Altruism would be against our donating to the charity that is 1/100th as effective. If the notion is only to “do good,” then this donation (even if it produces only 1/100th as much good) should be sufficient.
However, Effective Altruists will see this act as a violation of its core principles—and (pending some unusual circumstance) a morally wrong thing to do.
From this, it is clear that Effective Altruism is motived less by a general obligation to “do good” and a more specific obligation that we should “do good most effectively,” where effectiveness is reduced to aiding the greatest number of people or those in the severest of circumstance.
In sum, Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism are by no means the same moral theory, however, it is undeniable that they share a number of central features. Far from being independent of the utilitarian framework, I think it is clear by now that goal of Effective Altruism, as well as its strategy of execution, is inextricably linked to the hallmarks of Utilitarianism: Impartial Maximization of “the Good,” in this case human welfare. These principles are necessary features of the view.
As such, Effective Altruism is inherently Utilitarian in character, even if the views are themselves distinct. Criticisms of Effective Altruism on the basis of critiques to Utilitarianism are not only expected, but fair.
This is not to say that one ought not donate to highly effective charities. Undoubtably, part of living an ethical life is doing what one can to address the needs of others. However, Effective Altruists cannot dismiss these criticisms out of hand. There are problematic structural features inherent in this otherwise benevolent movement.
Savannah Pearlman
Savannah Pearlman is a PhD Candidate at Indiana University – Bloomington, where she is writing her dissertation on Moral Deference and marginalized testifiers. As an active member in her local Mutual Aid network, Savannah has become interested in philosophical issues related to philanthropy and altruism.
Thanks for this post! These are important issues and I was glad to see them discussed here.
It’s definitely true that utilitarians will find much to like in effective altruism. At the same time, many non-utilitarians have found homes within the movement as well. Here are some of the reasons why non-utilitarians have been attracted to thinking about effective altruism.
First, promoting the impartial good is important across many different deontic theories and many different axiologies. As for axiological robustness, you don’t have to be a hedonist or even a welfarist to think that it is important to improve the lives of others, for example by giving them access to clean water or by providing them with the financial means to live a dignified life of their own choosing. Indeed, the second example becomes if anything more promising as we move beyond simple hedonism and welfarism. And as for deontological robustness, many deontic theories accept that when the stakes are high enough, non-consequentialist constraints or personal prerogatives can be outweighed by duties to promote the impartial good. It is uncomfortable, to say the least, to realize that several lives could be saved for the price of a luxury car.
Second, moral uncertainty may mean that we should hedge our bets across a number of different deontic and axiological theories. Even if you are somewhat confident that we have only limited obligations to promote the welfare of strangers or future people, you might well harbor the lingering worry that we have significant obligations to promote the impartial good. And you might think that, if we turn out to have significant obligations to promote the impartial good, then we will act very badly indeed by shirking those obligations. As a result, it may well be that modesty and a recognition of the fallibility of our moral knowledge requires us to do more for the promotion of impartial good than our favorite moral theory demands.
It can be worth thinking seriously through these issues even if you are prepared, as many people are, to keep the majority of your financial resources for your own uses. Many of us regularly give a substantial chunk of our time and money to philanthropic causes. And although we might spend some of this at the opera, the animal shelter, and other causes connected with our own projects and desires, many of us often give with the intention of doing significant impartial good. When this is our aim, it can be important to make sure that we are doing good effectively, and that our efforts have not gone to waste.
I think it’s great that philosophy departments are competing to see who can do the most good in the world. Such trends should be enthusiastically applauded, both for their moral clarity, and for the rational use of great gifts which those involved have received.
I would suggest, don’t think this one to death, just do it.
It’s worth distinguishing three features of utilitarianism (only the weakest of which is shared by EA):
(1) No constraints. You should do whatever it takes to maximize the good — no matter the harms done along the way.
(2) Unlimited demands of beneficence: Putting aside any intrinsically immoral acts, between the remaining options you should do whatever would maximize the good — no matter the cost to yourself.
(3) Efficient benevolence: Putting aside any intrinsically immoral acts, and at whatever magnitude of self-imposed burdens you are willing to countenance: you should direct your selected resources (time, effort, money) that are allocated for benevolent ends in whatever way would do the most good.
EA is only committed to feature (3), not (1) or (2). And it’s worth emphasizing how incredibly weak claim (3) is. Most of the objections to utilitarianism instead relate to features 1 and 2, which simply do not carry over to EA at all. So I think it’s straightforwardly false and misleading to claim that EA is “inherently utilitarian” or inherits the putative “problematic structural features” of utilitarianism. (EA is not exhausted by claim 3, of course, since it tends to additionally claim that we should direct a non-trivial portion of our resources to benevolent ends. But so does every plausible moral view. So that’s still a far cry from the unlimited demands of utilitarianism.)
Rossian deontologists could easily accept the EA’s efficient conception of benevolence, for example, without this interfering in any way with the rest of their (decidedly non-utilitarian!) moral theory. The same seems true of many other non-utilitarian views. To reject EA, it seems you’d need a moral theory that countenances gratuitous inefficiency, which seems much harder to motivate (though some do, of course, accept such views).
The author writes…
“From this, it is clear that Effective Altruism is motived less by a general obligation to “do good” and a more specific obligation that we should “do good most effectively,” where effectiveness is reduced to aiding the greatest number of people or those in the severest of circumstance.”
Another way to approach the issue of effectiveness could be to set aside moral and social issues, and look at altruism through the lens of personal self interest.
As example, on one level Christianity’s advice to “love your neighbor as yourself” can be seen as moral advice, as an aide to social cohesion. From this perspective effectiveness is measured by the effect giving has on those other than the person providing service.
At a deeper level, the “love your neighbor” advice is really a guide to one’s personal liberation from the tiny prison cell of “me”. In this case, effectiveness is measured less by what is given, who it is given to, and the effect the gift has on the recipient, and more by the degree to which the giver is willing and able to “die to be reborn”, as Christianity puts it.
That is, to what degree is the giver able to transcend the perspective that they are alone, separate from other humans, and reality at large? To the degree that is accomplished, the giver is able to escape fear, and the many ailments which arise from it.
As I understand it, it is this personal liberation perspective on giving that has sustained Christianity for 2,000 years, because in the end it is the human condition to be primarily concerned with our own situation.
I have only just been introduced to the principles of effective altruism. However, my first thought is that, while, as the author states, its goals are admirable, it may fail to adequately acknowledge the underlying psychological motivators of altruist behavior altogether.
I wonder if the deeper question is – “what, exactly, motivates altruist behavior?” (potentially it is not cognition). If empathy in its most basic form, namely emotional contagion or “feeling what the other feels”, underlays selfless behavior, effective altruism, with its focus on rational decision-making may be missing significant components of altruist motivation. And that is problematic in my opinion.
It’s very important to think about the psychology of altruism. Effective altruists think a lot about this!
See for example Caviola et al “The psychology of (In)Effective Altruism” in Trends in Cognitive Sciences this year. More generally, pretty much anything by Luicius Caviola and Stefan Schubert is relevant here.
And remember that last time psychologists put out an open call for an argument that would actually move study participants to donate to charity, the winner was Peter Singer! (http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2020/06/contest-winner-philosophical-argument.html).
According to utilitarian philosophers, “only what is useful is good and that usefulness should be cogently regulated,”
” Criticisms of Effective Altruism on the basis of critiques to Utilitarianism are not only expected, but fair.”
That’s an extraordinary leap. It’s akin to arguing that the existence of similarities between cats and dogs justifies my complaint that my neighbor’s cat barks too loudly. Using a critique of utilitarianism to criticize EA is only fair if it actually applies to EA, and many don’t.
To illustrate how this supposed fairness operates in practice: I got here via https://aeon.co/essays/why-longtermism-is-the-worlds-most-dangerous-secular-credo
which claims “Although some longtermists insist that they aren’t utilitarians, we should right away note that this is mostly a smoke-and-mirrors act to deflect criticisms that longtermism the effective altruism (EA) movement from which it emerged – is nothing more than utilitarianism repackaged”, with the word “repackaged” linking here. Yow. LTism can certainly be criticized and those criticisms can include its utilitarian aspects, but this notion of transitivity of critiques based on one view “emerging” from other or having common attributes is quite invalid.
[…] the effective altruism (EA) movement from which it emerged – is nothing more than utilitarianism repackaged. The fact is that the EA movement is deeply utilitarian, at least in practice, and indeed, before […]
Your blog serves as a constant reminder that we can overcome any obstacle with a positive mindset.
I enjoy the thought-provoking questions you pose in your blog posts.