Philosophy of science is no longer the austere discipline concerned with the study of the logical structure of scientific theories. Of course, philosophical debates about scientific laws, confirmation, explanation, and causality are as vivacious as ever and, if anything, they have grown in breadth, depth, and sophistication. But today philosophers are interested in more than theories and models. They also want to analyze how experiments are set up, conducted, and concluded; whether and how the social and material dimensions of research contribute to the reaching of epistemic objectives; what data are and how they are produced and managed; and so on. In short, many contemporary philosophers of science look at how actual science is conducted in practice.
In recent years, philosophers have also begun to look at the science/society relationship. For a long time, such a relationship was regulated by a social contract, which conceives science as a purely epistemic activity carried out within an isolated Ivory Tower. This model leaves scientists free to pursue the Truths of Nature, set up research priorities and choose methods, leaving to others (like politicians and policy makers) the responsibility of implementing their results. Since the application of the knowledge produced within the Ivory Tower, in one way or another, benefits society, society has the duty (and surely the interest) of supporting scientific research, for instance by allocating adequate funding.
The old social contract model is currently under scrutiny. Firstly, the traditional separation between “pure” and “applied knowledge”—including the precedence often granted to pure knowledge—is being increasingly questioned, particularly in the context of publicly funded Innovation and Development research projects. Furthermore, scientists can make evaluative errors, and these errors may have potentially harmful effects. Since scientists, like everybody else, have the moral duty to prevent harm, the idea that science should be conducted by socially insulated scientific communities, interested only in “purely epistemic matters,” appears even more untenable.
The dilemma of liberal democracies adds a further layer to the debate. On the one hand, politicians must seek and rely on experts’ advice when facing complex issues that require highly specialized knowledge. On the other hand, however, scientific experts may end up becoming an unelected elite, capable of influencing political decisions. Once again, the idea that science is a detached activity that provides impartial knowledge of pure facts to decision-makers looks untenable. It turns out that scientific experts are indeed actively involved in the political sphere, with some fearing that the line between giving advice and epistocracy is too easy to cross.
As a way out to this dilemma, several philosophers suggest discarding the old social contract and allowing the public to be directly involved in the scientific decision process. In his books Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) and Science in a Democratic Society (2011), Philip Kitcher develops the ideal of a “Well-Ordered Science.” In Kitcher’s ideal model, panels of tutored and well-informed citizens representing a multitude of values, interests, and standpoints, actively engage in a constructive and critical conversation with scientists. The outcome of such an engaged conversation would be a consensus about research priorities and methodological choices. So-called citizens’ “mini publics” are a way to implement this ideal in practice. In her book Politics and Expertise (2021), Zeynep Pamuk argues that similar initiatives are still not democratic enough, since mini publics are usually called to deliberate on the agenda that has already been set by scientific experts. She then proposes that citizens should initiate the critical conversation about matters that they find concerning. In her proposal, citizens set “science courts,” call on scientists to present the pro and contra of particular research strategies, and then let a popular jury make the final decision. These are only some examples of philosophers supporting and developing the ideal of a democratized science.
Philosophers are not alone in doing so. There is a huge literature in Science and Technology Studies and science policy that explores new models for the “co-production” of scientific knowledge and for a stronger engagement of scientists with citizens and other stakeholders. If anything, some would say that philosophers are late at joining the party (though I find these complaints overly exaggerated, considering that Kitcher and others have been working on these issues for at least the past twenty-five years). Scholars from all these disciplines propose different ways to democratize science. Some of their models may be far too idealized, so that it becomes difficult to see how they could be instantiated in practice. Yet, leaving aside the specific details of their proposals, they all agree on the very idea that the democratization of science is indeed a good thing (for both science and democracy).
One of the arguments in favor of democratization is that it would restore public trust in science. Ironically, this and similar arguments are developed at a time when there is a growing distrust towards democracy, with some scholars in political philosophy even claiming that we have entered a “post-democratic society.” If the public distrusts democratic institutions, why do we allow ourselves to think that it would be more inclined to trust democratized science?
Furthermore, far too often we witness democratically elected governments that encourage skepticism towards science, disseminate “alternative truths,” and even make up their own distinction between what is scientific and what is not—by declaring, for example, that climate science is a pseudo-science, driven by “ideology” rather than by the observation of pure facts. It is worth noting that these governments have gained power through traditional democratic institutional mechanisms. If democracy may lead to questionable governments, how can we be sure that it will make science more just? And how can we protect science from ever-growing (and ever-worrying) governments’ intrusions? In today’s world, epistocracy may not be the most pressing problem after all.
Philosophers have then two options. They may just bite the bullet: even though democratic institutions may lead to socially undesirable results, democracy is still the best available form of government—and, by reflex, of science governance, too. If anything, instead of giving up the idea of democratized science, we should all work for preserving democratic institutions from misuses and manipulations. In short, democracy is not perfect, but it is at least perfectible. While I am not suggesting giving up on the general idea of democracy, of course, I just wonder whether hoping for improved democratic institutions is all we can do as philosophers when considering the science/society relationship.
There is a second option: reconsidering the old idea of autonomous science. The traditional social contract model considered science as autonomous and socially insulated. However, it is worth stressing that such a model became popular in the aftermath of WWII, first in the U.S. public policy and then in the rest of the world. However, the idea of an autonomous science does not have to be linked to what is, after all, a recent and local public policy model. Conceptually speaking, autonomy does not imply disinterestedness, irresponsibility, or “social apathy.” The opposite could indeed be the case: that is, autonomy could be a prerequisite of responsibility. If only an autonomous and responsible agent can actively and constructively contribute to democracy, then we as philosophers should reflect on how to make science responsible, instead of simply following the trend of democratization in the sense of inserting the public in the scientific decision process.
Philosophers of science have criticized the scientific Ivory Tower. They have proposed democratization to bring scientists out of their tower and into the real world. They have done so, however, by presupposing an ideal and almost romanticized conception of democracy. If philosophers of science want to go full “political” and analyze the science/society relationship as it unfolds in the actual world, they may want to add a touch of “political realism” to their debates. This would require them to get out of their own Ivory Tower and look at the messy, complicated, and turbulent world we live in.
Vincenzo Politi
Vincenzo Politi is a philosopher of science who is currently exploring the political relations between science and society. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy of Science from the University of Bristol (UK) and has held research positions in Mexico, France, Norway and Spain. He is currently a research associate at the Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona (Spain) and, from 2025, he will be a Ramón y Cajal researcher at the Universidad de Sevilla (Spain).
