There are two broad approaches to globalization and global justice in the philosophical literature, namely statism and cosmopolitanism. Statists take the nation-state and its institutions as the primary locus of political theorizing. Thus, when discussing globalization, statists often contend that citizens of one nation-state have no or extremely limited obligations to those of another, at most things like humanitarian aid and upholding treaties. Cosmopolitans, by contrast, often argue that obligations of justice transcend the borders of the nation-state; they often theorize about how various trans-national institutions should be developed in order to fulfill these obligations.
The growing interdependence and interconnection throughout the world – I will refer to this simply as ‘globalization’ setting aside the very large debate on what “globalization” actually is or entails – has been reason for many to think that a simple statist response to global justice is inadequate. However, the nation-state has long had pride of place in political philosophy. Statists use the centrality of the nation-state as a way to limit how far justice extends. Since the crux of the statist position is the primacy of the nation-state, if it can be shown that the nation-state is problematic, then a strictly statist view becomes untenable. In this post, I offer a critique of the nation-state by discussing a version of republican anarchism. By republican anarchism, I mean a political philosophy that both undermines the legitimacy and justification of the nation-state and is grounded in the republican commitment to freedom as non-domination.
Contemporary republican theorists understand justice in terms of non-domination. The basic idea is something like this: domination amounts to being controlled by an “alien” power where that control is the ability of someone, or something, to negatively affect the available choices of another in an arbitrary way, and the dominated is generally in a position of dependence, where that is understood as there being an inability or very high cost for the dominated to extract oneself from the dominating situation. For a republican theorist, “alien power” broadly means anything external to or outside the effective control or constraint of the dominated. The solution to domination is what Philip Pettit (1996) has previously called antipower. Antipower manifests as a form of social agency wherein one is able to shape, check or control the “alien” power exercised over one.
With this conception of justice in mind, I suggest that in order to be legitimate nation-state must first, and foremost, not dominate its denizens. Drawing on a distinction made by A. John Simmons (1999), when considering non-domination or domination with respect to nation-state legitimacy it is evaluated in a transactional and personal way. Thus, whether a nation-state is legitimate is determined based on the relationship between the nation-state and those it dominates or protects from domination. Also, it seems that the legitimacy of a nation-state may concern its capabilities and functions. For example, sociologist Max Weber identified an integral aspect of the nation-state is that it can successfully claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. More practically, it seems important that a nation-state should be able fulfill requirements such as those theorist and political activist Huey P. Newton (1995) felt were central for the functioning of a nation-state: “[t]hese are economic independence, cultural determination, control of the political institutions, territorial integrity and safety.”
For a nation-state to be justified, it must secure freedom as non-domination and prevent rather than being the cause of domination. However, again drawing on Simmons, when considering the justificatory status of a nation-state it is entirely a function of whether it acts as a dominator, prevents domination or secures non-domination from a third-person, or outsider, perspective. Other goods that the nation-state may provide – e.g., solving collective action problems, distributing goods and services, enabling political agency – could only help justify a nation-state if there are not alternatives that realize these same goods. Both cosmopolitans and anarchists provide exactly these types of alternatives. Thus, domination and non-domination are the most salient facet for evaluating the justification of a nation-state.
What I have laid out above is consistent with a broadly republican political theory, even though republicanism is typically understood to be a paradigmatically statist theory. Many republicans are of course statists. Indeed, as Quentin Skinner (2010), a leading voice in the revitalization of republican political theory, has pointed out, traditionally for republicans “[j]ust as it is possible to live and act freely if and only if you are a freeman [understood as one who is not subject to the domination of another], they argue, it is possible to live and act as a freeman if and only if you live in a free state.” Yet, there is a growing literature of critical cosmopolitan republicanism (CCR). Critical Cosmopolitan Republicans contend that the republican commitment to non-domination requires looking beyond the borders of nation states because the globalization has created new circumstances of justice. I suggest that the same type of reasoning calls not only for a non-statist republicanism, but an anti-statist – i.e. anarchist – republicanism.
Consider, again, that globalization entails a variety of new forms of arbitrary power exercised between and across national borders. This exercise of arbitrary power has wide ranging effects on the lives of individuals and over a variety of institutions with little or no say from those most affected by that power and influence. Further, because of the increasing interdependence of global trade, there is a high degree of dependence, which prevents individuals and institutions from “opting out.” Republicans have consistently criticized sub-state institutions and agents for functioning as dominators – e.g., patriarchal family structures, or how racism manifests in various systems of “justice.” I contend that republicans should be equally as critical of state and trans-national actors. Indeed, globalization requires a global perspective, and nation-states are simply not up to the task. Additionally, as James Bohman (2016) has pointed out “[i]n order to maintain control over its boundaries [nation-]states have to heighten executive powers, and even in this regard they often delegate executive authority to international institutions” which entails that nation-states “cannot both solve pressing transnational boundaries and maintain their undivided sovereignty and traditional monopoly powers.” If that is right, then CCR ought to be committed to the illegitimacy of nation-states. At the very least, the arguments and evidence it offers underwrite the anarchist conclusion that nation-states are illegitimate, because of the role nation-states play in domination from a transactional perspective and their failures with respect to those capabilities and functions identified by Weber and Newton. However, nation-states could still be justified, or justifiable, normatively speaking from a general, outsider point of view.
If nation-states are to be justified, they must function so as to prevent domination, especially for those residing within their own borders, and not play a significant role for bringing about domination, both within and outside their borders. Globalization makes that highly unlikely. Undocumented workers, refugees and other non-citizen denizens of a polity are paradigmatic cases of domination. Moreover, the literature on globalization discusses at length how less powerful nation-states are dominated by more powerful ones. For instance, Cécile Laborde (2010) has drawn attention to “the asymmetry, within the WTO, between the continued protectionism of rich states and the forced opening of third world markets, [which] is a striking example of the way in which powerful countries have exploited their agent-relative dominant position by entrenching and institutionalizing iniquitous trade rules.” On that count, it is clear that “rich states” act as dominators and poorer nation-states cannot prevent domination.
While these asymmetrical power relations certainly do exist, even fully industrialized world powers are vulnerable in many respects to similar types of domination. For example, Mark Sundeen (2012), discusses the following real-world dominating scenario: “the U.S. Endangered Species Act prohibited American importers from buying shrimp that had been harvested with nets that could accidentally kill sea turtles. Asian nations challenged the law before the WTO, which sided with the shrimpers. America was forced to back down.” In other words, the United States, despite its status on the world stage was unable to make sure that people within the United States were free to make their own decisions and those people were both in a position of high dependence and not really in a position to affect the decisions made by Asian countries and the WTO that affected them. Since all nation-states, to varying degrees, are susceptible to unchecked interference from external powers they are unable to ensure non-domination for their citizens and denizens. Domination, wherever it manifests, seems to a have corrupting influence. The presence of domination globally leads to domination within the borders of nation-states.
These considerations taken together underwrite a distinctive republican anarchism. What I am offering builds on the “critical” aspect of republicanism, where the concept of domination/non-domination is used as a normative tool to evaluate various institutions. When one views the current globalized circumstances of justice through the lens of republicanism, the nation-state fares quite poorly. Indeed, it seems that a commitment to non-domination, when coupled with these new circumstances of justice, undermines the very normative foundations of anything that could rightly be called a nation-state. Virtually, if not, all currently existing nation-states both function as major dominators – internally and externally – and are incapable of preventing significant forms of domination.
Ultimately, globalization continues to move the world forward and political theory has failed to keep up with those changing circumstances. Simply put, the statist position does not have the theoretical resources to adequately address the new circumstances of justice. If nation-states are illegitimate and unjustified, then so is the theory which depends on them.
Joshua Anderson
Joshua Anderson is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Virginia State University. His research focuses on questions of global justice, and political philosophy more generally. His book, Justice, Community and Globalization: Groundwork to a Communal-Cosmopolitanism, was just released in paperback by Routledge.
