During grad school, I was encouraged to teach a course on skepticism. I modeled the course on two seminars on skepticism I took during college.
Some students think philosophy is much easier than it really is. I know because I was one of them. Luckily, I was fixable. Some of my teachers, including my dissertation advisor, helped me to see that philosophical issues were often trickier than I initially thought. As a result, I try to build lessons so as to enable similar discoveries. This will involve, among other things, being prepared to explain why various common, tempting reactions to certain philosophical problems don’t work. (For example, when discussing the new riddle of induction, students will confidently assert that the key difference between ‘green’ and ‘grue’ is that only the latter is defined in terms of time. One had better be prepared with Goodman’s answer to this and a vivid way of illustrating why it’s convincing.)
Some of my favorite work in philosophy starts from innocent premises and proceeds to derive patently unacceptable conclusions from them. The last unit in particular includes some papers that epitomize this type of philosophy (see, e.g., Leslie 1991).
In the final unit, we consider a critique of traditional epistemology. Arguably, the course itself is within the scope of the critique. During discussion, I defended the author’s position from the students’ criticisms (as was the norm for us). In effect, I was advancing a pointed critique of my own course, and the students were playing defense. It felt like a healthy and constructive dynamic. Maybe a bit risky, but I’d do it again, and I’d extend the idea to other courses where appropriate.
When I was a student, Moore’s “proof” of an external world was something I loved to hate. But my students just really didn’t like it. I suppose I didn’t convey effectively what was interesting and important about Moore’s idea. I’ll have to rethink how to approach that reading.
My advice for those who hope to teach the course using my syllabus as a guide is to take only what you like; make it your own.
Here is the syllabus.
Unacceptable Conclusions: Introduction to Skepticism
Instructor: Zach Barnett <phizab@nus.edu.sg>
Meeting Time: TBA
Classroom:TBA
Office Hours: TBA
Course Description:
- War and Peaceis more than fifty pages long.
- The sun is more massive than the moon.
- What Hitler did was wrong.
Presumably, you take these things to be true. Quite probably, you take yourself to know that they’re true. The skeptic disputes this. This course introduces students to epistemology (the branch of philosophy devoted to studying knowledge and rationality) by examining powerful skeptical arguments for counterintuitive positions.
We will first consider skepticism in an extremely general form (“No one knows anything about the external world”) and then examine more specific challenges, with special regard to science (“Science does not give us knowledge”) and morality (“No one has moral knowledge”). Thereafter, we will consider a more recent form of skepticism stemming from disagreement (“No one knows anything about which there is widespread disagreement”), and then we will conclude with a smattering of relevant papers, including a discussion of whether philosophy can ever overturn common sense, as well as a critique of the very methods used in this course.
Attendance: Attendance is mandatory. If you expect to miss class, please contact me in advance. If you miss a class session unexpectedly, please get in touch to explain the absence.
Email: I aim (but do not promise) to respond to student emails within 24 hours. You may email me for any reason whatsoever – it needn’t relate to the course in any way.
Workload: Students will write three papers: one short (~1500 words) and two slightly longer (~2000 words). The papers will be assigned weeks 4, 7, 10, and 13. There will be four assignments, each focusing on a specific unit, and students will have to complete three of them.
Assignment 1 – External World Skepticism: due [TBA] (~1500 wds)
Assignment 2 – Science & Morality: due [TBA] (~2000 words)
Assignment 3 – Skepticism from Disagreement: due [TBA] (~2000 words)
Assignment 4 – Contemporary Debates: due [TBA] (~2000 words)
Students will be permitted to revise the first two papers they turn in.
Presentations: The final two class sessions are to be devoted to student presentations. Students will have the opportunity to present the strongest paper they wrote during the semester (~10 minutes per student). After presenting, students will field questions from their classmates and from me.
Disabilities: If you have a documented disability and wish to discuss academic accommodations, please contact me at your earliest convenience. If you do not have a documented disability but still would like to discuss the possibility of receiving individualized accommodations, please feel free to contact me.
Grading:
First paper (average of first draft and revisions) 15%
Second paper (average of first draft and revisions) 25%
Third paper (average of first draft and revisions) 25%
Final presentation 10%
Class participation (includes attendance, reading responses, discussion) 25%
Reading List:
Week 1: Introduction to Philosophy, Epistemology
– Introduction to central questions of the course.
– Primer on validity, soundness, and the goals of philosophical argumentation.
– What is knowledge? What is justified belief?
– Sextus Empiricus’ Regress Argument.
Weeks 2-4: External World skepticism, Replies
| René Descartes (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. (Meditations 1, 2) | A foundational piece, advancing a strong skeptical argument against knowledge with certainty. |
| G.E. Moore (1939). “Proof of an External World.” Philosophical Papers (126-148, 144-148). | Here is a hand; hands are external object. So an external world exists. |
| Peter Unger (1971). “A Defense of Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 80 (2): 198-219. | Argues that certainty is a necessary condition on knowledge, one which is never satisfied. |
| G.C. Stine (1976). “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” Philosophical Studies 29: 249-261. | Answers skepticism by appeal to context. Different standards apply in different situations. Some standards prevent us from knowing, but not all. |
| Jonathan Vogel (1989) “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Journal of Philosophy: 271–295. | Although skeptical hypotheses can explain all of our data, they do not provide the best explanation of it. |
| Hilary Putnam (1981) “Brains in a Vat,” Reason, Truth, and History (ch. 1, 1-21), Cambridge University Press. | Assumes Causal Theory of reference; argues that falsity of the Brain-in-vat hypothesis follows. |
Weeks 5-7: Science & Morality
| David Hume (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature (Book I, Part III, Section VI). | Infamous dilemma for inductive reasoning. Is the uniformity principle a priorior a posteriori? |
| Nelson Goodman (1983). “The New Riddle of Induction,” Fact, Fiction, and Forecast(ch. 3, 73–81). Harvard University Press. | Presents the grue riddle, which poses a challenge to induction even if Hume’s problem is solved. |
| Thomas Nagel (1974). “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83: 435–450. | Argues that science can never fully account for experience; some questions will remain unanswered. |
| Kathleen Akins (1993). “A Bat Without Qualities,” Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. (eds. M. Davies and G. Humphreys): 345–358. Blackwell. | An empirically informed response to Nagel’s skeptical claim about the prospects of a science of consciousness. |
| J.L. Mackie (1977). “The Subjectivity of Values: Moral Scepticism” Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (ch. 1, §1, §8, §9). Penguin Books. | Two important arguments against objectivity of value: from relativity and from queerness. |
| Sharon Street (2006). “Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think So?” (685–693). | Vividly develops a dilemma for “mind-independent” (roughly: ‘objective’) theories of value. |
Weeks 8-10: Skepticism from Disagreement
| Richard Feldman (2007). “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. (ed. L. Antony) 194-214. | Argues that it is not reasonable to maintain confidence in one’s view in the face of disagreement with an “epistemic peer.” |
| Peter van Inwagen (1996). “Is It Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence?” Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. (eds. J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder): 137–154. | Suggests that disagreement does not undermine justification, even when there is ample reason to respect your disagreer. |
| Thomas Kelly (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (eds. J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler) 167-196. | Argues that a person should stand her ground in the face of disagreement iff she reasoned well in the first place. |
| Adam Elga (2007). “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41: 478–502. | Argues for the “equal weight view” which says that, often, we must give disagreeing opinions equal weight. |
| Jennifer Lackey (2010). “What Should We Do When We Disagree?” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (eds. T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne) 274-293. | Argues that we should sometimes give respected disagreers equal weight and other times stand our ground. |
| Hilary Kornblith (2013). “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?” Disagreement and Skepticism (ed. D. Machuca) 260–276. | Argues that philosophical knowledge isn’t possible due to philosophy’s poor track record and lack of consensus. |
Weeks 11-13: Contemporary Discussions
| Elizabeth Anderson (1995). “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and Defense,” Hypatia 10: 50–84 (50–58; 70–79). | Offers an account of what “feminist epistemology” is, why it’s plausible, and how it informs critiques of traditional epistemology (like we’ve been doing in this course). |
| Susanna Rinard (2013). “Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology: 185-213. | Argues by analogy to science that philosophical discoveries should sometimes lead us to reject common sense beliefs. |
| John Leslie (1991). “Ensuring Two Bird Deaths with One Throw” Mind 100 (1): 73–86. | Uses powerful thought-experiment to motivate “quasi- causation,” a bizarre concept which can apparently be used to solve Newcomb’s Paradox. |
| Nick Bostrom (2003). “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?” Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 243–255. | A compelling case that we should believe ourselves to be living in a computer simulation. |
| Adam Elga (2004). “Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 383–396. | Argues that if Dr. Evil is stationed on the Death Star plotting our destruction, we can thwart him by making use of an epistemological principle pertaining to beliefs about oneselves. |
| Peter Unger (1979). “I Do Not Exist,” Perception and Identity (G.F. Macdonald, ed.): 235–251. | Pretty much what the title says. A fitting end to the course. |
The Syllabus Showcase of the APA Blog is designed to share insights into the syllabi of philosophy educators. We include syllabi that showcase a wide variety of philosophy classes. We would love for you to be a part of this project. Please email sabrinamisirhiralall@apaonline.org to nominate yourself or a colleague.
Zach Barnett
Zach Barnett teaches philosophy at the National University of Singapore. He has written about the epistemology of disagreement, the problem of induction, and vagueness in ethics. Before pursuing philosophy, Zach taught sixth-grade math full time.
