David Thorstad is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Global Priorities Institute, Oxford, and a Junior Research Fellow at Kellogg College. His research focuses on bounded rationality and norms of inquiry.
What are you working on right now?
Most of my work sits at the intersection of two topics. The study of bounded rationality asks what rationality demands of agents with limited cognitive resources and abilities. The study of norms of inquiry asks normative questions about processes of inquiry, such as evidence-gathering and reasoning. I think that these two topics are intimately related and the focus of my current research is to bring them together.
My main project at the moment is a book manuscript. My aim in this book is to zoom in on a set of normative assumptions which underly bounded rationality theorizing, to state these assumptions as precisely as I can, to develop a normative theory that can ground them, and to draw out implications of this theory for philosophical and scientific discussions about rationality.
I am also working on a series of papers on topics connected to bounded rationality and inquiry. For example, I am currently thinking about duties to gather evidence; the normative importance of coherence in epistemology; and norms of decisionmaking under severe forms of ignorance and computational intractability.
What’s your favorite quote?
Herbert Simon once said that human rationality is shaped by a pair of scissors whose blades are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor. I’ve always been impressed by Simon’s ability to cut to the heart of what matters to bounded rationality and what does not.
For example, we often forget that agents are limited as much by their environments and other external constraints as they are limited by internal constraints on cognitive resources and abilities. The same cognitive strategies which work well in one environment may work poorly in another environment.
By way of illustration, a good way to predict the outcome of Wimbledon tennis matches is to assume that the players you recognize will win. But recognition might be a poor way to predict the outcome of a charitable benefit match, where the players you recognize could be retired greats.
For this reason, it is important to think about the rationality of cognitive strategies in an ecological, or environment-relative way. In studying bounded rationality, we do not ask whether a strategy such as recognition-based inference is rational or irrational full-stop. Instead, we ask in which environments the strategy would be rational to use, and in which environments it would be irrational.
Who do you think is the most overrated / underrated philosopher?
Most underrated: it’s a tie between Kristie Dotson and Edward Stein.
I’m consistently inspired by Dotson’s vision of a progressive, socially-relevant epistemology that brings the focus back to issues of silencing, injustice, oppression, and other outcomes that can result from our epistemic practices. Dotson’s work helps us to see how these considerations could be relevant to the project of analytic epistemology, and what they might imply about the nature of the epistemic project. Dotson’s work has been getting a good deal of attention recently, and I hope that this trend continues.
Edward Stein made my list because he wrote one of my favorite books of all time: Without good reason. The book deals with a collection of philosophical and scientific views about rationality that arose in response to experimental work in the second half of the twentieth century. Stein’s treatment brings together that unique combination of analytical rigor, conceptual clarity and empirical grounding that allows philosophers at our best to make an impact on ongoing scientific debates. Many of Stein’s discussions have become so authoritative that we youngsters tend to forget what Stein did for us. After reading Stein, it is hard to remember ever having seen things any other way.
What topic do you think is under explored in philosophy?
I’d like to see more work on global priorities research (but we’re picking up steam). Global priorities research asks philosophically interesting and practically important questions that arise in thinking about how to do the most good with a limited stock of resources. For example, we ask whether it is most important for altruists to act with the aim of improving the long-term future of humanity, or to solve the most pressing contemporary problems instead.
Questions in global priorities research bear important connections to a wide range of philosophical topics including moral uncertainty, population ethics, and duties of beneficence. These questions are also practically important in deciding how to structure our lives. It is not uncommon to hear that papers on global priorities research have had an impact on the career choices and donation decisions of concerned altruists.
What is your favorite sound in the world?
Glenn Gould playing the Goldberg Variations in 1981. Just listen to the Aria. It will change your life twice.
What are your goals and aspirations outside work?
I’d like to settle down in one place long enough to own a dog. Specifically, a German Shepherd raised by the monks of New Skete. I think that this must be how eudaimonia is achieved.
This section of the APA Blog is designed to get to know our fellow philosophers a little better. We’re including profiles of APA members that spotlight what captures their interest not only inside the office, but also outside of it. We’d love for you to be a part of it, so please contact us via the interview nomination form here to nominate yourself or a friend.
Dr. Sabrina D. MisirHiralall is an editor at the Blog of the APA who currently teaches philosophy, religion, and education courses solely online for Montclair State University, Three Rivers Community College, and St. John’s University.
