TeachingThe Godfather’s Mafia Meeting Scene: A Fictional Narrative of Hobbesian Contractarianism

The Godfather’s Mafia Meeting Scene: A Fictional Narrative of Hobbesian Contractarianism

Whenever I teach the undergraduate courses of Ethical Theory and Contemporary Social Ethics, I include The Godfather’s mafia meeting scene as part of these courses when we discuss the topic of Hobbesian contractarianism. In this scene, the mafia heads of the five families collectively negotiate for safeguarding their stakes in the crime business by bargaining over their mutual advantage. In doing so, they behave as the agents of harm for each other, in Hobbesian terms.

The Godfather’s mafia meeting scene simplifies the ethical matters of their business among the mafia heads of the five families, should one interpret it in the context of Hobbesian contractarianism. Although all stakeholders are present in the meeting, the main dialogue is between two mafia heads, namely Don Corleone and Philip Tattaglia, moderated by Don Barzini. Corleone puts the case of saving his son from his forced exile by negotiating with the mafia heads, who would be potential threats to his son’s life. His words reflect that the people attending the meeting do not find accept any moral values as having objective validity.

Rather, all of them believe in practicing a morality guided by their subjective priorities as individuals. The ethical point they are collectively making is that no one from amongst them ought to harm the others, lest one were to invite harm against oneself in the process. The tone of Corleone’s speech shows that he takes all mafia heads, including his major opponent Tattaglia, to be natural equals. This natural equality is defined as the capability of each to do violence to his others, which is the kernel of Hobbesian contractarianism. All mafia men are of the view that they are naturally equal in terms of their ability to harm each other physically, and the only way to protect themselves from that harm is to have a contract of not harming each other that is in their mutual advantage.

Don Corleone says that his attempt to have such a contract with other potential harmers is mainly guided by his will to protect his son’s life, who was forced to leave the country when he killed Tattaglia’s son, Sollozzo. In return the Tattaglia family killed Corleone’s son, Sonny Corleone.

At that moment, he not only theoretically refers to the Hobbesian notion of natural equality of human beings in terms of harming each other, but also nods to the notion of mutual advantage being the basic moral principle of Hobbesian contractarianism. Therefore, Corleone makes the point that it is in mutual advantage of all that they ought to refrain from harming one another. He swears on the soul of his grandchildren that he will not be the one to break the peace, and he simultaneously warns all that if anyone harms his son, Michael Corleone, that will be considered as breaking the contract of peace, and so it will be harmful for all. Tattaglia, responding to Corleone’s offer of the peace contract, asks that if Corleone sometime in the future become stronger, will he even then not break the peace? At that moment, Tattaglia refers, perhaps unwittingly, to the major drawback of Hobbesian contractarianism: If one observes that the other is fragile enough not to retaliate against any harms done to them, then it allows the one being strong to harm the other being weak.

Hobbesian contractarianism proposes that harming others is not inherently or naturally right or wrong. One can harm others without being conscious and cautious of honoring or not honoring a moral value, instead being solely motivated by the mutual advantage of all parties to the social contract. Therefore, it is not objectively normative to refrain from harming others; rather, this is simply the best option for the mutual existence of each party. It is an entirely selfish morality, one which works only so long as it remains in the interests of each party.

The Godfather’s mafia meeting scene demonstrates how the mafia leaders as individuals bargain over their mutual advantage at a convention of the criminal families in the community.

Such a communal-conventional outcome of bargaining, where individuals negotiate based on their equal power to harm each other, can be seen as a Hobbesian social contract. The details of their discussions further emphasize Hobbesian contractarianism. For instance, when Don Corleone offers to share his political and judicial connections with all mafia leaders, Don Barzini remarks that everyone must pay for this sharing, rejecting any notion of communal rights akin to communism. They perceive this mutually beneficial agreement as a ‘moral artifice’ [1] that restrains natural inclinations to harm others.

In this framework, refraining from harm isn’t an obligation owed to others but rather a strategic judgment influenced by one’s bargaining power. Corleone’s threat of retaliation if his son is harmed illustrates the artificial nature of their mutual agreement. It underscores that individuals are keenly aware that their provisional protection from harm hinges on their bargaining strength. This perspective challenges conventional notions of rights and duties, suggesting that those without sufficient bargaining power may forfeit their claims within such agreements.

A holistic view of The Godfather narrative reveals that Michael Corleone’s actions culminate in eliminating all major adversaries, knowing they lack the means to retaliate effectively. This outcome underscores the critical role of bargaining power in maintaining the equilibrium of mutual benefit.

Notes:

[1]: Gauthier judges that such a mutually advantageous convention is a ‘moral artifice,’ for it is seemingly providing a sort of moral code though it is ‘generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational choice.’ For this see Gauthier, D.: Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.4

References:

Hampton, J. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Riley, P. Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

Buchanan, J. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

Gauthier, D. Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Diggs, B.J. “A Contractarian View of Respect for Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 18 (1981).

Gough, J. W. The Social Contract, 2nd edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).


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Abdul Rahim Afaki
Abdul Rahim Afaki is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Karachi in Pakistan.

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