How You Can Wrong Every Member of a Group by Wronging Only One Member of That Group

Suppose a Latina woman walks down the street in a predominantly white neighborhood in the United States. A resident yells at her: “Go away! We don’t want job-stealing people like you around here!” 

I want to draw attention to three features of this case. First, the action is a wrong done to a person who is a member of a social group (Latinx people). Second, members of the group in this case are in a position of social inferiority in the society in which this wrong occurs. Third, facts about the group are essential to understand the kind of wrong it is.

Call actions that have these three features “group wrongs.” Unfortunately, group wrongs are common. Other examples include sexual harassment and assault of women, violent hate crimes committed against LGBTQ+ people, and racial slurs.

Group wrongs clearly wrong the direct victim they are committed against (e.g., the Latina woman). But, do they also wrong other members of the entire social group? And if so, which members of the group? I argue that group wrongs wrong not only the person they are committed against but also every member of the group to which this person belongs.

Let’s start with two intuitions about group wrongs that I think many of us share.

Intuition 1: These actions are wrong not merely because of some bad consequences they bring about.

In our example above, the action against the Latina woman is wrong not merely because it might harm her or encourage others to do similar things. Rather, there is something about the action that is wrong besides any of these consequences it might bring about. To motivate this intuition further, consider another case. Suppose a group of workers at a school for children with significant cognitive disabilities make fun of the children in ways that neither the children nor anyone else will ever know about. This is obviously wrong. Now, we could tell a story that says the wrongness really does come from some consequence. But I think the more intuitive answer is that we don’t need to look for further consequences. Many others agree and discuss cases of “harmless wrongdoing” and think that many social wrongs should be understood in these terms.

Intuition 2: These actions wrong every member of the group to which the direct victim belongs.

This intuition might seem more controversial. But on reflection, I think many of us share it. Consider responses people might have to the Latina woman’s harassment. Many of us would agree that other Latina women would have a stronger claim than non-Latinx people to demand an apology or make claims against the harasser. This happens frequently. Consider when public figures do something that wrongs some members of a social group (e.g., when they utter slurs or make sexist comments). Often, there is public backlash that demands not just an apology to the direct victim of the slur or sexist comment but also to all women or members of the racial group. For instance, the Indian opposition party argues that Prime Minister Modi “owes an apology to the women of India” for comments and allegedly sexist legislation.

One way you might want to explain group wrongs is by appealing to structure. Group wrongs involve members of groups which are socially inferior. Perhaps these actions contribute to entrenching the social structures that make them inferior. They, thus, might be thought to wrong every member of the group. Catharine MacKinnon can be seen as giving an argument of this sort when she argues that sexual harassment “uses, and helps create women’s structurally inferior status.”

I think that in many cases, group wrongs do contribute to unjust social structures. However, I don’t think this explanation can be the whole story. It is not clear that any one of these actions genuinely contributes to entrenching, perpetuating, or making the social structures worse. This is an example of “the problem of collective harm.” But, as we have seen, it seems intuitively plausible that group wrongs can be wrong even if they do not bring about bad consequences.

Another explanation you might opt for is based on attitudes. Many people think that when you do an action with an impermissible or ill-motivated attitude, this can be sufficient to make an action wrongful. Perhaps someone who commits a group wrong has an attitude of disregard for members of the group and thereby wrongs them all. Many people use this to explain why discrimination is wrong.

No doubt, many perpetrators of group wrongs have problematic attitudes about the members of the groups they commit their actions against. However, I don’t think that problematic attitudes are necessary for group wrongs. Consider a case in which someone uses a racial slur against a particular individual because he wants to hurt that particular individual. This person obviously has an objectionable attitude about the individual victim. But, it is possible he has nothing but good regard for every other member of the group and is motivated purely by the fact that he knows this slur will hurt this particular person. I still think that other members of the group have a claim that he has wronged them.

At this point one could always suggest that the fact that none of these accounts are successful gives us reason to give up one of our two intuitions. However, I think another explanation is available: group wrongs are wrongful (in part) because they constitute a social inequality. Since this social inequality is (primarily) wrongful because of what it does for members of the social group, group wrongs wrong every member of the social group. Let me unpack this.

The most important part of this idea is the distinction between an action constituting and an action causing social inequality. An action causes social inequality when it perpetuates, maintains, or further entrenches social inequalities. An action constitutes social inequality, however, when it is among the actions that social inequality consists of. For instance, women’s social inequality plausibly (partly) consists of a gendered wage gap in which equally qualified women are paid less than men. An action in which an employer pays an equally qualified woman less than a man constitutes women’s social inequality since it is one of the actions that women’s social inequality consists of. This is true even if this token instance in which a woman is paid less does not actually causally contribute to the social inequality of women. My suggestion is that group wrongs work in this way: Even when they do not cause a group’s social inequality, they can still constitute it.

The challenge for this suggestion is to explain why constituting social inequality is wrongful even when it does not cause social inequality. Here is an explanation I find plausible. Social inequality occurs in societies. There are certain ways that individuals are required to act where the source of this obligation comes from the fact that they are members of a particular society. There is a set of actions that individuals in a society are obligated to one another to act consistently with, where this set of actions comes from the values and norms of that society. Among this set of actions are actions that treat one another as social equals. An action which constitutes another’s social inequality is inconsistent with the way the individual is obligated to others to act. And so, when an individual does an action that constitutes another individual’s social inequality, this individual violates an obligation to other members of society that they owe in virtue of being a member of that society with norms and values of social equality.

The actions involved in group wrongs constitute social inequality in this way. Individuals are required not to do these sorts of actions (slurs, hate crimes, etc.) because the social norms and values of the society prohibit such inequalitarian behaviour. And so, doing one of these actions is wrong; it violates an obligation that members of the society have in virtue of being members of the society.

Okay, you might say, but why do these actions wrong every member of the group in particular? As we have seen, there seems to be an intuition that these actions wrong group members in distinctive ways. But if these actions are wrong because they violate an obligation one has in virtue of being in a society, why not say perpetrators owe this obligation to all members of society and thus wrong all members of society?

Here is my answer: These actions are wrong in multiple ways. One way they are wrong is because of what they do to the direct victims. Another is because they violate an obligation owed to all members of society. But, these actions are also wrong in another distinctive way based on what they do to group members in particular. My proposal is this: When an action is wrong because it violates an obligation not to do an action inconsistent with the norms and values of a society, this action wrongs all members of the society, but wrongs people disadvantaged by the norm or value it is inconsistent with to a greater degree than those not disadvantaged by the norm or value in question. To illustrate, consider an analogous case:

Pollution: Asami owns a factory located near a lake. Asami knowingly pollutes this lake to an extent that would be dangerous if everyone did it. This lake is near a city that contains two groups: Luckys and Unluckys. Because of a genetic quirk, Unluckys are likely to develop a fatal disease if they consume water polluted by the toxin Asami’s factory releases, whereas Luckys are not. Fortunately, Asami is the only one who pollutes the lake, and so the levels of toxins remain low enough that there is no increase in the likelihood that Unluckys develop this disease.

Asami violates an obligation to all members of the society—Luckys and Unluckys—not to pollute the lake. But, because she is the only one who pollutes, this action does not have any bad consequences. Yet, because she acts inconsistently with the values and norms of society (she fails to do her “fair share”), Luckys and Unluckys both have a valid complaint against her. Crucially, the norm that she violates is one that Unluckys are more vulnerable to; they stand to lose more by its violation. And so, I think it is intuitive that Unluckys have a greater and distinctive complaint as compared to Luckys.

There are, of course, disanalogies between Pollution and group wrongs. But I think Pollution supports the point I am arguing for. When an individual violates an obligation not to do an action that constitutes social inequality, violating this obligation wrongs all members of society, but wrongs those disadvantaged by that social inequality to a greater degree.

Putting this together, then, we get an explanation for why group wrongs wrong every member of the group. These actions constitute the social inequality of members of the group to which the person they are committed against belongs. They violate an obligation owed to members of the social group disadvantaged by that social inequality. And so, they wrong every member of the group to which the person they are committed against belongs.

Much more needs to be said. But if something like the picture I have sketched is correct, then certain actions can wrong every member of a group by wronging only one member of that group.

 

Thanks to Martina Valković for the invitation to contribute and for helpful editorial comments on a first draft.