This edition of The Forefront of Research interviews Cecilea Mun about the recently created Journal of the Philosophy of Emotion. Cecilea Mun is the founding Director of the Society for the Philosophy of Emotion. She specializes in mind and emotion, epistemology, philosophy of science, feminist philosophy, and moral psychology.
Describe some of the articles, symposiums, reviews, etc. that the JPE publishes?
The philosophy of emotion can be connected to all areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, philosophy of mind, epistemology, feminist philosophy, ethics, and moral psychology. In our inaugural issue, which was published on January 31, 2020, concerns in ethics and moral psychology were addressed by Iskra Fileva’s article on what it means to be a victim with respect to the vice of envy; by Ronald de Sousa’s article on the possibility of respecting those whom one holds with contempt; by Antony Aumann and Zac Cogley’s article on anger and forgiveness, which provided a solution to the puzzle of how one can forgive someone while still holding them responsible for their wrongdoing; and by Evan Simpson’s article, which called into question the utilitarian notion of rationality in ethical decision-making. Furthermore, the book symposium on Rick A. Furtak’s (2018) book, Knowing Emotions, addressed concerns shared by philosophers of mind, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, and especially those concerns related to cognitivism and non-cognitivism about emotion, as well as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) approaches to emotion and mind.
Furthermore, although the contents of the inaugural issue are primarily by authors working in the discipline of philosophy, the JPE is also open to publishing any well-written, rigorously researched paper that engages the topics and literature in the area of philosophy of emotion, regardless of the disciplinary perspective from which the article is written. So, for example, we would welcome works by psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, etc., that either challenge or provide additional supporting arguments for views expressed in the inaugural issue or any other work within the discourse of philosophy of emotion. We also welcome manuscripts by philosophers of emotion that take a more extensive interdisciplinary approach, including works in the intersection of philosophy of emotion, psychology, and experimental philosophy.
The main aim of the JPE is to facilitate dialogue between interdisciplinary scholars of emotion from a broad range of disciplinary backgrounds, and because there are currently several journals that do so for those who conduct interdisciplinary research primarily in the psychology of emotion, the JPE’s mission is to do so for those who conduct interdisciplinary research primarily in the philosophy of emotion.
The JPE is also associated with the Society for Philosophy of Emotion (SPE), which conducts affiliated group sessions at the three annual American Philosophical Association conferences. Presenters are encouraged to submit their papers to the JPE, and revised commentaries and responses from the SPE author-meets-critics sessions are published as book symposiums in the JPE. The SPE also conducts pre-publication workshops for their affiliated group sessions, and the participants in these workshops will subsequently participate in an author-meets-critics session and a book symposium. Any work from these affiliated group sessions, however, must first pass a double-anonymous peer review with at least two peer referees before being published in the JPE.
Finally, beginning with its second issue, the JPE will publish a new publication announcement, which will highlight new books and edited collections on emotion and related topics that were published within a year of the publication date of the announcement. This is a free service that the JPE will provide, and the only thing we ask is for authors or publishers to submit the necessary information by completing a very simple form. More detailed information about what the JPE publishes and how one can submit information about a recently published book or edited collection can be found on our submission page.
What are some of the main concerns in the philosophy of emotion, and how are they related to the more general debates in philosophy and other disciplines?
Many of the main concerns in the philosophy of emotion can be related to more general debates within philosophy as well as debates within other disciplines. The JPE welcomes manuscripts on any of the intersecting debates that I mention below, as well as on other possible debates that potential contributing authors can think of:
1) The overarching question in the philosophy of emotion is the question “What is an emotion?” This question is distinct from the question of what discrete emotions are (e.g., joy, anger, sorrow, shame, and guilt). This question can be related to concerns in metaphysics, and more specifically ontology (including concerns in mereology). It is widely recognized by emotion researchers that there are discrete emotions, but it is currently widely contested as to whether or not these discrete emotions (which some may also include moods as kinds) constitute a coherent kind (natural or otherwise). Furthermore, if discrete emotions do constitute a coherent class, what is the unifying principle and how is this principle justified? Are they kinds of feelings, thoughts, perceptions, actions, etc., or do they constitute a sui generis kind? If not, why not? These debates can be characterized as debates between what I refer to as realists, instrumentalists, eliminative realists, and eliminativists about emotion (Mun 2016).
2) Another debate between these kinds of theorists are concerns about the place of ordinary language in emotion research. The significant question here is not whether or not ordinary language plays a role in theorizing about emotions, but instead the question of whether or not it ought to play such a role in the science of emotion. This question can be understood as a question in the area of philosophy of science, and responses to this question may eventually lead one to concerns about the purpose of scientific inquiry, skepticism and knowledge, as well as language and reference.
This is also where the philosophy of emotion connects with experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophy is a burgeoning area in the discipline of philosophy. It began with research in ethics and moral psychology, and started to get applied to research in epistemology, but it is also drawing interests from other areas, including philosophy of emotion. The aim of experimental philosophy is to develop and apply empirical methods for the purpose of conducting philosophical research.
This approach to philosophy of emotion is especially useful because it can help researchers get at those questions about the relationship between language use, emotion concepts, and emotions. For example, the Australasian Experimental Philosophy Group just recently conducted a two-week online experimental philosophy (x-phi) conference on corpus analysis, which uses empirical methods to analyze written information (e.g., books, journal articles, blog posts, transcripts, and even social media communications) in order to develop and test various hypotheses about language use. I believe such research, as well as the more traditional methods of experimental philosophy (e.g., conducting experiments on the employment of concepts through the use of surveys) can help us not only get at concerns about what emotions are but also as to what the relationship between the language of a science of emotion and ordinary language ought to be.
3) Insofar as emotions are regarded to be something like a mental state, constituted by mental states (e.g., perceptions, imaginations, feelings, thoughts, judgements), or are related to mental states in some significant way, many of the concerns in the philosophy of emotion can be directly related to concerns in the philosophy of mind. Yet I think one of the most interesting debates in the philosophy of emotion, mind, and cognitive science is the debate regarding the import of emotions to concerns about intentionality and consciousness. For example, some philosophers of mind have proposed a view which takes phenomenal intentionality to be a fundamental kind of intentionality. Uriah Kriegel (2013) has referred to this research program as the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP). According to Kriegel, one of the central tenets of this research program is basicness: “Phenomenal intentionality is a basic kind of intentionality and functions as a source of all intentionality” (Kriegel 2013, 5).
In these debates, the phenomenal aspect is typically understood as indicating something akin to a conscious experience in which there is something it is like to be in such a state. Some emotion researchers, however, deny that emotions are necessarily conscious or phenomenal states, yet they maintain that emotions are intentional states. Furthermore, such emotion theorists may argue that it is possible for non-phenomenal or non-conscious emotional states (e.g., as subpersonal processes or actions) to not only be causally prior to phenomenal or conscious emotional states, but that the subsequent states derive their intentionality from the prior states. Such conclusions challenge the PIRP’s tenet of basicness and can call into question whether or not a dualistic framework is consistent with the PIRP.
Furthermore, a significant distinction that would need to be addressed in such debates would be the difference between states that are non-conscious, conscious, and one in which a person is subjectively aware of being in such a state (i.e., “conscious awareness” or “awareness”). For example, one might argue that one can have a phenomenal, and therefore conscious, emotional experience without being aware of being in such a conscious state, and both of these kinds of states would be distinct from the kind of non-phenomenal or non-conscious emotional states that were previously mentioned. Emotions, therefore, complicate some of the debates in philosophy of mind in such a way as to challenge various theories of mind that may not have appropriately recognized the intricacies of emotional experiences.
4) A third debate, which is related to both of the concerns mentioned above is the debate between what philosophers of emotion refer to as cognitive theories of emotion and non-cognitive theories of emotion. As mentioned above, the book symposium on Rick A. Furtak’s monograph, Knowing Emotions, which was published in our inaugural issue, touched upon some of the concerns in this debate, and we hope to also have contributions in our second and future issues about these concerns. Also as indicated in Furtak’s book symposium, one aspect of this debate concerns the trend in the philosophy of emotion toward 4E (embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended) approaches to theorizing about emotions. Such views are typically characterized as being akin to non-cognitive or feeling theories of emotion that reject a representational theory of mind, yet they have also been characterized as “cognitive” theories of emotion (read Scarantino and de Sousa 2018).
There is a question, however, as to the coherence of such theories of emotion, especially if emotions are taken to be essentially intentional states or if intentionality is rejected as an essential feature of what emotions are. Furthermore, there is a question as to how such theories can account for more sophisticated emotional experiences in which some sort of representational content seems to be essential to those emotional experiences. For example, experiences of shame seem to require at least two basic kinds of conscious, phenomenal, representational, intentional content: the subject’s first-person representation of oneself as an object of another subject’s experience and the subject’s second- or third-person representation of another subject’s perspective of the subject as an object. For radical embodied cognition theorists of emotion, the question then becomes how to make sense of an emotion like shame without “sneaking” in representations by another name. One can also question whether or not a 4E approach ought to be regarded as a “cognitive” theory, along with more traditional cognitive theories of emotion.
5) That emotions can be characterized as cognitions also provides an entry point for discussions about the rationality of emotions and its relation to knowledge, rational decision making, behavioral economics, politics, and the pursuit of justice. If emotions can be rational, then perhaps it can also be a vehicle for knowledge. Furthermore, our ordinary language discourse about emotions seems to suggest that emotions can be rational. We can, therefore, ask how one might explain the rationality of emotions, and its relationship to knowledge. Doing so would address concerns in the intersection of philosophy of emotion, mind, and epistemology.
A related set of questions would extend these concerns into the intersection of decision theory, epistemology, behavioral economics, political science, and feminist philosophy. These are questions about the precise role emotions or a discrete emotion play(s) in rational decision-making, politics, public policy, and the pursuit of justice. For example, one might be concerned with whether or not the effect of emotions or a discrete emotion on rational decision-making processes would necessarily render such processes to be “irrational,” and whether or not emotions or a discrete emotion ought to play a role in every day and political decision-making.
One way to get at these questions is by approaching them from a decision theory perspective and to consider the import of emotions or a discrete emotion in making rational decisions, especially in accordance with something like an expected utility theory of rational decision-making. Another approach is to take a virtue or vice epistemology perspective, and consider what kinds of emotions contribute to epistemic virtues or vices, why they do so, and to what extent. A third approach is to consider the rationality of emotions from the perspective of political science and to consider not only whether or not emotions promote or hinder our rational political decision-making, but the various ways in which it can do so and how emotions can be managed so as to ensure that it promotes rather than hinders rational political decision-making. A fourth approach is to seek to understand the role emotions play in creating and upholding various forms of injustices, including structural injustices, and to consider how, through an understanding of emotions, we can work to undo these harms.
6) As demonstrated by several articles published in the inaugural issue, the philosophy of emotion is intimately related to concerns in moral psychology and ethics. Some kinds of emotions are regarded to be intrinsically moral kinds or to have versions that are moral kinds (e.g., guilt, shame, anger, remorse, regret), and some ethical frameworks are grounded in the nature of emotions (e.g., emotivism and virtue ethics). Concerns regarding the nature and implications of moral emotions fall squarely within the intersection of philosophy of emotion and moral psychology, and they especially involve concerns regarding the normative functions of these emotions. Concerns regarding the grounding of ethical frameworks in emotions is also an interesting topic, and fall more so within the intersection of philosophy of emotion and meta-ethics. Whether or not such theories are successful theories of emotion are still open for debate, but I think one of the most interesting questions in this area is whether or not a realist ethical theory that is grounded in the nature of emotions can be developed. Some might suggest that virtue ethics is such a theory, but if one is speaking of Aristotle’s version of virtue ethics, there is a question as to whether or not his account is a realist account about moral properties.
7) Another set of concerns in the philosophy of emotion intersects with concerns about culture, such as religion and art. In regard to art, one central question that lies at the intersection of philosophy of emotion, philosophy of religion, psychology, and anthropology is the question of the import or significance of emotions in religious experiences. For example, the experience of awe is often connected with religious experiences, and one might question what the function of awe is in such experiences, whether awe serves a function that is uniquely tailored for religious experiences or whether awe is less domain specific, and how awe serves this function.
In the intersection of philosophy of emotion and art, one of the most long-standing problem has been what is referred to as the Paradox of Fiction. This paradox is also often referred to as the Radford Paradox, named after Colin Radford (1975) who is often credited with introducing this paradox (read Schneider). The paradox is about the rationality of having emotional responses to fictions if it is the case that we can only have such emotional responses to things that we perceive or believe to be real. One of the most interesting aspects of grappling with this paradox is that it can lead one into addressing concerns in the areas of aesthetics, metaphysics, mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of language.
These are only some of the very interesting concerns in the area of philosophy of emotion. There are other important questions, such as those regarding the role of emotion in education and character development, which I have not said much about. I hope, however, that emotion researchers will be willing to enlighten our readers about all of these topics and more.
What effects do you hope it will have?
I hope the JPE will have at least two significant effects for the philosophy of emotion. First, I hope it will help scholars already working in the area of philosophy of emotion to share their work with both the scholarly community and the general public; and that in doing so, it will also encourage scholars in other areas and disciplines to recognize the significance of the philosophy of emotion and engage the work in this area in their own research. Second, I hope that scholars in other areas and disciplines can help philosophers of emotion more readily understand and appreciate the import of the work in areas and disciplines outside the philosophy of emotion. The overarching aim is to facilitate the exchange of ideas between philosophers of emotion and researchers in other areas and disciplines, as well as increasing the general appreciation of emotion research.
Who would you recommend read your journal regularly?
I would recommend anyone interested in the philosophy of emotion to read the JPE, but I think it would be especially helpful for both graduate students, academics, and professional scholars. Because we aim to foster rigorous, open, and fair exchanges of ideas among an interdisciplinary community of scholars who conduct research in the philosophy of emotion, our papers, symposiums, and book reviews should help provide some interesting, accessible insights that are on the cutting edge of the current discourse in the philosophy of emotion, related areas, and disciplines outside of philosophy.
What advantages are there to publishing with your journal compared to other journals that works on the same or similar topics?
Because the JPE is still in its infancy, this is a difficult question to answer. The main problem is the concern with prestige that many authors have with respect to choosing a venue for publishing their research, and despite its internationally renowned editorial advisory board, the JPE does not currently have the history that a journal usually needs in order to establish its prestige. So, in regard to prestige, the journal can only offer authors the possibility of being a part of the history that would eventually establish its prestige, which is actually quite a lot if you think about it.
Besides the possibility of contributing to the history of establishing the JPE’s prestige, the JPE can also offer authors the condition of having their manuscripts vetted, reviewed, and a decision rendered by experts in the area, and a venue which will make their work openly accessible to a wide audience. There are other journals on emotion, such as Emotion: History, Culture, and Society, Emotion Review, Emotion and Cognition, and Emotion, but the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion is the only journal that specializes in the area of the philosophy of emotion.
Why is the work of this journal valuable?
One of the most valuable aspects of the JPE is the kind of cooperation that it promotes among those who work in the philosophy of emotion, including those who take an interdisciplinary approach to their research. The JPE’s core values are diversity, inclusiveness, collegiality/community, honesty, integrity, the principle of charity, rigorous scholarship, and clarity of content. It takes a lot of work with various people all doing their fair share to uphold these values, yet because the JPE is a journal for the scholarly community by the scholarly community, the benefits from this work are equally shared among its contributors. Please refer to the information provided on the home page for more details.
Thank you Nathan for allowing me to share some information about the JPE with the readers of the Blog of the APA, and I hope that at least some of them decide to join the conversation in the philosophy of emotion by submitting a manuscript to the JPE.
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The purpose of The Forefront of Research is to draw attention to the work done at conferences or by journals. We seek to interview conference organizers, editors, presenters, authors, and keynotes about recent or upcoming research presented in journals or at conferences. The goal is to highlight new ideas, interpretations, and projects that can shape the field and about which it is important for researchers to know. Please contact us if you have ideas for this series.
Cecilea Mun
Cecilea Mun is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics program, with the Department of Philosophy, at the University of Louisville, KY, the founding director of the Society for Philosophy of Emotion, and the founding editor-in-chief of the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion. I have a total of 15 years teaching experience at the undergraduate level of education, and have taught at a variety of institutions, including community colleges, public land grant institutions, and one of the largest public universities in the country.
