Gerad Gentry is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Philosophy of Law at Lewis University and a visiting Associate to Germanic Studies at the University of Chicago. He works chiefly on the systematic relationship between the idealism of Kant and Hegel. Recently, he was a Bilinski Fellow and Research Visitor at Yale University (2017-18) and Fulbright researcher at the University of Potsdam and Humboldt University of Berlin (2016-17). This interview explores his work related to the presentation he gave at the recent Eastern APA in New York City.
What was your symposium at the Eastern about? What was the topic of your presentation?
In this symposium talk, I take up a problem at the heart of the idealism of Kant and Hegel. The problem is how to understand the logic of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit]. To underscore the systematic implications of this principle, I draw attention to two common critiques of Hegel’s idealism. The critiques concern two features of Hegel’s idealism that are important but equally problematic. Namely, Hegel’s identity claims between freedom and necessity as well as the a priori and a posteriori. The real difficulty with these identities arises if we think that Hegel retains a discursive conception of reason (as Kant does). My analysis of this principle of purposiveness is an analysis of the ground on which a discursive conception of reason can possess both identities as features of reason itself.
Put differently, my argument is an answer to the question: what is the “proof” by which Hegel takes himself justifiably to transition from Kant’s critical philosophy to the ground of absolute philosophy? Hegel highlights purposiveness as a key moment in this transition, but how are we to understand this concept such that we too might agree with the validity of that transition? And how does this clarify Hegel’s notion that absolute idealism relies on a form of discursive reason, in which exists a genuine identity of freedom and necessity that is incompatible with rational determinism or all-encompassing monism?
How does your presentation connect with your larger research project?
My larger project is personal. Reading Hegel is immensely enjoyable and I find myself regularly stepping away from his writings with fresh insights on life. I care deeply about systematicity and interdisciplinarity. To make sense of a diversity of human pursuits, perspectives, and approaches to life, requires a rich and dynamic system to bring about enrichment while avoiding a reductive understanding. Hegel’s system of idealism is defined by such an aim. For philosophy to do what Hegel’s work does for me is philosophy at its best.
Given the systematic nature of Kant and Hegel’s accounts, a redefinition of a key principle like purposiveness necessarily modifies the broader systematic relations between both forms of idealism. The whole does not remain the same. My symposium talk is a step in a larger effort of identifying a specific source of continuity that winds its way through Kant and Hegel and yields substantial insight into the ground of Hegel’s expansive claims regarding the nature and role of philosophy in life.
My larger work on this subject aims to trace out the major implications that arise for both Kant and Hegel’s idealism when we understand the principle of purposiveness as a free lawful structural movement of reason. Key here is that it is understood at first (for Kant and in Hegel’s Logic) as importantly distinct from anything like a reasoning subject. It is just a necessary, ideal structure of reason itself, which then serves as a ground for the validity of the mental processes of the reasoning subject as engaged in specific kinds of judgments, rational pursuits, practices, and institutions. Ultimately, I take such a core principle of reason to be the ground on which Hegel’s system can lay important claims to the significance of art, history, culture, religion, and the political and ethical life of societies as forming and informing genuine philosophy, while nevertheless retaining the necessity (synthetic a priori validity) of the Kantian ideal. That is a tall order for absolute idealism. It is Hegel’s claim, and I think we subvert our own contemporary philosophical efforts by dismissing that claim as mere bravado.
You’ve mentioned how your work is related to the Society for German Idealism and Romanticism. Talk about the work the Society does and why it is important.
The Society for German Idealism and Romanticism (SGIR) is a thriving community cultivating conversation and scholarship on two of the most significant, interrelated movements in the history of western thought. The SGIR seeks to advance scholarship in the history of philosophy and contemporary issues by bringing the insights of idealism and romanticism to bear on contemporary global matters.
In an age where scholarship is understandably driven toward the esoteric, the SGIR gives space for specialized work that takes seriously the interdisciplinarity and cross-pollination that was not merely embraced by the German idealists and romantics, but genuinely celebrated. True philosophy, for many in these two movements, cannot arise in isolation from other core practices of human life and thought. The SGIR gives contemporary space for such an approach to philosophy while drawing on the strengths and insights of our own age.
I think that philosophy, by nature of what it is, always faces the risk of becoming increasingly disconnected from the needs of our time. The SGIR contributes to a kind of philosophizing that takes up the full range and relation of human interests and problems. So, for example, we recently hosted a session on “the a priori in Feminism and Race” in an effort to encourage the application of idealist thought to important issues of our time. Other topics have included freedom, the imagination, aesthetics, systematicity, normativity, and organic life, to name a few. More than this, it is a truly exceptional community of philosophers and scholars from related fields genuinely interested in the subject, the shared conversation, and in the wellbeing of each other. Since its inception, the society has grown at a rate of about 100 members per year. To my mind, this kind of thriving community represents the best of philosophy as a profession.
The SGIR Review publishes several issues each year, including a forthcoming special-topic issue. What new or interesting ideas are put forth in those articles?
The SGIR Review is a peer-reviewed journal recently registered with the Library of Congress, published by the SGIR, and working occasionally in cooperation with other journals in the field, such as Cambridge Journals’ Kantian Review. The SGIR Review currently focuses on publishing the symposium reviews from the SGIR Author Meets Critics sessions at the three APA meetings each year. We have just begun accepting nominations (and self-nominations) for a book review editor in order to gather reviews for the top five to eight books published in our field each year.
The SGIR Review also publishes special-topics issues. For instance, a special-topics issue on the a priori in feminism and race is forthcoming in August of this year. This issue will offer a diversity of perspectives on the potential contributions of the a priori tradition to the contemporary articulation of these topics, while also offering critiques of the misapplication of those very same principles (e.g. by Kant). The issue aims to be a helpful resource for those teaching college courses on either feminism and race, issues of equality, rights, or on the history of philosophy broadly. One core question that such an issue invites us to ask is this: what would be lost if we remove the a priori grounding of the equality of individuals as rationally necessitated ends in themselves? what are the sources of shortcomings in this tradition of thought? and how might they be overcome without losing the insights as we move forward?
The SGIR has a conference on Hegel and Freedom coming up in September. What research are you expecting to be presented there?
Hegel’s notion of freedom was of course deeply influenced by both Kant and Aristotle, but also by the artistic practices of the romantics, and particularly by Goethe’s notion of freedom as a realized activity of a deeply artistic life-growth. A distinctive of the SGIR’s conferences is that we give space not only for traditional philosophers, but also for scholars operating on the fringes of philosophy or even squarely in other fields of Germanic studies like literature and art. A portion of the talks are always selected through a double-blind review process. I anticipate the talks (invited and submitted) will represent a diversity of productive yet focused engagement on the kinds and significances of Hegel’s notion of freedom. To this end, I expect that this joint conference with the Hegel Society of Great Britain will be a productive and insightful opportunity for conversation. Next year (and the year after) the activities of the society will focus more on the romantics, but this year is a Hegel-heavy year.
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