Dr. Justin Bernstein is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University. Prior to joining FAU, he was a Hecht-Levi Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Berman Institute of Bioethics at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Bernstein received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, an M.A. from University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee,and a B.A. from Vassar College — all in Philosophy. The dog in the photo that he’s trying to coax into posing is Cleo, who is somewhere between 10-12 months old.
What would your childhood self say if someone told you that you would grow up to be a philosopher?
I don’t think my childhood self really had a sense of what a philosopher was, but my parents have a story they like to tell. Our family was on vacation at the beach when I was around seven or eight. After a day splashing around and building sandcastles, we were watching a beautiful sunset. And I said something like, “Since we’re all going to die, what’s the point to living? It’s really all pointless, isn’t it?” My parents bring up that anecdote and say something like, “you were ALWAYS a philosopher.”
What is your favorite thing that you’ve written?
I’ll include three things.
First, my dissertation, An Act-Focused Theory of Political Legitimacy, has a special place for me. It’s basically a book, and I’m still in the process of breaking it down into some self-standing articles. I think it engages with some relatively underexplored territory in debates about political legitimacy by focusing much more on the legitimacy of particular actions rather than, say, the legitimacy of the state. (Thus, an ‘act-focused’ theory of legitimacy.) I argue that my act-focused theory can better make sense of legitimate actions in illegitimate states and illegitimate actions in legitimate states than its ‘state-focused’ rivals. My view also makes broadly ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘consequentialist’ conceptions of legitimacy far more appealing. Put succinctly, consequentialist or instrumentalist conceptions struggle to ground a right to rule on the part of the state — especially if we compare those views to conceptions of legitimacy that appeal to the ‘consent of the governed’ in some sense, which are well-suited to grounding such a right. So, if we think of legitimacy as a state’s right to rule, then consequentialist or instrumentalist views of legitimacy encounter significant obstacles that their rivals don’t encounter. If I’m right and the legitimacy of an action doesn’t turn on whether the state has this right, however, many purported obstacles to broadly consequentialist or instrumentalist views of legitimacy disappear. I then sketch a (broadly) consequentialist theory of political legitimacy that embodies this act-focused approach.
Second, a New York Times op-ed, All Children Should Have to Get a Flu Shot. During a meeting with Zeke Emanuel, I suggested that many of the reasons that justify mandating the MMR vaccine for children also justify mandating the flu vaccine. A few hours later, he called me and proposed that we write an op-ed in defense of that position, which the New York Times ultimately accepted.
Third, my co-authors (Ruth Faden and Sirine Shebaya) and I recently finished significantly revising The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, Public Health Ethics. I’m especially proud of it because I put forward a taxonomy that I think helps to understand the landscape of public health ethics, a taxonomy that organizes the entry. Namely, debates in public health ethics typically concern two normative concepts: justice and legitimacy.
Debates about justice arise in public health ethics because public health concerns the health of populations — and so public health ethicists immediately face questions about aggregation, the fair distribution of benefits and burdens of policies, and other familiar questions that arise in debates about justice. Debates about legitimacy arise because governments are the primary agents realizing public health. As a result, public health ethicists face familiar questions about how individual liberty constrains the government’s mandate to promote public health or how we should resolve normative disagreements about the appropriate role of government in promoting public health. And, of course, public health policies frequently lead to debates that involve both concepts. Consider, for instance, opposition to soda taxes. Some opposition charges that these taxes are regressive—and therefore unjust. Others have objected on a variety of grounds that fall under the ‘legitimacy heading’ — for instance, the justification for such taxes rests on a contentious view of the human good that some would reasonably reject.
What time of day are you most productive and creative?
I’m a night owl. 10 PM-3 AM.
What are you working on right now?
Other than converting my dissertation into self-standing articles, most of my forthcoming work and papers in progress focus on how individuals should act in the face of collective action problems concerning health, in some broad sense of ‘concerning health.’ For example, some of my work addresses the ethics of vaccine-refusal, what to make of the intense anger people feel in response to certain kinds of vaccine refusal, and the moral significance of vaccine refusal caused by historical or ongoing injustices. Other work focuses on the pandemic. Several Hopkins colleagues (Anne Barnhill, Brian Hutler, Travis Rieder, Ruth Faden, and Hahrie Han) and I developed an ethics framework designed to assess the ethics of ‘nonpharmaceutical interventions’ undertaken in response to pandemics — especially the ethics of ‘reopening’ and ‘shutting down.’ I’m also part of a team that has addressed whom we should prioritize when the United States government allocates the first batch of a coronavirus vaccine. Finally, other forthcoming work and papers in progress address how individuals should act in response to massive harms endemic to climate change or factory farming.
Name a trait, skill or characteristic that you have that others may not know about.
I used to be a relatively accomplished competitive fencer — I was an NCAA finalist, placed top 16 in the Junior Olympics, etc. It’s odd to say it now, but fencing used to be a really central part of my identity. And, in some ways, fencing is kind of like philosophy — trying to come up with a clever attack/argument, a lot of anticipating an opponent’s/interlocutor’s response, thinking quickly on your feet, and so forth. I do miss fencing and I keep saying I’ll get back into it…but I already ruptured my Achilles tendon while fencing when I was 18 (and in much better shape), so a return might not be the best idea.
This section of the APA Blog is designed to get to know our fellow philosophers a little better. We’re including profiles of APA members that spotlight what captures their interest not only inside the office, but also outside of it. We’d love for you to be a part of it, so please contact us via the interview nomination form here to nominate yourself or a friend.
Dr. Sabrina D. MisirHiralall is an editor at the Blog of the APA who currently teaches philosophy, religion, and education courses solely online for Montclair State University, Three Rivers Community College, and St. John’s University.
